



>THIS IS **THE WAY**

The Inspector

Automating the forensic investigation of infected computers

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>THIS IS **NORTEL**



The Inspector Agenda


- > An overview of the inspector and the reason it was created.
- > What functions the inspector performs
- > What have been the benefits
- > Questions & Comments



The Inspector Non-Agenda

- ~~> Inspector, the greatest forensic tool ever created~~
- ~~> Inspector, now available in the lobby at special conference pricing~~

What is Inspector




- > A tool used to remotely examine machines that are suspected of being infected.
 - Gathers useful information about the computer
 - Conducts a high level vulnerability assessment
 - Identifies “Malware Candidates” and gathers samples of them
 - Gathers additional directory listings and logs which may be needed for further analysis

The Problem – Changing threatscape


> Prior to 2004, we were primarily fighting network worms

- Examples: Blaster, Code Red, Funlove
- Discrete software components - behaved in a predictable fashion
- New worms typically resulted in large, network outbreaks followed by small “After shocks”.




> Starting in 2004, we started to experience “Bots” on our corporate network

- Took us several months before we fully understood that the threat had changed
- Now seeing smaller, regionalized outbreaks
- No longer discrete software components - Human controlled and thus unpredictable
- Bots used a “Swiss Army Knife” approach to gaining access to systems.




Reaction to Change



- > We were very good at:
 - Rapidly detecting infected systems on the network.
 - Rapidly neutralizing the threat
- > What we needed to improve:
 - Identifying the specific malware involved in the outbreak.
 - Finding Typhoid Mary
 - Identifying the vulnerabilities being exploited.
- > Work around: Audit computers
 - Problem: physically accessing remote computers
 - Problem: network audits delayed Isolation
 - Problem: manual audits were time consuming and conducted in a spotty fashion.


Automating Forensic Analysis



Key Goals

- > Take advantage of time between detection and isolation.
- > Minimize human involvement
- > Speed
- > Consistency
- > Collect malware samples
- > Keep results for further analysis (metrics, etc)

How was it built?



Constructed using Open (“Free”) Technologies

The Inspector: automating the forensic investigation of infected computers

Sample output – System Description



Inspector Report on 47.82.11.1

Time = 2005/08/18 11:44 GMT
WINS = **Name Deleted**
Domain = americasw
OS Version = Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional

SMS Information


Operating System	Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional	Service Pack	
Computer Make	Dell Computer Corporation	Model	OptiPlex GX270
Serial Number	6ZMDP31	CSC Asset#	AC775684
Computer Location	SC100	Last Update	8/16/2005 14:29:11
Owner	Name Deleted	GID	Emp # Deleted
ESN	Phone # Deleted	Dept	RB20

➤ Tries to gather identification information from the computer

➤ Consults IT databases to gather further useful information about the computer.

➤ Even if the computer is not found in the IT database, that fact is an important clue!

Sample Output – Vulnerability Assessment



➤ Checks for common vulnerabilities exploited by Bots.

- MS06-040
- MS05-039/047
- MS04-012 (MS03-026)
- MS04-011
- Weak Passwords
- Weak DBA passwords.

➤ Checks for vulnerabilities externally, and if possible, internally.

➤ Checks status of computer's defenses.

➤ Checks for presence of non-standard applications which may have aided the spread of Malware.

Sample output – Virus Candidates



Winnt Directory					
File	Att	size	Modified	Status	Virus
webhdll.dll	A	40960	Tue Feb 8 10:15:12 2005	Downloaded	Found application Spyware-WebHancer.
whinstaller.exe	A	32768	Tue Feb 8 10:13:55 2005	Downloaded	Found application Spyware-WebHancer.dr.
winlogin.pif	SR	161792	Mon Jul 22 15:05:04 2002	Downloaded	

System32 Directory					
File	Att	size	Modified	Status	Virus
msdos.pif		127488	Thu Jun 19 02:35:04 2003	Downloaded	Opanki.worm.gen virus !!!
winlogin.pif	SR	130560	Mon Jul 22 15:05:04 2002	Downloaded	

C:/ Directory					
File	Att	size	Modified	Status	Virus
dos.pif	A	161792	Fri Aug 12 09:53:44 2005	Downloaded	
servu3.exe	A	0	Mon Feb 14 11:56:07 2005	Downloaded	
system.exe	A	138240	Sat Aug 13 11:48:25 2005	Downloaded	

- Checks common directories for malware files
- Ignores common OS & Application files
- Looks for some known Malware filenames.
- Looks for recently modified files
- Looks for “Hidden” files
- Downloads samples for further analysis.



Additional Inspector Actions

- > Grabbing list of installed programs
- > Grabbing complete file listings from key directories
- > Grabbing Anti-virus logs
 - Done after sample collection.

Inspection times vary, but usually <5 minutes



The Short-Comings

- > Can not tell if a vulnerability existed before infection or resulted from it.
- > Full audit can be blocked by Malware's counter-measures.
 - Many bots disable access to administrative shares
- > Audit will also be limited if the infected computer is not in domain.
 - Non-corporate computers, etc
- > Some Malware infestations force an immediate reboot during infection process, resulting in the system going offline.

Today, Inspector is typically capable of doing full inspections on ~25% of infected computers on our network.

Insight into Bots



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➤ AV software was able to detect adware and spyware, as well as a known bot.


(Aka W32.ALLIM) Bot spread via AIM.

➤ But what about the four new bots, variants of Opanki and SDbot (Spybot) found on the same machine?

What cleanup strategy would you use?

The Inspector: automating the forensic investigation of infected computers

Case Study: Inspector vs Zotob



- > August 2005: Zotob (MS05-039 exploiting worm)
 - Whilst the media was focusing on Zotob, using inspector we saw 8 distinct bots (not all Zotob)
 - Some bots were downloading additional software/new versions.
 - Knowing the nature of the outbreak(s) is essential to managing cleanup process.
- > During outbreaks, its not uncommon to use ad hoc means of identifying infected systems.
 - Inspector is able to help confirm infections by looking for key infection files.



Benefits of Sample Collection.

- > Allows quick delivery to AV vendors
- > Facilitates quick identification with tools such as VirusTotal.
- > Quick identification speeds research on nature of malware
- > Provides samples for testing in our own lab to identify BOT Command and Control servers.
- > In the first 18 months of operation, Inspector allowed us to collect an average of 21 new malware samples (undetected by our primary AV vendor) monthly.
 - Peak: 66 new malware detections (May 2005).

Why are we using stats from last year?



Inspector and Root Cause Analysis

- > Most of our infected systems had one of 8 common vulnerabilities.
 - Inspector helped identify weaknesses in IT processes and procedures
 - Cleanup Processes
 - Patching new computers on the network
 - Continued presence of vulnerabilities has been determined to be an issue with compliance.

- > Inspector analysis helped build business case to move from a reactive to pro-active model.
 - Why wait for a worm to find your vulnerable systems?
 - 99% compliance isn't good enough when the other 1% is still a big number.
 - Enforcing security compliance will reduce both the quantity and size of outbreaks.



Conclusion

- > Inspector is not worlds greatest forensic tool
 - Simple, speedy
 - Effective - Provided considerable insight into the nature of malware and security process failures in our environment
- > Lots of room for improvement
 - Limited to only fully scanning ~25% of infected systems
 - Move from an agent-less to an agent based model (home-grown or commercial)?
- > Considerable benefit to automating forensic audits of infected computers
 - Save time and effort during a crises
 - Help provide insights into the nature of an outbreak
 - Help drive change and improvements to policies and procedures.
 - Helps provide the knowledge to reduce both the size and number of outbreaks.



or





-- Last Slide --