Everything happens for a reason

The choices made by ransomware operators

PwC Threat Intelligence

TLP:WHITE

October 2023





Introductions



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PwC

Been in the team for 4 years focusing on Ransomware-as-a-Service threat actors

- · Malware reverse engineering
- Confuses International Relations with Incident Response
- Always happy to discuss the Rugby World Cup
- Sorry for all the coughing



@Katechondic



PwC Threat Intelligence

Strategic and Technical roles Global

Threat research used by public and private sector organisations to protect networks, defend nations, provide situational awareness & inform strategy.

- Team members spread across 8 countries and 3 continents
- Focus on both technical and strategic analysis
- Cross-collaboration alongside intel partners
- Support to IR, red teams, threat hunting teams etc.

Why are we here? The agenda of this presentation




The-Ransomware-as-a service universe


The Exosphere

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The Exosphere A top down view of our world (the RaaS ecosystem)

Framing the RaaS Space - perspective





Things are bad...real bad

01

Lack of law enforcement presence

Law Enforcement has not been the omnipotent presence it once was to criminals - there is an emboldened sense of untouchability

enforcement presentent More actors

than ever

02

More actors than ever before

The number of consolidated actors in this space has grown by double (depending on how one measures "consolidated")

2023 RaaS ecosystem

03

Experience is transferred


Even as new programmes are created as older ones are closed down, the experience of the members involved does not disappear

CAPPETENCE IS THE CO

04

Extortion is king

Whilst encryption is still a large part of the RaaS ecosystem, operators are starting to make a turn towards the "data" element being most important






Run uTorrent and select File > Add Torrent from URL



Paste magnet URL to the Add Torrent from URL dialog box and click \mathbf{OK} button



tix.com

synlab.fr

rhenus.group

pbinfo.com

payback.group

payback.group

mesvision.com

informa.com

STEP 1

Download and install free uTorrent client

(if you don't already have it)

https://www.utorrent.com/downloads/ Or any other torrent client that you prefer

List of available calls

Route		Descrption	Notice	
GET	/api/robot/blog/updates/{epoch_millis}	Brief information about articles created or updated since {epoch_millis}	size <= 1000	
GET	/api/blog/{id}	Article with {id}		
GET	/api/blog/attachment?id={id}	Article attachment with {id}		
GET	/api/blog/all/{from}/{size}	Articles starting (from) with page (size)	size <= 9	
GET	/api/blog/brief/{from}/{size}	Brief information about articles starting (from) with page (size)	size <= 1000	

Usage

Collections

Blog

Fetch updates since the beginning and synchronize each article with your database.

After that any subsequent updates call should supply the most recent `updatedDt` from previously synchronized articles + 1 millisecond.

Migration

We have introduced `updatedDt` field to the article, combine it with new updates call to make your crawler updates aware. As a temporary quick fix you can simply replace the route `\api/blog/all-brief` with `\api/blog/brief/0/1000`.

Also notice that we have limited page size of `\api/blog/all` call to 9 articles.

Example

Download simple crawler implementation written in Python.

import datetime
import http
import json
import logging
import time
import urllib.parse
from http import client

BION 2

Launched in 2014, BionPharma was founded by a team of executives and professionals with years of cumulative experience in the generics industry. Bionpharma's goals are to develop and commercialize affordable quality generics and building strong and effective partnerships. Based in Princeton, New Jersey, and with offices in Raleigh, North Carolina BionPharma is licensed to do business in the United States and is accomplished in the areas of

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EDVMS

Als BSB-Steuerberatungsgesellschaft mbH betreuen wir seit über 30 Jahren Unternehmen und Privatpersonen. Dabei fokussieren wir uns vor allem auf gewerbliche Steuerberatung, Lohnbuchhaltung sowie die Betreuung von land- und forstwirtschaftlichen Betrieben. Die enge Zusammenarbeit mit unseren Mandanten ist uns besonders wichtig. Durch unseren Verwaltungssitz mitten in Münster sowie 25 Niederlassungen, in Münster, im Münsterland und in

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TWINTOWER

1 2 ... 31 >

Since its inception in 1993 when it was located in New York City, Twin Towers Trading has been setting the standard in the field of live demonstrations. Whether on television or in retail environments, TTT has garnered a well-deserved reputation for presenting unique products with dynamic and engaging presentations referred to as "retailtainment." Millions of people are enthralled yearly, and today, in addition to its corporate headquarters in Manalapan, New Jersey TTT's offices in Sarasota, Las

