



Macintosh OSX Binary Malware

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Program

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
1- Introduction

Introduction

- Growing Popularity
Mac Mini, MacBook Pro



- OSX threats Leap (binary) and Inqtana (java).
Macintosh vulnerable to native malware?



2003	2004	2005	2006
23	15	22	9

Source: <http://secunia.com>

- **NEW** McAfee drivers for Macintosh
- HyperCard Script requires additional install

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
MacOS	0	10	43	12	4	0	0
MacHC	0	1	4	3	0	0	0
OSX	0	0	0	0	0	1	5

■ Malware Numbers:

MacOS-HC-OSX	LINUX-UNIX	WINDOWS
83	700	212.000

- Macintosh MarketShare 5%
- User/Root rights
- Open Source

Architecture

- PowerPC \leftrightarrow INTEL
- MSB \leftrightarrow LSB
- 64 BIT \leftrightarrow 32 BIT
- Applications with Universal symbol run on both



- Mach-O (Mach object) Binary format.
OSX/Leap examined at binary level

OSX/Leap

latestpics															
00000000	FE	ED	FA	CE	00	00	00	12	00	00	00	00	00	02	biúf.....
00000010	00	00	00	0B	00	00	05	A8	00	00	00	85	00	00
00000020	00	00	00	38	5F	5F	50	41	47	45	5A	45	52	4F	...8__PAGEZERO..
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	00	00	00
00000040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00000050	00	00	00	04	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	8C	5F	5F __TE
00000060	58	54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	XT.....
00000070	00	00	30	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	30	00	00	00	..0.....0.....
00000080	00	00	00	05	00	00	00	05	00	00	00	00	5F	5F__te
00000090	78	74	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	5F	5F	xt.....__TE
000000A0	58	54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	23	XT.....#D
000000B0	00	00	12	68	00	00	13	44	00	00	00	02	00	00	...h...D.....
000000C0	00	00	00	00	80	00	04	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
000000D0	5F	5F	70	69	63	73	79	6D	62	6F	6C	5F	73	74	__picsymbol_stub
000000E0	5F	5F	54	45	58	54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	__TEXT.....
000000F0	00	00	35	AC	00	00	00	00	00	00	25	AC	00	00	...5-.....%-.....
00000100	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	80	00	00	08	00	00
00000110	00	00	00	24	5F	5F	73	79	6D	62	6F	6C	5F	73	...\$__symbol_stu
00000120	62	00	00	00	5F	5F	54	45	58	54	00	00	00	00	b...__TEXT.....
00000130	00	00	00	00	00	00	35	AC	00	00	00	00	00	255-.....%-.....
00000140	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	80	00
00000150	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	14	5F	5F	70	69	63	73__picsym
00000160	62	6F	6C	73	74	75	62	31	5F	5F	54	45	58	54	bolstub1__TEXT..
00000170	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	35	C0	00	00	...5Å...
00000180	00	00	25	C0	00	00	00	05	00	00	00	00	00	00	...%Å.....
00000190	80	00	04	08	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	20	5F	5F__cs
000001A0	74	72	69	6E	67	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	5F	5F	tring.....__TE
000001B0	58	54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	XT.....;@
000001C0	00	00	04	84	00	00	2B	40	00	00	00	02	00	00+@.....
000001D0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00
000001E0	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	D0	5F	5F	44	41	54	41D__DATA..
000001F0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	40	00	00	00@...P.
00000200	00	00	30	00	00	00	50	00	00	00	00	07	00	00	..0...P.....

2- Mach Header

Mach Header

```

00000000 | FE ED FA CE | 00 00 00 12 | 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 02 | píúĦ.....
00000010 | 00 00 00 0B | 00 00 05 A8 | 00 00 00 85 | 00 00 00 01 | .....|.....
00000020 | 00 00 00 38 | 5F 5F 50 41 | 47 45 5A 45 | 52 4F 00 00 | ...8_PAGEZERO..
    
```

- magic : FEEDFACE - Mach-O file
- cputype : 12 **PPC**
- cpusubtype : 0 **ALL**
- filetype : 2 **EXECUTABLE**
- ncmds : B
- sizeofcmds : 5A8
- flags : 85

