




FINDING IOC'S IN UNEXPECTED PLACES CTA THREAT INTELLIGENCE PRACTITIONERS' SUMMIT

John Alexander, CISSP & HCISPP Senior Information Security Engineer, Mayo Clinic

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LOG4J/LOG4SHELL CVE-2021-44228





https://spgcontrols.com/news/detect-and-mitigate-the-log4shell/



LOG4J / LOG4SHELL OBSERVED

- Searching for "jndi" references in SIEM logs
 - Identified attacked hosts as subdomains of another domain in DNS
 - Example: server.mayo.edu.some.other.domain
 - Some noise reduction necessary (e.g. some SAAS offerings)
- "Other Domains"
 - Typically, free public DNS request logging services
 - Often new domains, various hosting
 - DNS requests could represent attacked assets in near real time
 - Can we mine these for blocking and/or alerting?



THREAT INTELLIGENCE PRACTITIONERS' SUMMIT

LOG4J / LOG4SHELL CONJECTURE

- Insecure by Design?
 - Multi-Actor Coordination?
 - Perhaps Bot/Scanners to find vulnerable
 - Plausible Deniability / Burnable Initial Sources
 - DNS request logging services for collecting hostnames
 - Possible follow-up by others for more payloads



LOG4J / LOG4SHELL SIEM SWIMMING

- Searched for our domains as subdomains of others
 - Intentionally Broad Search
 - Hosts, DNS, Processes, URLs, anything...
- Unexpected Finding: Email Logs
 - Hosts were not vulnerable
 - Hosts had error reporting enabled via email
 - Error condition encountered was in the Subject of the email




LOG4J / LOG4SHELL CONCLUSIONS

- Inadvertent Honeypots
 - Non-vulnerable systems with error reporting enabled & configured
- IOCs
 - Blocking to detect & protect vulnerable assets
 - One domain identified, was not yet listed in our TI feeds (at that time)
- Theoretical Risk
 - Circumvention/Amplification What if one of our email processing systems or email recipient clients had Log4J trigger off of an email?



QUESTIONS & ANSWERS



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