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VDVEN

Van der Ven Auto's is marktleider in milieuvriendelijke autorecycling. En daar zijn we best trots op. Elke sloopauto wordt vakkundig ontdaan van onder meer aanwezige vloeistoffen en accu, en vervolgens nog verder minutieus gestript. In samenwerking met Auto Recycling Nederland (ARN) wordt dankzij deze highend werkwijze een recyclingpercentage behaald van 95% op het totaalgewicht van een demontagevoertuig. Samen streven we naar een groene automotive. Wij hetalen een marktconforme priis

> Published Visits 0% 8558

> > Read more


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small and medium-sized businesses, we can offer you investment solutions that are right

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AKIRA]



Well, you are here. It means that you're suffering from cyber incident right now. Think of our actions as an unscheduled forced audit of your network for vulnerabilities. Keep in mind that there is a fair price to make it all go away.

Do not rush to assess what is happening - we did it to you. The best thing you can do is to follow o ur instructions to get back to your daily routine, by cooperating with us you will minimize the dama ge that might be done.

Those who choose different path will be shamed here publicly. The functionality of this blog is extremely simple - enter the desired command in the input line and enjoy the juiciest information that c orporations around the world wanted to stay confidential.

Remember. You are unable to recover without our help. Your data is already gone and cannot be traced to the place of final storage nor deleted by anyone besides us.

guest@akira:~\$ help

List of all commands:

leaks - hacked companies

news - news about upcoming data releases

contact - send us a message and we will contact you

help — available commands

clear - clear screen

guest@akira:~\$



The Thermosphere RaaS encryption binaries and what we can learn



What makes a RaaS binary?

- RaaS binaries are a product, requiring a modicum of flexibility and ease of use
- The malware is a representation of a developer's thought process
- Things I watch out for:
 - Flags
 - Filesize delimiters
 - Trial and error "unique" functions
 - Always start with version 1.0 of any binary

```
bx, di
text:0040304C
                              cmp
                                      short loc 403056; Ukraine
text:0040304F
                              inz
text:00403051
text:00403051 loc 403051:
                                                       ; CODE XREF: LanguageCheck+391
text:00403051
text:00403056 :
text:00403056
text:00403056 loc 403056:
                                                      ; CODE XREF: LanguageCheck+3E1
text:00403056
                                      bl, 3Bh
                                                       : Ukraine
                              XOL
text:00403059
                                      bx, si
                              cmp
                                      short loc_403063
text:0040305C
                              jz
                                      bx, di
text:0040305E
                              cmp
                                      short loc_403068 ; Belarus
text:00403061
                              jnz
text:00403063
text:00403063 loc 403063:
                                                       ; CODE XREF: LanguageCheck+481
text:00403063
text:00403068 ;
text:00403068
                                                       ; CODE XREF: LanguageCheck+501
text:00403068 loc 403068:
                                      bl
text:00403068
                              inc
                                                      : Belarus
text:0040306A
                                      bx, si
                              cmp
text:0040306D
                              jz
                                      short loc 403074
                                      bx, di
text:0040306F
                              CMP
text:00403072
                                      short loc 403079 ; Tajikistan
                              jnz
text:00403074
text:00403074 loc 403074:
                                                       ; CODE XREF: LanguageCheck+5C1
text:00403074
                              jmp
text:00403079 :
text:00403079
text:00403079 loc_403079:
                                                       ; CODE XREF: LanguageCheck+611
text:00403079
                                      bl, ØBh
                                                       ; Tajikistan
                              xor
text:0040307C
                                      bx. si
                              CMD
                                      short loc_403086
text:0040307F
                              jz
```

```
u 🏄 🔀
                                 loc 49309C:
                                                        ; ulRID
                                        220h
                                 push
                                 push
                                                        ; hToken
                                        SHTestTokenMembership
                                 call
                                 cmp
                                         eax, 1
                                        byte ptr [esp+8]
                                 setz
                                        eax, ds:set_flag_logging
                                        eax, 3
                                 cmp
                                         loc 493183
lea
       eax, [esp+8]
       ecx, offset aCargoRegistryS; "/cargo/registry/src/github.com-lecc6299"...
mov
lea
       edx, [esp+0C0h]
       [esp+0C0h], eax
mov
```

dword ptr [esp+24h], offset off 680360; "token is admin="

dword ptr [esp+1Ch], offset aLockerCoreOsWi 5 ; "locker::core::os::windows::privilege es"...

