



IBM Global

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# Virtual Reality: How Secure Is Your Virtualised Network

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IBM Internet Security Systems®  
Ahead of the threat.™



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# Agenda


- **Introduction to Virtualization**
- **Security and Risk Implications**
- **Operational and Organizational Implications**
- **Common Mistakes**
- **What Can I Do?**
  - Current technologies and solutions
  - The future of virtualization and enterprise security

# Foreword: Unprecedented Cost and Complexity

**New methods and motives: adding to the complexity and sheer number of risks**

**Compliance spending: investing in more point products to solve more point problems**

**IT Innovation: requiring new ways to secure the new ways we collaborate**




**The global economy: Fluctuations in economic climates**

**Flexibility in business methods: to improve operations and serve customers**



# Introduction to Virtualization



## Basics: Disruptive Innovation


### **Virtualization is a Disruptive Innovation**

#### **Virtualization:**


**The logical abstraction of physical computing resources (OS, application, switches, storage, networks) designed to create computing environments that are not restricted by physical configuration or implementation.**

# Basics: Virtualization Architecture


Before Virtualization




After Virtualization



# Basics: Virtualization Types




Examples:  
 KVM (Linux)  
 VMware Workstation  
 VMware Server  
 Microsoft Virtual PC



Examples:  
 Xen  
 VMware ESX  
 IBM pHype / LPARs  
 Microsoft Hyper-V

## What does Virtualization Change?


- **Everything**
  - Dynamic, fluid data-center
  - Resource pools
  - Commoditization of everything
  - Increased efficiency
- **Nothing**
  - Virtual IT is still IT
    - Security, sprawl, management, complexity, heterogeneity



## Major Players



- Founded in 1998
- Division of EMC



- Pioneered virtualization over 40 years ago
- LPAR, sHype, Phantom



- Acquired XenSource in 2007 for \$500 million
- Based on open-source Xen hypervisor



- Virtual server, acquired VirtualPC in 2003 from Connectix
- Hyper-V (fka Viridian) to be released in 2008



- Based on open-source Xen hypervisor



# Security and Risk Implications

## Virtualization and Enterprise Security

- **Virtualization != Security**
  - Standard servers are as secure as standard VMs
- **Partitioning divides VMs, but does not secure them**
- **Same principles apply**
  - Defense in depth
  - Network design and segmentation
  - Unified security management



## Threat Landscape

- **New Swath of **Availability** Attacks**
  - Owning a single guest
  - Breaking out of the guest
  - Compromise of Virtual Console/Management
    - Provision my own evil guest(s)
    - Adjust resource quotas
    - Shut OFF guest(s)
  - Compromise of the VMM/Hypervisor
    - IsGameOver()




## Threat Landscape (cont.)

- **Other Threats...**
  - Regulatory
  - Auditors
  - Org-Charts...
    - Separation of Duties
    - Politics



# Points of Exposure




# Operating Systems and Applications

- **Traditional threats remain:**

- Malware: Viruses, Worms, Trojans, Rootkits
- DoS/DDoS attacks
- Buffer Overflows, SQL Injection, XSS
- Data Leakage
- Access Control, Compliance, Integrity


- **Virtualized OSeS and Apps threats remain:**

- Disaster Recovery and Sandboxing are notable arguments
- However, they do not increase native resistance to OS/Application threats




# Virtual Machines

- **Compliance and Patching**
  - Ability to “Suspend” / “Activate” VMs alters update lifecycle.
- **Virtual Sprawl and Identification**
  - Difficult to keep track of VMs. Unmanaged, rogue VMs.
- **Dynamic Relocation (Live Migration)**
  - Are VMs moving to less secure machines, networks, datacenters, etc?
  - Static security policies no longer apply.




## Virtual Machines (cont.)

- **Replay Attacks and Data Retention**
  - VM replay may foster advanced cryptographic attacks.
  - Is sensitive data being cached in unknown areas for replay purposes?
- **Virtual Machine Stealing**
  - VMs are just as files, its trivial to steal a full system or groups of systems.





# Exploiting Live Migration: Xensploit



By default, live migration traffic is sent in plain text across the network. A man-in-the-middle attack can be used to own endpoints in limitless ways.

# Virtual Machine Manager / Hypervisor



- **Single Point-of-Failure/Attack**
- **Mandatory Access Control / Resource Sharing**
  - Can we guarantee isolation, sharing and communication?
- **Inter-VM Traffic Analysis:**



# VMM / Hypervisor (cont.)

- **Attacks against the VMM / Hypervisor.**

- There are going to be bugs that lead to security risks.
- Shrinking size of VMMs is good for security, but does not make them immune to risk. Features demand complex code.



VMware ESX 3  
~2GB Surface Area  
Lines of Code: Millions



VMware ESX 3i  
~32MB Surface Area  
Lines of Code: ~200,000

- **Hypervisor Services**



- Network – DHCP, vSwitching, general packet processing
- Communication – Inter-domain communication APIs (VMCI, XenSocket)
- Other Services – Security (VMsafe), Disaster Recovery (vMotion), etc.



## Virtualization-Aware Hardware

### ■ Hardware Assist (Intel-VT, AMD-V)

- Techniques (e.g. rootkits) with stealth capabilities.
- Low-level makes detection more difficult.
- Risk to non-virtualized deployments.
  - Blue Pill: Malicious hypervisor injection for AMD-V
  - Vitriol: Leverages Intel VT-x




### ■ I/O Virtualization

- VMs natively share virtualization-aware I/O devices.
  - Virtual Ethernet Cards (vNICs), Virtual FC HBAs (vHBAs), etc.
- How do we secure a new class of on-demand, dynamic and virtualized allocation of resources?