- **MSB – 32 - EP**

CpuType

■ machine.h

VAX	1	1 (Hex)
MC680x0	6	6
I386	7	7
MC98000	10	A
HPPA	11	B
MC88000	13	D
SPARC	14	E
I860	15	F
POWERPC	18	12

FileType

1	relocatable object file
2	demand paged executable file
3	fixed VM shared library file
4	core file
5	preloaded executable file
6	dynamically bound shared library
7	dynamic link editor
8	dynamically bound bundle file
9	shared library stub for static linking only, no section contents


3- Segments

Segments

00000020	00 00 00 38 5F 5F 50 41	47 45 5A 45 52 4F 00 00	...8__PAGEZERO..
00000030	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00
00000040	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000050	00 00 00 04	00 00 00 01 00 00 01 8C __TE
00000060	58 54 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00	XT.....
00000070	00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 30 00 00 00 00 07	..0.....0.....
00000080	00 00 00 05 00 00 00 05	00 00 00 00 5F 5F 74 65__te
00000090	78 74 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 5F 5F 54 45	xt.....__TE
000000A0	58 54 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 23 44	XT.....#D

- cmd : 1
- cmdsize : 18C
- segname : __TEXT the name field has 0x10 bytes allocated
- vmaddr : 1000 starting virtual memory address
- vmsize : 3000 number of bytes in virtual memory
- fileoff : 0 offset in file of the data to be mapped at vmaddr
- filesize : 3000 number of bytes occupied by this segment on disk
- maxprot : 7 maximum permitted virtual memory protections
- initprot : 5 initial virtual memory protections
- nsects : 5 the number of section data structures following this load command.
- flags : 0

File and Virtual Memory Area for the 4 segments



Nsects

cmdsize	38	18C	1D0	38
segname	__PAGEZERO	__TEXT	__DATA	__LINKEDIT
nsects	0	5	6	0

4- Sections



Sections

latestpics																
00000000	FE	ED	FA	CE	00	00	00	12	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	biúĭ.....
00000010	00	00	00	0B	00	00	05	A8	00	00	00	85	00	00	01I.....
00000020	00	00	00	38	5F	5F	50	41	47	45	5A	45	52	4F	00	...8__PAGEZERO..
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	00	00	00	00
00000040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00000050	00	00	00	04	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	8C	5F	5F	54I__TE
00000060	58	54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	XT.....
00000070	00	00	30	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	30	00	00	00	07	..0.....0.....
00000080	00	00	00	05	00	00	00	05	00	00	00	00	5F	5F	74_te
00000090	78	74	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	5F	5F	54	xt....._TE
000000A0	58	54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	23	XT.....#D
000000B0	00	00	12	68	00	00	13	44	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	...h...D.....
000000C0	00	00	00	00	80	00	04	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00I.....
000000D0	5F	5F	70	69	63	73	79	6D	62	6F	6C	5F	73	74	75	__picsymbol_stub
000000E0	5F	5F	54	45	58	54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	__TEXT.....
000000F0	00	00	35	AC	00	00	00	00	00	00	25	AC	00	00	02	..5-.....%-...
00000100	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	80	00	00	08	00	00	00I.....
00000110	00	00	00	24	5F	5F	73	79	6D	62	6F	6C	5F	73	74	...\$__symbol_stu
00000120	62	00	00	00	5F	5F	54	45	58	54	00	00	00	00	00	b...__TEXT.....
00000130	00	00	00	00	00	00	35	AC	00	00	00	00	00	00	255-.....%-
00000140	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	80	00	08I.....
00000150	00	00	00	00	00	00	14	5F	5F	70	69	63	73	79	6D__picsym
00000160	62	6F	6C	73	74	75	62	31	5F	5F	54	45	58	54	00	bolstub1__TEXT..
00000170	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	35	C0	00	00	055A...I
00000180	00	00	25	C0	00	00	00	05	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	..%A.....
00000190	80	00	04	08	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	20	5F	5F	63	I....._cs
000001A0	74	72	69	6E	67	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	5F	5F	54	tring....._TE
000001B0	58	54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	3B	XT.....;@
000001C0	00	00	04	84	00	00	2B	40	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	...I...+@.....
000001D0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
000001E0	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	D0	5F	5F	44	41	54	41	00D__DATA..
000001F0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	40	00	00	00	50@...P..
00000200	00	00	30	00	00	00	50	00	00	00	00	07	00	00	03	..0...P.....
00000210	00	00	00	06	00	00	00	00	5F	5F	64	61	74	61	00__data..
00000220	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	5F	5F	44	41	54	41	00__DATA..
00000230	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	40	00	00	00	49@...I..