dword ptr [esp+0C4h], offset sub_45ED20

dword ptr [esp+20h], 2Fh; '/'

eax, ds:dword_6EE078 dword ptr [esp+18h], 3

dword ptr [esp+28h], 1 dword ptr [esp+2Ch], 0

mov

mov

```
; BOOL mw_test_token_memberhsip()
mw_test_token_memberhsip proc near
push 220h ; ulRID
push 0 ; hToken
call SHTestTokenMembership
retn
mw_test_token_memberhsip endp
```

BlackBasta

A consistent middle-of-the-pack RaaS binary

BlackBasta, a fully fledged programme


- BlackBasta first appeared in April of 2022 after Conti collapse
- Conti and Basta highly likely share leadership (at least in 2022)
- Basta leak site victims peak and trough over time, but have averaged 23.5 victims per month since Feb 2023
 - Compare that with:

■ Alphv: 34.9


■ LockBit: 94.4

Royal/Blacksuit: 14.0

■ Karakurt: 3.4




Relation between Conti and Basta



```
if ( *first char cmd line == 45 )
    if (argc <= i + 1)
      mw memmove(v18, first char cmd line);
      LOBYTE(v19) = 2;
      *sub_102AEA0(v18) = byte_1090C84;
      LOBYTE(v19) = 0:
      sub 1029610(v18);
      mw memmove(v17, first_char_cmd_line);
      LOBYTE(v19) = 1;
      v6 = sub 102AEA0(v17);
      LOBYTE(v19) = 0;
      sub 1029610(v17);
v7 = mw memmove(v18, "-forcepath");
LOBYTE(v19) = 3;
5UD 1024AA0(V14, &V10, V/);
LOBYTE(v19) = 0;
sub 1029610(v18);
v8 = sub 1036F10(v14, &v15);
if ( unknown libname 1(v8) )
  v9 = sub 102AF20(&v16);
  sub 102A410(dword 10A724C, *(v9 + 24));
  v10 = mw memmove maybe(dword 10A9670, "Forced path: ");
  v11 = sub 10226A0(v10, dword 10A724C);
  sub 102A8D0(v11, sub 1024910);
mw make new service fax restart(v12, v13);
 Liverything happens for a reason
```

```
if ( !StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW(&ServiceStartTable) )
 v5 = OpenSCManagerW(0, 0, 0xF003Fu);
   if ( GetLastError() == 5 )
     v6 = mw memmove maybe(dword 10A9670)
                                           "Please run program as admin");
     LastError = GetLastError();
     mw memmove maybe(dword 10A9670 "Cant open scm manager: ");
     v6 = sub 102A700(LastError);
   sub 102A8D0(v6, sub 1024910);
   loaddll(0);
 mw delete shadow copies();
 phkResult = &v18;
 mw maths and memmove(&v18, &xmmword 10A71D4);
 v31 = 0;
 v28 = v17;
 mw maths and memmove(v17, &lpServiceName);
 v31 = -1:
 if ( mw service stuff(v5, v17[0], v17[1], v17[2], v17[3], v17[4], v17[5],
   SystemMetrics = GetSystemMetrics(SM CLEANBOOT);
   bootMode = SystemMetrics;
   boot option string = mw memmove maybe(dword 10A9670, "Boot option; ");
   printedBootMode = makePretty(boot option string, bootMode);
   v10 = sub 103D330(&printedBootMode[*(*printedBootMode + 4)], 10);
   sub 103AB20(printedBootMode, v10);
   sub 10376E0(printedBootMode);
   if ( !SystemMetrics )
```



