

Practise What You Preach: a study on

tech-savvy readers' immunity to social

engineering techniques

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Introduction



Social Engineering

- process of deceiving people into giving you access to confidential information
- an art, a combination of creativity and skill.



Introduction



Social Engineering

- each attack has its unique features **BUT...**
- they all tend to follow the same steps:
 information gathering



relationship development





implementation.

Introduction



 the number of articles, news reports, stories connected to "cyber-security" is greater than before

SO...

 the number of "security-savvy users" has increased considerably

BUT...

 scammers are still doing their jobs very well due to inherent human weaknesses -> directly linked to the psychological and emotional background of the targeted persons



Methodology



- 2 types of analysis: qualitative and quantitative
- Qualitative analysis The Health Belief Model (HBM), Theory of Reasoned Action; Personal or Moral Norms, Persuasive Communication, Identity Theory, Risk Homeostasis







Aim:

- -to identify situations in which tech-savvy commentators/forum members willingly break/testify to having broken data security rules they are well aware of
- to test the explanatory models against rulebreaking situations that are relevant to online safety
- to "measure" the distance between norm and action

Theoretical background - Summary



- Health Belief Model (HBM)- desire to avoid an incident (infection, data theft, breach of privacy) vs belief that a prescribed action will prevent the incident
- 2. Theory of Reasoned Action personal or moral norms: users continue interacting with an unknown person even when the suspicion of a scam has already arisen
- **3. Persuasive Communication** "who says what to whom"; linguistic clues why users manage/do not manage to avoid scam traps
- **4. Identity Theory -** membership into a specific online community perceived as rendering individuals immune to security risks
- 5. Risk Homeostasis level of acknowledged risk: users engage in potentially dangerous interactions to test opponents' technical knowledge and skills



What defines tech-savvy users here:


- they read and comment on news pertaining to the data security industry/ know about and communicate on tech support forums
- demonstrate some degree of data security knowledge (awareness of the existence of scams and of scam proving methods, awareness, even post factum, of social engineering techniques)



Typology of analyzed situations based on:

- perceived likelihood of a data security incident versus action taken to prevent it
- personal norms preventing action in interactions posing a data security risk
- 3. perceived elements of *persuasive communication* versus reasons why such elements were ignored
- 4. acknowledged degree of risk taken in interactions/incidents posing a data security risk.





Perceived likelihood of incident- low -> No action

I didn't immediately suspect anything; the guy sounded he was actually in a call center and he was very confident in his manner -> I noticed that to a degree, but....

The victim attempts to question the veracity of the caller's claim, but fails to take action in the first place because of the caller's position of authority as support center representative






Personal norm helps the victim decide against the course of action suggested by the scammer.

When asked for a 79£ payment, the victim puts an end to the conversation for fear of her husband's reaction to her making such an expense.





Subjective level of risk accepted in cases where the suspicion of scam arises.

The forum member starts by saying that he <u>willingly</u> followed the unknown caller's directions "till he tried to sell me something or do something really suspicious".






Distance between rule and action under rule; Low perceived risk -> no preventative action plus extra info volunteered

The forum member initially acknowledges the risk posed by password sharing, but chooses to disregard it, which leads to his/her being exposed as not having a very clear idea about a social network account's closedown.






Distance between rule and action under rule; Low perceived risk -> no preventative action plus extra info volunteered

Commenting on an article advising readers on how to create a strong password, the user ends up revealing his own version of a password creation mechanism.



I will state this once again. I have been a Mac user since 1985. Since then I have worked at many Mac-only advertising agencies and most of my friends are designers & writers who use Mac's in their personal lives as well as work lives. And I have never known one single Mac user who has ever had a computer virus, trojan horse, or malware. Conversely I've only met a few PC users who haven't had such problems.



The best protection against malware and viruses on any system is the user. The user being careful. The problem with people thinking they are safe because of the hardware is that they will fall for stupid things. Don't buy antivirus, just be informed and careful.

Constructed identity and objective rule vs personal norm

A form of prescribed conduct — use of an antivirus on Mac devices- is broken due to the existence of a subjective reason— I have not seen this happening to anyone around me—strengthened by the respective person's membership in a group considered to be immune to risks—Mac users never get infected.

(4092 comments)

Same is true on Mac or Windows

Posted by

May 21, 2012 9:32 AM (PDT)



Hypotheses:

H1: The **higher** the interviewees' security/privacy **knowledge**, the **stricter** their **attitude**/conduct towards privacy.

H2: The **more** interviewees **use the Internet to impress the others**, the **less strict** they are about the privacy of their data.

H3: The **higher** the **level of** interviewees' **narcissism**, the **less strict** their attitude about private information disclosure.



SURVEY:

-643 tech savvy users

- time frame: 2 months

-Narcissism – 'I am an extraordinary person, I deserve a lot of attention'

Information disclosed	%
Personal information	
Address and phone	94
Parents' names	81
Information about their family	80
Job/Interests	
Strategies, future plans	97
Information about co-workers	93
Information about the company they work for	91
Passwords	
Type of passwords	82
Other info about their passwords	53
Image for the others	
Others' opinions about them	96



NARCISSISM



- could predict the likelihood of users protecting their sensitive data.
- related to presenting oneself positively in front of a large audience



If users are admired and appreciated by the others, they enthusiastically disclose a lot of sensitive information in the discussions.

CONCLUSIONS



- -Low levels of perceived risk or a specific degree of acceptable risk, personal norms, membership in a community, persuasive communication may cause users to break security rules they are aware of.
- The distance between prescribed and actual action depends on the salience of one or several of these elements — personal "gullibility" factor
- The experiment revealed interesting results, but it certainly does not provide the last word in the privacy debate.



Thank You!