- OSX/Leap has 5 sections inside the __TEXT segment

__text section inside the __TEXT segment


00000040	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000050	00 00 00 04 00 00 00 01	00 00 01 8C 5F 5F 54 45		
00000060	58 54 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00		
00000070	00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 30 00 00 00 00 07		
00000080	00 00 00 05 00 00 00 05	00 00 00 00 5F 5F 74 65		
00000090	78 74 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 5F 5F 54 45		
000000A0	58 54 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 23 44		
000000B0	00 00 12 68 00 00 13 44	00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00		
000000C0	00 00 00 00 80 00 04 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		
000000D0	5F 5F 70 69 63 73 79 6D	62 6F 6C 5F 73 74 75 62		
000000E0	5F 5F 54 45 58 54 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		
000000F0	00 00 35 AC 00 00 00 00	00 00 25 AC 00 00 00 02		
00000100	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	80 00 00 08 00 00 00 00		

- **sectname** : __text , the name field has 0x10 bytes allocated
- **segname** : __TEXT , the name field has 0x10 bytes allocated
- **addr** : 2344
- **size** : 1268
- **offset** : 1344
- **align** : 2
- **reloff** : 0
- **nreloc** : 0
- **flags** : 80000400
- **reserved1** : 0
- **reserved2** : 0

Section command info for the various sections inside the `__TEXT` segment.

sectname	<code>__text</code>	<code>__picsymbol_stub</code>	<code>__symbol_stub</code>	<code>__picsymbolstub1</code>	<code>__cstring</code>
segname	<code>__TEXT</code>	<code>__TEXT</code>	<code>__TEXT</code>	<code>__TEXT</code>	<code>__TEXT</code>
addr	2344	35AC	35AC	35C0	3B40
size	1268	0	0	580	484
offset	1344	25AC	25AC	25C0	2B40
align	2	2	2	5	2
reloff	0	0	0	0	0
nreloc	0	0	0	0	0
flags	80000400	80000008	80000008	80000408	2
reserved1	0	0	0	0	0
reserved2	0	24	14	20	0

■ Section File Areas in the `__TEXT` and `__DATA` segments.



5- EP – Possible Virus Techniques

EP / Possible Virus Techniques

■ CALC.exe																	
00000000	4D	5A	90	00	03	00	00	00	04	00	00	00	FF	FF	00	00	MZyy..
00000010	B8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	40	00	00	00	00	00	00	00@.....
00000020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00E.....
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	C8	00	00	00LI!Th
00000040	0E	1F	BA	0E	00	B4	09	CD	21	B8	01	4C	CD	21	54	68	is program canno
00000050	69	73	20	70	72	6F	67	72	61	6D	20	63	61	6E	6E	6F	t be run in DOS
00000060	74	20	62	65	20	72	75	6E	20	69	6E	20	44	4F	53	20	mode...\$.
00000070	6D	6F	64	65	2E	0D	0D	0A	24	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0A8" 'cVq'cVq'cVq
00000080	D6	C3	38	22	92	A2	56	71	92	A2	56	71	92	A2	56	71	ø%Tq cVq'cWq cVq
00000090	F8	BE	54	71	89	A2	56	71	92	A2	57	71	CC	A2	56	71	ø%Eq cVqU^Pq cVq
000000A0	F0	BD	45	71	99	A2	56	71	55	A4	50	71	93	A2	56	71	'cVq'cVqRich'cVq
000000B0	92	A2	56	71	B9	A2	56	71	52	69	63	68	92	A2	56	71PE..L...
000000C0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	50	45	00	00	4C	01	03	00y4.....à...
000000D0	B4	AF	FD	34	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	E0	00	0F	038.....
000000E0	0B	01	05	0C	00	1C	01	00	00	38	00	00	00	00	00	00	à.....0.....
000000F0	E0	19	01	00	00	10	00	00	00	30	01	00	00	00	00	01p.....
00000100	00	10	00	00	00	10	00	00	05	00	00	00	05	00	00	00	IS.....
00000110	04	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	70	01	00	00	06	00	00&.....
00000120	98	53	02	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	04	00	00	10	00	00!
00000130	00	00	10	00	00	10	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	00	00	00	@...&.....
00000140	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	20	20	01	00	8C	00	00	00
00000150	00	40	01	00	18	26	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00è.....
00000160	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00text.....
00000170	F0	11	00	00	1C	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00data...
00000180	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	000.....0...
00000190	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
000001A0	00	10	00	00	E8	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
000001B0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
000001C0	2E	74	65	78	74	00	00	00	0E	1A	01	00	00	10	00	00
000001D0	00	20	01	00	00	10	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
000001E0	00	00	00	00	20	00	00	60	2E	64	61	74	61	00	00	00
000001F0	84	0F	00	00	00	30	01	00	00	10	00	00	00	30	01	00