V2.0 improved features substantially

```
v5 = nNumberOfBytesToRead;
v12 = 0:
v6 = unknown libname 58(nNumberOfBytesToRead);
Overlapped.hEvent = 0;
Overlapped.8 = a2:
*&Overlapped.Internal = 0i64;
NumberOfBytesRead = 0;
ReadFile(hFile, v6, v5, &NumberOfBytesRead, &Overlapped);
mw CryptFile(v6, v6, v5);
WriteFile(hFile, v6, v5, &NumberOfBytesRead, &Overlapped);
j j free(v6);
nNumberOfBytesToRead += *&a2;
*&v9.Internal = 0i64;
v9.hEvent = 0;
v9.8 = (a4 + 292);
a2.OffsetHigh = 0;
WriteFile(hFile, &nNumberOfBytesToRead, 8u, &a2.OffsetHigh, &v9);
v7 = a5:
*a5 = &CryptoPP::SymmetricCipherFinal<CryptoPP::ConcretePolicyHolder<CryptoPP::
v7[1] = &CryptoPP::SymmetricCipherFinal<CryptoPP::ConcretePolicyHolder<CryptoPF</pre>
v7[2] = &CryptoPP::SymmetricCipherFinal<CryptoPP::ConcretePolicyHolder<CryptoPF</pre>
v7[8] = &CryptoPP::SymmetricCipherFinal<CryptoPP::ConcretePolicyHolder<CryptoPF</pre>
return sub 1000EFA0();
```

```
sub 100111B0(v25, FileW, &v45);
   highPart = v66:
   if ( v66 <= 0 )
     if ( v66 < 0 || LowPart < 5000 )
       v57 = 0x40590000000000000164;
fileOver1GB:
       v86 = 0i64:
       howBigIsFile = 0;
       goto encryptionSections;
     if ( LowPart <= 0x400000000 )
       goto fileOver1GB;
   *v57 = 0x3FF00000000000000164:
   v32 = sub 1000DB90(v49, &v67);
   mw encrypt(FileW, 0i64, 5000i64, SPAIR64 (v66, LowPart), v32);
   highPart = v66:
   howBigIsFile = 5000:
encryptionSections:
   v59 = 0:
   v29 = ( PAIR64 (highPart, LowPart) - howBigIsFile) / 64;
   v63 = HIDWORD(v29);
   v65 = v29:
   *v57 = *v57 * 0.01:
   v30 = (v29 * *v57);
   if ( v30 )
     v62 = ( SPAIR64 (v63, v65) / v30) >> 32;
     *&v57[4] = SPAIR64 (v63, v65) / v30;
     if ( SPAIR64 (v63, v65) / v30 )
```

C:\Users\Cyber\Desktop>"Basta ransomware October.exe" -encryptionpercent
File encription percent: 0
RELEASE BUILD
ENCRYPTION

Flag	Functionality
-bomb	Active Directory access only, proliferates malware through wldap32.lib library
-killservices	Kill specific services
-forceprivate <key></key>	Allows for the choice of a private key
-forcepath <folderpath></folderpath>	Encrypt files within a specific folder path
-nomutex	Skips creation of the mutex
-disablewhitelist	Not fully functional; removed from newest version
-file <filepath></filepath>	Encrypt a specific file
-threads <number></number>	Launch with a specific number of threads

