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Spam recognition by methods independent from text content

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Ralf Iffert
ISS C-Force

Mark Usher
ISS C-Force

Conventional spam filters are ineffective

- Circumvented by random text
- Outsmarted by spams without any text
- RBLs fooled by changing IPs with high frequency

Overview

Introduction of two spam detection methods independent from text analysis

- **Structure Analysis**
  - Analysing the HTML structure of the email
- **Flow Analysis**
  - Analysing the flow of incoming emails

Structure Analysis

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Basic Idea

- Remove all content from HTML part
- Calculate a hash on the remaining HTML structure
- Add hash to a database that is used for spam analysis

Sample Spams





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Structure Analysis – Sample Spams: Extract of Source Code

Extract from source code of sample 1

```
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><span style=3D" float : right ">r</span>V<=
span style=3D" float : right ">e</span>i<span style=3D" float : right ">e</=
span>a<span style=3D" float : right ">q</span>g<span style=3D" float : righ=
t ">c</span>r<span style=3D" float : right ">j</span>a <FONT color=3D#EC370=
7><STRONG>$ 69<span style=3D" float : right "> w </span>,95</STRONG></FONT>=
 (1<span style=3D" float : right "> S6 </span>0 t<span style=3D" float=
 : right "> WU </span>abIets)</FONT></DIV>
```

Extract from source code of sample 2

```
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><span style=3D" float : right ">v</span>V<=
sig://4A3DDB22F7C25943 (structhash)
span style=3D" float : right ">e</span>i<span style=
span>a<span style=3D" float : right ">j</span>g<span
t ">q</span>r<span style=3D" float : right ">j</span
1><STRONG>$ 69<span style=3D" float : right "> x </s
 (10<span style=3D" float : right "> OR </span> 
float : right "> 0r </span>s)</FONT></DIV>
```



Master Spam Database

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Structure Analysis – Workflows

Manufacturer's side

Client's side



Experimental Results

- Voluminous inflow of spam
- Master Spam Database
  - Fed by mails delivered from the spam honey pots
- Client Spam Database
  - Exclusively: 1.6%
  - Used for the local spam analysis
  - Updated by the Master Spam Database

Detection ratio: 45.1%

False positive ratio: 0.010%

Blocked	Delivered

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Flow Analysis

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Flow Analysis

Basic Idea

Identifying “similar“ emails arriving within a small time frame

→Detection of whole spam threads

→Similarity of emails is determined by similarity measures

Flow Analysis





Flow Database

Type	SimilaritySignature	Sender	TimeStamp
1	sig://90445BE9C82FCCAE	sig://E98DBF565BAD2554	2006-10-12 14:23
2	sig://1141FB0CBD68C0F8	sig://E98DBF565BAD2554	2006-10-12 14:23
3	sig://062BAE7F5C13FC22	sig://E98DBF565BAD2554	2006-10-12 14:23
4	sig://155CCDEEEA36B809	sig://E98DBF565BAD2554	2006-10-12 14:23

Similarity Measures

- Simplified body text
- Set of image URLs
- Set of attachments

Flow Database

- Administration of similarity measures
- Columns of the Flow Database
  - Type of similarity measure
  - Similarity signature
  - Time when entry was generated
  - Sender of the e-mail

Further measures are conceivable…

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Flow Analysis – Workflows

Usage of the Flow Database

- Conditioned by the two parameters:
  - Threshold for similar emails
  - Time-frame that is monitored
- Only contains information of emails received within the time-frame



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Computing time

Computing time depends on

- P_i Averaged time to extract the similarity data of the i^{th} similarity measure
- M_i Averaged hash calculation time on the i^{th} similarity data
- R Time for one database request
- N Number of similarity measures

→ **Computing time per mail:**
of the i^{th} similarity measure

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N}\left(P_i + M_i + R\right)$$

Memory requirements Flow Database

Required memory depends on

- ***M*** Maximal number of entries in Flow Database
- ***S*** Size in bytes of each Flow Database entry

→ **Required memory: *M*S***

Example

***M* depends on**

- ***N*** Number of similarity measures = 4
- ***E*** Throughput in emails per minute = 600
- ***X*** Time-frame in minutes used for the Flow Analysis = 10

→ ***M = N*E*X***

***S* depends on**

- ***C*** Number of bytes consumed by a Flow Database entry = 44
- ***O*** Memory overhead = 12

→ ***S = C+O***

→ **Required memory: *N*E*X*(C+O)***

= 1.28 MB

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Further approaches

- Automated detection of random text
- Usage of visual features
- Image signatures invariant against random variations



`sig://C3B90474A349823E` `sig://C3B90474A349823E` `sig://C3B90474A349823E`

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Many thanks for your attention!

Q & A

Ralf Iffert
ISS C-Force
riffert@iss.net

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Ahead of the threat.™