- File Header
- Entrypoint
- PE Binary


```

ARCH
00000000 7F 45 4C 46 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |ELF.....
00000010 02 00 03 00 01 00 00 00 E0 83 04 08 34 00 00 00 .....à...4...
00000020 4C 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 34 00 20 00 06 00 28 00 L...4...(.
00000030 18 00 17 00 06 00 00 00 34 00 00 00 34 80 04 08 .....4...4...
00000040 34 80 04 08 C0 00 00 00 C0 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 4|...À...À...
00000050 04 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 F4 00 00 00 F4 80 04 08 .....ô...ô...
00000060 F4 80 04 08 13 00 00 00 13 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ô|.....
00000070 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 04 08 .....|...
00000080 00 80 04 08 8D 05 00 00 8D 05 00 00 05 00 00 00 .|...|...|...
00000090 00 10 00 00 01 00 00 00 90 05 00 00 90 95 04 08 .....|...||...
000000A0 90 95 04 08 F0 00 00 00 08 01 00 00 06 00 00 00 ||...ä...
000000B0 00 10 00 00 02 00 00 00 E0 05 00 00 E0 95 04 08 .....à...à...
000000C0 E0 95 04 08 A0 00 00 00 A0 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 à|.....
000000D0 04 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 08 01 00 00 08 81 04 08 .....|...
000000E0 08 81 04 08 20 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 .|...
000000F0 04 00 00 00 2F 6C 69 62 2F 6C 64 2D 6C 69 6E 75 ...../lib/ld-linu
00000100 78 2E 73 6F 2E 32 00 00 04 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 x.so.2...
00000110 01 00 00 00 47 4E 55 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 .....GNU...
00000120 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00 .....
00000130 09 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
00000140 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 .....
00000150 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 .....
00000160 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
00000170 00 00 00 00 76 00 00 00 6C 83 04 08 81 00 00 00 .....v...l|...|...
00000180 22 00 00 00 21 00 00 00 7C 83 04 08 76 00 00 00 "...l...|...v...
00000190 12 00 00 00 3D 00 00 00 8C 83 04 08 AC 00 00 00 .....=...||...-...
000001A0 22 00 00 00 37 00 00 00 9C 83 04 08 37 00 00 00 "...7...||...7...
000001B0 12 00 00 00 64 00 00 00 AC 83 04 08 E1 00 00 00 .....d...-|...á...
000001C0 12 00 00 00 1A 00 00 00 BC 83 04 08 2E 00 00 00 .....¼|...
000001D0 12 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 CC 83 04 08 7D 00 00 00 .....(...i|...}...
000001E0 22 00 00 00 55 00 00 00 80 85 04 08 04 00 00 00 "...U...||...
000001F0 11 00 0E 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....

```

- File Header
- Entrypoint
- ELF Binary

Possible Virus Techniques for OSX Mach-O Files

- No EP in Mach Header
- Change the immediate bytes at the start or the end of the executable code itself in the `__text` section
- Or by putting a call instruction in these to another section where the real virus bytes reside.

- *underscores__sectname = Tradition, Not Mandatory*
- *section type and attributes are important.*

Section **flags** field holds dual information about these:
least 8 bits define the section **type**.
most 24 significant bits define the section **attributes**.

If flags = 11223344 then
 type = 44
 attributes = 11223300

sectname	__text	
flags	80000400	
type	0	Regular section
attributes	0x80000400	Contains Machine Instructions

TYPE

- **REGULAR** 0x0 regular section
- **ZEROFILL** 0x1 zero fill on demand section
- **CSTRING_LITERALS** 0x2 section with only literal C strings
- **NON_LAZY_SYMBOL_POINTERS** 0x6 section with only non-lazy symbol pointers
- **LAZY_SYMBOL_POINTERS** 0x7 section with only lazy symbol pointers
- **SYMBOL_STUBS** 0x8 section with only symbol stubs, byte size of stub in