But wait there's more - ESXi and "3.0"

```
std::basic string<>::basic string(local 48,"-forcepath");
 uVar8 = std::_Hash_bytes(local_48[0],*(local_48[0] + -0x18),0xc70f6907);
 uVar10 = DAT 0062c708;
 uVar7 = uVar8 % DAT 0062c708;
 pplVar2 = *(argList + uVar7 * 8);
 if (pplVar2 != 0x0) {
   plVar9 = *pplVar2;
   uVar6 = p1Var9[3];
   do {
     if (uVar6 == uVar8) {
       if ((*(local 48[0] + -0x18) == *(plVar9[1] + -0x18)) &&
          (iVar3 = memcmp(local_48[0], plVar9[1], *(local_48[0] + -0x18)), iVar3 == 0)) {
         if (local 48[0] != &DAT 0062c5d8) goto LAB 004045f9;
         goto LAB 0040459f;
     plVar9 = *plVar9;
   } while ((plVar9 != 0x0) && (uVar6 = plVar9[3], uVar7 == uVar6 % uVar10));
 if (local 48[0] != &DAT 0062c5d8) {
   plVar9 = 0x0;
_AB 004045f9:
   std::basic_string<>::_Rep::_M_dispose(local_48[0] + -0x18);
   if (plVar9 != 0x0) {
_AB 0040459f:
     std::basic_string<>::assign(&forcedPath);
     pbVar5 = std::operator<<(&std::cout, "Forced path: ");</pre>
     pbVar5 = std::_ostream_insert<>(pbVar5,forcedPath,*(forcedPath + -0x18));
     std::endl<>(pbVar5);
 AutoBuilderProcess();
 return 0;
```

```
std::basic string<>::basic string(local 48,"-forcepath");
 uVar8 = std:: Hash bytes(local 48[0],*(local 48[0] + -0x18),0xc70f6907);
 uVar10 = DAT 0062c708;
 uVar7 = uVar8 % DAT 0062c708;
 pplVar2 = *(argList + uVar7 * 8);
 if (pplVar2 != 0x0) {
   plVar9 = *pplVar2;
   uVar6 = p1Var9[3]:
   do {
     if (uVar6 == uVar8) {
      if ((*(local 48[0] + -0x18) == *(plVar9[1] + -0x18)) &&
          (iVar3 = memcmp(local_48[0], plVar9[1], *(local_48[0] + -0x18)), iVar3 == 0)) {
         if (local 48[0] != &DAT 0062c5d8) goto LAB 004045f9:
         goto LAB 0040459f;
     plVar9 = *plVar9;
   } while ((plVar9 != 0x0) && (uVar6 = plVar9[3], uVar7 == uVar6 % uVar10));
 if (local 48[0] != &DAT 0062c5d8) {
   plVar9 = 0x0;
AB 004045f9:
   std::basic string<>:: Rep:: M dispose(local 48[0] + -0x18);
   if (plVar9 != 0x0) {
AB 0040459f:
     std::basic string<>::assign(&forcedPath);
     pbVar5 = std::operator<<(&std::cout, "Forced path: ");</pre>
     pbVar5 = std:: ostream insert<>(pbVar5,forcedPath,*(forcedPath + -0x18));
     std::endl<>(pbVar5);
AutoBuilderProcess();
return 0;
```

```
first char cmd line = v3[i];
  if ( *first char cmd line == 45 )
    if (argc <= i + 1)
      mw memmove(v18, first char cmd line);
      LOBYTE(v19) = 2;
      *sub 102AEA0(v18) = byte 1090C84;
      LOBYTE(v19) = 0:
      sub 1029610(v18);
      mw memmove(v17, first char cmd line);
      LOBYTE(v19) = 1;
      v6 = sub 102AEA0(v17);
      LOBYTE(v19) = 0;
      sub 1029610(v17);
v7 = mw memmove(v18, "-forcepath");
LOBYTE(v19) = 3;
sub 1024AA0(v14, &v16, v7);
LOBYTE(v19) = 0;
sub 1029610(v18);
v8 = sub 1036F10(v14, &v15);
if ( unknown libname 1(v8) )
  v9 = sub 102AF20(&v16);
  sub 102A410(dword 10A724C, *(v9 + 24));
  v10 = mw memmove maybe(dword 10A9670, "Forced path: ");
  v11 = sub 10226A0(v10, dword 10A724C);
  sub 102A8D0(v11, sub 1024910);
mw make new service fax restart(v12, v13);
```

```
TickCount = GetTickCount();
mw args(v26, v27);
mw mutex();
sub 40B760(L"Checking arguments\n", v26);
if ( dword 4C0254 )
 HIDWORD(v25) = \&dword 4C0244;
  if ( dword 4C5BF0 == dword 4C5BF4 )
    sub 401EC0(dword 4C5BF0, HIDWORD(v25));
    mw confirmICOExists(HIDWORD(v25));
    dword 4C5BF0 += 24;
else
  v0 = sub 407950(0x20u);
 v39 = 21;
  v40 = 31:
  strcpy(v0, "c:/users/public/music");
 Block = v0:
 v41 = 1:
  sub 403250(v26, v27);
  sub 408EF0(&Src, Block, Block + 21);
  sub 403FD0(v32);
  v1 = dword 4C5BF0;
  LOBYTE(v41) = 2;
  if ( dword 4C5BF0 == dword 4C5BF4 )
```

```
tickCount = GetTickCount();
mw loadArgs();
mw CreateMutex();
mw createICOTemp(Src);
mw confirmICOExists(&v37, Src);
mw_SetICOAsDefaultIcon(v37, v38, v39, v40, v41, HIDWORD(v41));
sub 1000BDD0(L"Checking arguments\n");
if ( dword 100C2254 )
 HIDWORD(v41) = %dword 100C2244;
  if ( dword 100C7D60 == dword 100C7D64 )
    sub 10001EF0(&::Src, dword 100C7D60, HIDWORD(v41));
    mw confirmICOExists(dword 100C7D60, HIDWORD(v41));
   dword 100C7D60 += 24;
  mw GetVolumeInfo(&v63);
  v0 = v63;
 v1 = 0:
  if ((v64 - v63) / 24)
   v2 = 0:
     HIDWORD(v41) = &v0[v2];
      if ( dword 100C7D60 == dword 100C7D64 )
       sub 10001EF0(&::Src, dword 100C7D60, HIDWORD(v41));
      else
```




Akira

The new darling child of the RaaS landscape

Akira - too successful to be new?