# Management Infrastructure

## ■ Software Threats:

- Keys to the castle.
- Vulnerabilities in management applications.
- Secure storage of Virtual Machines and management data.




## ■ Operational Threats:

- Managing risk requires new technology, skills and expertise.
- We now also factor the extremely dynamic nature of virtualization into our evaluation of overall risk.

# Vulnerabilities by Year

**XFDB Search: VMware, Xen, Virtual PC, QEMU, Parallels, etc.**



# Operational and Organizational Implications



# Organizational Ownership?


- Who owns the Virtual [Fill in the Blank] ?

Network Admin

Server Admin

Application Owners

Data Custodians



## Organizational Ownership?

- **Traditional disciplines and functions still require competence**
- **Separation/Segregation of Duties remains critically important**
- **Care and Feeding of the Virtual Infrastructure will also be required**
  - Are you likely to have a mix of Physical and Virtual Servers?
  - Are you likely to have a heterogeneous mix of Virtual platforms?



## Politics of Ownership

- **“Turf Wars” and “Land Grabs” are possible**
- **“Hot Potato” is also possible**
- **“Finger Pointing” is probable**




## New Operational Challenges

- **Find the Server...**
  - Live Migration makes servers harder to track
- **Configuration/Patch Management**
  - Pause/Offline features impact:
    - Audits
    - Scanning
    - Patching
  - Boot Prone?
- **Image Management**
  - Storage
  - Version Control



## Operational Controls

- **Discipline, Discipline, Discipline**
- **What are your policies for use of Virtualization?**
  - Which Servers can be clustered?
  - Which Servers cannot be clustered?
- **What are your controls for provisioning?**
  - Easy to slip into Virtual Sprawl
  - Two Key System?





# Common Mistakes

## Elective Risk

- **Never use Type 2 Server Virtualization for Production**
  - True Story...
- **These “Free” versions of the platform are meant for Testing**
- **Type-2 VMM specific vulnerabilities**


## Failure to Establish Policy

**Before it gets away from you...**

- **Establish Clear Use Guidelines**
- **Establish Clear Roles & Responsibilities**
- **Establish Controls for Provisioning**
- **Establish Intelligent Image Management**
- **Establish Security Guidelines**
- **Establish Compliance Requirements**

## Failure to Consider Compliance

- **Will you still be PCI Compliant?**
  - Consult your Auditors **Early and Often**
  
- **PCI DSS 2.2.1 states:** “Implement only one primary function per server”
  - How does your auditor interpret this?
  - What I’ve seen...
  
- **Anticipate Future Regulatory Granularity**
  - Right now Virtualization is ahead of Compliance




## Failure to Involve Security

- **By default, Virtualization reduces your security posture**
  - New attack surfaces
  - New operational risks
  - New availability risks
  - Increased complexity that comes with beneficial features
    - E.g. Live Migration
- **Security Analysis/Design can inform smart compensating controls and best practices while countermeasures mature**

## Failure to Control Live Migration

- **Cascading Failover Example**
  - True Story...
- **We often overlook the fluid realities of Live Migration**
  - E.g VMotion



## “Silver Bullet” Virtual Appliances

- **Today’s Virtual Security Appliances are very nascent**
  - Coverage is limited
  - There is NO Silver Bullet
  - Buzz Words and Snake Oil abound
  - Realistic expectations can help reduce over-confidence in these products
  
- **Security will improve as Virtual Platforms release their Security APIs and as Security Vendors leverage them**



**What Can I Do?**

# Securing Virtualization: Today

## First Generation Virtualization Security:


- Install security in each guest VM.
- Apply defense-in-depth.
- Lock-Down Management.
- Segment networks with VLANs.
- Use stand-alone security appliances.

## Potential Limitations:

- New VMs need security provisioning.
- Redundant security = more resources.
- Management nightmare.
- Inter-VM network traffic analysis.
- Implicit trust in the VMM



We can do better! - Integrate security into the Virtual infrastructure, don't bolt it on.



# Securing Virtualization: Tomorrow

## Next Generation Virtualization Security:


- Apply defense-in-depth.
- Shrink the management stack.
- Install Security VM on each machine.
- Integrate Security VM with VMM.

## Security VM Features:

- Centralized network protection.
- Agent-less host protection.
- Policy-based MAC and isolation.
- VM NAC, assessment, and control.

## Additional Security:

- Hypervisor attestation (TPM)
- VM attestation (vTPM)





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Questions?

## Further Reading

- **Chris Hoff's BLOG "Rational Survivability"**
  - <http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/>
  - <http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/virtualization/index.html>
  - Ongoing Virtualization Thought Leadership
- **Neil MacDonald of Gartner**
  - Several Excellent Research Notes
- **X-Force Threat Research**
  - [http://www.iss.net/x-force\\_threat\\_insight\\_monthly/index.html](http://www.iss.net/x-force_threat_insight_monthly/index.html)
  - <http://blogs.iss.net/>
- **Center for Internet Security Benchmarking**
  - [http://www.cisecurity.org/bench\\_vm.html](http://www.cisecurity.org/bench_vm.html)