Attributes

- **S_ATTR_PURE_INSTRUCTIONS** 0x80000000 section contains only true machine instructions
- **S_ATTR_SOME_INSTRUCTIONS** 0x00000400 section contains some machine instructions

sectname	__text	__picsymbol_stub	__symbol_stub	__picsymbolstub1	__cstring
flags	80000400	80000008	80000008	80000408	2
type	0	8	8	8	2
attributes	0x80000400	0x80000000	0x80000000	0x8000400	0

sectname	__data	__nl_symbol_ptr	__la_symbol_ptr	__dyld	__bss	__common
flags	0	6	7	0	1	1
type	0	6	7	0	1	1
attributes	0	0	0	0	0	0

6- Universal Binaries

Universal Binaries

date																	
00000000	CA	FE	BA	BE	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	07	00	00	00	03	Ép%.....
00000010	00	00	10	00	00	00	47	EC	00	00	00	0C	00	00	00	12Gi.....
00000020	00	00	00	00	00	00	60	00	00	00	4A	70	00	00	00	0CJp.....
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00000040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00000050	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00

date																	
00000000	CA	FE	BA	BE	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	07	00	00	00	03	Ép%.....
00000010	00	00	10	00	00	00	47	EC	00	00	00	0C	00	00	00	12Gi.....
00000020	00	00	00	00	00	00	60	00	00	00	4A	70	00	00	00	0CJp.....
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00000040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00000050	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00

cputype	7 (I386)	12 (PowerPC)
cpusubtype	3 (ALL)	0 (ALL)
offset	1000	6000
size	47EC	4A70
align	C	C
File Area	1000-57EC (Active code ends, filled till 6000 with zero's)	6000-AA70 (EOF)



Universal Binaries

date																	
00000FC0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00000FD0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00000FE0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00000FF0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00001000	CE	FA	ED	FE	07	00	00	00	03	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	íúip.....
00001010	0C	00	00	00	0C	05	00	00	85	00	00	00	01	00	00	00
00001020	38	00	00	00	5F	5F	50	41	47	45	5A	45	52	4F	00	00	8...__PAGEZERO..
00001030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	00	00	00	00	00	00
00001040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00001050	04	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	8C	01	00	00	5F	5F	54	45_TE
00001060	58	54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	00	00	XT.....

date																	
00005FD0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00005FE0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00005FF0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00006000	FE	ED	FA	CE	00	00	00	12	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	piúí.....
00006010	00	00	00	0B	00	00	05	34	00	00	00	85	00	00	00	014...
00006020	00	00	00	38	5F	5F	50	41	47	45	5A	45	52	4F	00	00	...8__PAGEZERO..
00006030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	00	00	00	00	00
00006040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
00006050	00	00	00	04	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	8C	5F	5F	54	45_TE
00006060	58	54	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	00	XT.....

Universal Binaries


- Dual Code Malware
- Intel → Jump PowerPC, placeholder, jump Intel
- Corruptions

7- Tools

Tools

- “**otool**” - information about the file format structure
`/usr/bin/otool -hv /bin/date`
- Another such tool is called “**nm**”.
- For debugging **gdb** can be used.
- **dd** backup

- IDA v4.9 sp1 can be usefull partially.



Function name	Segment	Start	Length	R	F	L	S	B	T
start	__text	00002344	00000040	R
__start	__text	00002384	00000174	R
sub_25F8	__text	000025F8	00000048	R
sub_2660	__text	00002660	0000003C	R
sub_269C	__text	0000269C	0000005C	R
sub_26F8	__text	000026F8	0000015C	R
__dyld_init_check	__text	000028B4	00000040	R
dyld_stub_binding_helper	__text	000028F4	00000018	R
__dyld_func_lookup	__text	0000290C	00000010	R
_darwin_unwind_dyld_add_image_hook	__text	0000291C	00000088	R
_darwin_unwind_dyld_remove_image_hook	__text	00002A04	00000120	R
__darwin_gcc3_preregister_frame_info	__text	00002BA4	0000007C	R
_xor	__text	00002C80	0000006C	R
_main	__text	00002CEC	00000104	R
_installHooks	__text	00002DF0	00000128	R
_infect	__text	00002F18	000001E8	R
_infectApps	__text	00003100	0000010C	R
_copySelf	__text	0000320C	000001A4	R
_sprintf_LDBLStub	__text	000033B0	000000AC	R
_sprintf_LDBLStub	__text	0000345C	000000AC	R

8- Conclusion

Conclusion

- OSX/Leap not perfect but proof of concept
- File-infecting viruses for the OSX platform are certainly a possibility in the near future.

■ **Thanks for Attention!**
Questions?

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