- Akira first appeared in April of 2023 seemingly out of nowhere
- Akira highly likely makes use of Conti developer/leadership
- Akira has become a "consolidated" ransomware programme with a potential political leaning
- Akira has reactive codebase developers, altering encryption mechanisms once it is proven to be flawed.



Affiliate Management and political leanings



Akira's codebase links to Conti

```
BYTE * fastcall mw_stringDecrypt(_BYTE *string)
 // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
 v1 = string + 1;
 if ( *string )
  return v1:
 string plus 1 = string + 1;
 v3 = 16i64:
 do
   v4 = *string plus 1++;
   *(string plus 1 - 1) = (7 * (v4 - 47) % 127 + 127) % 127;
   --v3;
while ( v3 );
```

Akira's codebase links to Conti

```
string[16] = 7;
string[17] = 29;
string[18] = 0;

for ( i = 0i64; i < 0x12; ++i )
    string[i] = (41 * (string[i] - 29) % 127 + 127) % 127;
    if ( !sub_180001B10(qword_180007018, dword_180003004, string) )
        break;
    ++v0;
}
while ( v0 < dword_180007014 );
return 1i64;</pre>
```

Akira's codebase links to Conti

```
MILTITE ( T )
 v67[3] = 0;
                                                                                                         Trickbot
 qmemcpy(string, "}\nKKy @tu*5@J\adt", 16);
 string[16] = 22;
 string[17] = 12;
 string[18] = 43;
 string[19] = 1;
 qmemcpy(v69, "dL", sizeof(v69));
 tor ( i = 0164; i < 0x16; ++i )
   v5 = 12 * (string[i] - 76) % 127 + 127;
   string[i] = v5
              - 127 * (((((2164392969164 * v5) >> 32) & 0x80000000) != 0164) + (((2164392969164 * v5) >> 32) >> 6));
 v6 = sub 18001753C(v83, string, 21i64);
 v7 = sub 1800175D0(v6);
 v8 = sub 1800175D0(a2);
 v9 = sub 1800113F4();
 v10 = v9(v8, v7);
 sub 1800175AC(v83);
 if ( v10 )
   break;
 alsoString[2] = 0;
 alsoString[3] = 11:
 qmemcpy(&alsoString[4], "/IQ/Ic", 6);
  Tor ( ] = 0164; ] < /; ++] )
   v12 = 63 * (99 - alsoString[j + 3]) % 127 + 127;
   alsoString[j + 3] = v12
                     * (((((2164392969i64 * v12) >> 32) & 0x80000000) != 0i64) + (((2164392969i64 * v12) >> 32) >> 6));
```

Akira's codebase links to Conti

```
string[11] = 13;
string[12] = 13;
                                                                                        Conti
string[13] = 13;
for ( i = 0i64; i < 0xE; ++i )
 v11 = (unsigned int)(unsigned __int8)string[i] - 13;
 string[i] = (15 * (int)v11 % 127 + 127) % 127;
VIZ = "( QWUKD ")V/;
v13 = (unsigned int ( fastcall *)( int64, char *))sub 180004840(v11, 15i64, 3446876362i64, 81i64);
if ( v13(v12, string) )
 v27[7] = 0;
 gmemcpy(v28, "%$%$$$", 6):
 for (j = 0.64; j < 6; ++j)
    alsoString = (unsigned int)((35 * (36 - (unsigned __int8)v28[j]) % 127 + 127) % 127);
   v28[j] = alsoString;
```

