

# **FirePeony**

# A ghost wandering around the Royal Road

**NTT Security Holdings** 

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### \$ whoami





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
# **FirePeony**



- aka SharpPanda
- China-nexus APT group
- CheckPoint published a report in June 2021

https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/Chinese-apt-group-targets-southeast-Asian-government-with-previously-unknown-backdoor/


- Targeting Southeast Asia, including Vietnam and Thailand
- Using RoyalRoad RTF, 5.t Downloader, VictoryDII, Soul Framework
- → Expands target area including Japan and Europe starting in May 2023



### **Case 1: Attack flow**




#### Attack on Vietnam in January 2023



### **Case 1: Decoy file**





### **Case 1: Template Injection**



/word/\_rels/settings.xml.rels


```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
          <Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships">
               <Relationship Id="rId9626" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/attachedTemplate"</p>
               TargetMode="External"/>
          </Relationships>
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Security Holdings

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id lindex
             Iformat id: 2 (Embedded)
              class name: b'PACKage
              data size: 278016
              OLE Packase object:
Filename: '¥x11ài±¥x1aá'
              Source path: , ,
               [emp path =
               MD5 = 'd41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
   0008FA0Eh |format id: 2 (Embedded)
              class name: b'Equation.2\x00\x124\x\x\90\x124\x\T2'
              data size: 8485
                    97409f91329120291b036eb178d978d4
     Stirling - [rf9d.a]
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
```
def decode 8291706f(enc data):
            print('[!] Type [8291706f] is Detected!')
160
            print('[+] Decoding...')
161
162
            key = bytearray(b"2Y1K77")
163
164
            s = rc4 ksa(kev)
            dec data = rc4 prga(enc data, s)
165
166
                                  https://github.com/nao-sec/rr_decoder
167
            return dec data
```



### Case 1: 5.t Downloader




5.t Downloader sends the host's environment information to the C&C server, which downloads and executes additional malware if targeted



### Case 2: Attack flow




#### Attack on G7/G20 in May 2023



### **Case 2: G7 Hiroshima Summit**






To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/cabinetoffice.gov.uk/d/msgid/sherpa.office/c64e5acc4a6540d8b3ae030a1d20faf1%40kemlu.go.id.

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### Case 2: Decoy file






### Case 3: Attack flow





#### Attack on Japan in July 2023



# **Case 3: Japanese decoy file**







### Similar case (1/2)



#### Mustang Panda

- Initially, they primarily targeted Southeast Asia
- They began to expand their targets to Europe from around 2021
- The decoy files used the theme of Russia-Ukraine conflict, and we thought that the purpose is to collect information related to that

https://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/google\_fog\_of\_war\_research\_report.pdf

### Similar case (2/2)



The decoy file used in this attack on the G7/G20 was discussed at the G7 Hiroshima Summit

 The summit discussed the security sector, particularly Russia-Ukraine conflict <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ecm/ec/page4\_005920.html">https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ecm/ec/page4\_005920.html</a>

→ When it comes to matters of national importance, even APT groups that previously targeted specific regions may change their targets and priorities



# RoyalRoad RTF Weaponizer




#### Tools shared in China-nexus' APT group

- It generates an RTF file that exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft Office's Equation Editor
  - CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802
  - The vulnerability being exploited is old
- Many APT groups used it.
  - APT40, Goblin Panda, Tick, Tonto, TA410, TA413, TA428, FunnyDream ...
  - There are some characteristics for each period and group
- It was very popular around 2020, but around 2023 it's rarely seen
  - One of the few groups still using this tool is FirePeony


### RoyalRoad: General behavior





### RoyalRoad: Behavior by FirePeony





# RoyalRoad: FirePeony unique features



- Encode file
  - 4D A2 EE 67
    - > RC4 encode and the key is "123456".
  - 82 91 70 6F
    - > RC4 encode and the key is "2YIK77".
- Export file name
  - "5.t" was used only first time
  - After that random name is used
- Execute malware
  - By task scheduler



Both are FirePeony specific encodings Encoding is often common to other groups



Output file names are often fixed (e.g., "8.t")



Only FirePeony uses the task scheduler

### **Template Injection**



Case1: Only RTF



Traditional attacks using RoyalRoad mostly use RTF alone and do not use Template Injection


FirePeony does not use RTF alone

 $\textbf{Case2: DOCX} \rightarrow \textbf{RTF}$ 



Most FirePeony attacks load RTF files from DOCX files

Cae3: RTF → RTF



RTF files may be loaded by Template Injection from the other RTF files


https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/theat-insight/injection-new-black-novel-rtf-template-inject-technique-poised-widespread

### 5.t Downloader



#### It's an original simple downloader by FirePeony


- It constantly sends user information to the C&C server
- If attackers are interested, they can send in additional malware
  - VictoryDII and Soul Framework are finally executed
- It verifies download data with FNV-1A64



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fowler%E2%80%93NoII%E2%80%93Vo hash function

### **Timeline of 5.t Downloader**






# **Victory DII**



#### Backdoor reported by CheckPoint

- It's downloaded from loader and decrypted in its memory, and then executed
- The backdoor function has general backdoor functions such as file manipulation, screenshot acquisition, and information acquisition and so on



https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/chinese-apt-group-targets-southeast-asian-government-with-previously-unknown-backdoor/

### **Soul Framework**



Framework consisting of a loader called SoulSearcher and a backdoor called SoulBackdoor

- It has been observed since around 2017
- Payload and Config are stored in the registry and loaded from there
- Three formats have been confirmed "Binary XML Semicolon"
- SoulSearcher used an export function called StartW, which has the same name as 5.t.Downloader
- LZMA compression algorithm

https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/unraveling-the-evolution-of-the-soul-searcher-malware https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/pandas-with-a-soul-chinese-espionage-attacks-against-southeast-asian-government-entities/



### **OPSecFail: Open Directory**



In 2021, OpenDir of C&C server was reported by CheckPoint



# **OPSecFail: Log File Analysis**



#### There were some log files on the server in January 2023

- Timestamp is UTC+7
- The first log == Likely attacker
  - Singapore IP address
  - The recorded date and time are clearly earlier.
  - JOHN is also included in the creator information of the decoy file

•	
dc:creator	Dell
dcterms:modified	2023-01-05T07:10:00Z
dcterms:created	2023-01-05T07:10:00Z
cp:lastModifiedBy	JOHN

**Document Properties** 

# Relationship to other APT groups




TAG-16 / FunnyDream / TA459 / Roaming Tiger

- China-nexus APT groups
- RoyalRoad RTF Weaponizer
- Targeting Southeast Asia
- Infrastructure overlap
  - 45[.]197.133.23
    - https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2021-1208.pdf

#### **Diamond Model**





# Wrap-Up



- aka SharpPanda
- China-nexus APT group
- They have been observed since at least May 2021
- Targeting Southeast Asia, including Vietnam and Thailand
- Using RoyalRoad RTF, 5.t Downloader, VictoryDII, Soul Framework
- → Expands target area including Japan and Europe starting in May 2023