Everything happens for a reason PwC Threat Intelligence

Akira's codebase links to Conti

Everything happens for a reason PwC Threat Intelligence


Akira has proven a malleable developer

```
if ( !CryptAcquireContextW(&phProv, 0i64, L"Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provide
  goto LABEL 101;
if ( !CryptStringToBinaryA(pszString, 0, CRYPT STRING BASE64HEADER, pbBinary, &pcbBinary, 0i64,
  goto LABEL 101;
v34 = X509 ASN ENCODING;
if ( !CryptDecodeObjectEx(
       X509 ASN ENCODING,
       8.
                                                 memset(a1->key 0x20C, 0, 0x20Cui64);
       pbBinary,
                                                 CPAcquireContext = a1->field 69;
       pcbBinary.
       CRYPT DECODE ALLOC FLAG,
                                                 v131 = CPAcquireContext;
       0164.
                                                 if ( !CPAcquireContext )
       &pInfo.
       &pcbStructInfo)
                                                   if ( *p encryptSize )
     !CryptImportPublicKeyInfo(phProv, X509 ASM
                                                     (**p memset address)(&a1->field 80);
     (v35 = phProv, CGPGenKey = phKey, !phProv)
                                                   v10 = &a1->field 7C;
     IphKey
     (memset(v136, 0, 0x234ui64), !CryptGenRanc
                                                   goto LABEL 301;
     !CryptGenRandom(v35, 8u, v136)
     (*&v136[40] = *&v136[8],
                                                 if (!CryptGenRandom(*CPAcquireContext, 32u, &a1-> 0)
      *&v136[56] = *&v136[24],
                                                       !CryptGenRandom(*v131, 8u, &a1-> 0) // 40 bytes total
      *&v136[72] = *v136.
                                                      (v130 = *&a1-)field 148.
     pdwDataLen = 40,
                                                       *a1->key 0x20C = *&a1-> 0,
      !CryptEncrypt(CGPGenKey, 0i64, X509 ASN E
                                                       a1->field 168 = v130.
                                                       a1->field 178 = a1-> 0,
                                                       a1 -> 40 = 40
                                                       !CryptEncrypt(v131[1], 0i64, 1, 0, a1->key 0x20C, &a1-> 40, 0x20Cu)) )
```



Rhysida - the reality of the 2023 landscape

- A private RaaS appearing in May 2023
- Has observed success based on the leak site numbers
- The leak site itself displays victim data in a user friendly format; but bulk collection is not immediately possible.
- The codebase is not advanced, but proof that one merely needs a functional encryptor.



Very few customisable options

```
*a3->mallocd mem also = 0;
a3->delete sef = 1;
a3->no wallpaper = 1;
a3 - > md5 = 0;
a3->scheduled task = 0;
strcpy(v6, "-d");
strcpy(&v5[6], "-sr");
strcpy(v5, "-nobg");
strcpy(&v4[3], "-md5");
strepy(v4, "-S");
for ( *&v6[7] = 0; ; ++*&v6[7] )
  result = *&v6[7];
  if ( *&v6[7] >= argc )
    break:
  if ( *&v6[7] )
    if (!strcmp(argv[*&v6[7]], v6))
      ++*&v6[7];
      if ( argv[*&v6[7]] )
        strcpy(a3->mallocd mem also, argv[*&v6[7]]);
        *&v6[3] = 0;
        while ( *&v6[3] < strlen(a3->mallocd mem also) )
          if ( *(a3->mallocd mem also + *&v6[3]) == '\\' )
            *(a3->mallocd mem also + *&v6[3]) = 47;
          ++*&v6[3];
        if ( *(a3->mallocd mem also + strlen(a3->mallocd mem also) - 1) == '/' )
          *(a3->mallocd mem also + strlen(a3->mallocd mem also) - 1) = 0;
```

Flags set in a very "1.0" way

```
*a3->mallocd mem also = 0;
a3->delete sef = 1;
a3->no wallpaper = 1;
a3 - > md5 = 0;
a3->scheduled task = 0;
strcpy(v6, "-d");
strcpy(&v5[6], "-sr");
strcpy(v5, "-nobg");
strcpy(&v4[3], "-md5");
strcpy(v4, "-S");
for (*&v6[7] = 0; ; ++*&v6[7])
  result = *&v6[7];
  if ( *2\sqrt{6}[7] >= argc )
    break:
  if ( *&v6[7] )
    if (!strcmp(argv[*&v6[7]], v6))
      ++*&v6[7];
      if ( argv[*&v6[7]] )
        strcpy(a3->mallocd mem also, argv[*&v6[7]]);
        *&v6[3] = 0;
        while ( *&v6[3] < strlen(a3->mallocd mem also) )
          if ( *(a3->mallocd mem also + *&v6[3]) == '\\' )
            *(a3->mallocd mem also + *&v6[3]) = 47;
          ++*&v6[3];
        if ( *(a3->mallocd mem also + strlen(a3->mallocd mem also) - 1) == '/' )
          *(a3->mallocd mem also + strlen(a3->mallocd mem also) - 1) = 0;
```

The Troposphere How the affiliates are behaving and what we can do

Affiliate TTPs - the good, the bad, and the worrying


Depending on the initial access vector, execution is being conducted through Domain/Local Account (i.e. scheduled tasks and modified GPOs).

This phase is often completed with the help of tooling; often offensive security tools (several entities will use their own tooling, but there is a lot of opportunity for detection here)

Initial Access Execution Persistence Discovery/Credential Command & Control

Initial access methods are becoming oriented away from phishing (sorry vishing stans). Odays, externally facing vulns, legitimate credentials, third party compromise, and information stealers

Persistence is often achieved through legitimate accounts - either previously established or created during this phase. This phase is often completed with the help of tooling; often often offensive security tools (several entities will use their own tooling, but there is a lot of opportunity for detection here)




- Open ports should be closed
- Multi factor authentication implemented across all logins
- Automated and continuous vulnerability scanning of internet-facing infrastructure
- Oof, this one is tricky
- Patching at the instruction of the relevant vendor
- The following phases are easier to defend
- Strong/phishing resistant MFA to be implemented across all logins (including third parties)
- Monitoring for anomalous account logins
- Reducing session time
- Moving to passwordless authentication


Initial Access

Special mention to Phishing/Vishing:


- Cybersecurity will always be a human problem
- It is the responsibility of the employer to ensure protocol is enforced, and that a sense of skepticism is given to all unknown requests



- EDR tools can monitor for newly created users that initiate a scheduled task
- Detection in place for users creating scheduled tasks on remote systems
- Antivirus goes a long way to detecting malicious bad
- Tamper protection in place to prevent the switching off of anti-virus
- Restrictions in place for tools like
 PowerShell or certain file extensions from downloading files / WDAC and SmartScreen
- New accounts performing certain action such as interacting with newly created files or "known bad registries" - should be flagged



- Known offensive security tools should be denied on-disk for User Groups
- Monitoring for access to known Password directories/registry hives with EDR
- Ensure that there is a limited number of password attempts for logins, especially services that by default have set credentials
- Monitoring for anomalous account logins
- Long, complex passwords on all accounts
- Files used as password stores especially in Cloud environments - must be either encrypted or removed entirely (secret scanning)
- Implementation of Privileged Access
 Workstations, or PAM tools that provide session management
- Removing local admin privileges from standard users, and implementing tiering in AD



- Outbound internet access for all servers restricted to an allow list by firewalls / web filtering tooling
- Alerts in place for known offensive exfiltration tools (e.g. WinSCP, RClone).

- Base64 encoded Headers to be flagged as severe
- Network detection in place for "common" malware traffic
- Significant one-way traffic flagged as severe

Ransomware Protection Framework

Reduce your attack surface

Prevent Internet-facing weaknesses

Automated and continuous vulnerability scanning of Internet-facing infrastructure with effective remediation processes

Multi-factor authentication configured for all email and remote access accounts

Reduce the threat of phishing

Web security tooling that restricts content and blocks malicious downloads

Email tooling that restricts attachments and scans for malicious content

Hardened endpoints to restrict execution of untrusted scripts and executables

Restrictions that prevent the execution of untrusted Microsoft Office macros

Prevent standard day-to-day accounts from having local administrator privileges

Reduce attackers' dwell time

Endpoint detection and response tooling deployed on workstations and servers

Continuous monitoring capability that rapidly investigates and contains alerts, including out of hours

Regular 'red teaming' to validate detection and response capabilities

Centralised log collection and rules configured to detect common techniques used by ransomware groups

Security tooling (or detection rules) that monitors for anomalous use of privilege accounts

Antivirus tooling that automatically remediates 'commodity malware' and is monitored for critical detections

Ability to remotely perform forensics analysis and take containment actions

Limit blast radius of unauthorised access

Increase the cost of escalating privileges

Controls to restrict and secure the use of accounts with domain administrator privileges

Internal vulnerability scanning with effective remediation processes

Proactive hunting and remediation of Active Directory hygiene issues

Host-based firewalls on workations configured by default to block inbound traffic

Network segmentation that restricts lateral movement from workstations

Outbound internet access for all servers should be restricted to an allow list by firewalls / web filtering tooling

Cloud-based SaaS services for employee email and file-sharing

Prepare to respond to and recover

Endpoint protection tooling that detects and blocks ransomware behaviours

Exercised cyber incident response and crisis management plans

Playbooks for rapidly isolating parts of network and managing the impact

IT Resilience (for ransomware failure mode)

Validated backups with tested recovery of infrastructure (e.g. Active Directory)

Verified protection of backups to prevent corruption or deletion by an attacker

Prioritised recovery plans for key business systems and applications

Playbooks for mass rebuilding of endpoints and servers at scale



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