# Surviving 0-days

reducing the window of exposure

Andreas Lindh, VB2013



#### About me

- Security analyst/architect
- Used to work for Volvo IT
- Defender by profession
- @addelindh on Twitter




#### So what's this about?

- Software vulnerabilities, exploits and the current defense model
- A suggested way of improving that model



### Defense





#### Legacy implementation

- Perimeter protection
- Access controls
- System hardening
- Antivirus



#### Evolution

- All the legacy and more:
  - SIEM
  - DLP
  - Application firewalls
  - Etc.
- Basically, more tools




#### Client-side attacks





### Got protection?





#### What does this mean?

- The perimeter changed
- Our defenses didn't
- Antivirus to the rescue?



#### The New York Times hack





#### Symantec Statement Regarding New York Times Cyber Attack

Created: 31 Jan 2013 | 8 comments



Symantec Corp.













As a follow-up to a story run by the New York Times on Wednesday Jan. 30, 2013 announcing they had been the target of a cyber attack, Symantec (NASDAQ: SYMC) developed wing statement:

"Advanced attacks like the ones the New York Times described ollowing article, (http://nyti.ms/TZtr5z), underscore how important it is for companies, countries and ers to make sure they are using the full capability of security solutions. The advanced capabiliti dpoint offerings, including our unique cally target sophisticated attacks. Turning on only reputation-based technology and behavior-based blocking the signature-based anti-virus components of endpoint states alone are not enough in a world that is changing daily from attacks and threats. essive in deploying solutions that offer a combined approach to security Anti-virus software alone is not enough.



### So how did we get here?

- Human nature
  - Easier to buy tools than to work hard
  - Bad prioritization
- Defense isn't sexy



"Put another way, n people want to fix security holes, 10n people want to exploit security holes, and 100000n want Tetris."

(Dan Kaminsky)



### But we patch, right?





#### Well, sort of but...

- We do it slowly
- Sometimes we can't patch
  - Legacy systems
  - 3<sup>rd</sup> party systems



#### HD Moore's law





### What about 0-days?





### The Microsoft report



## Software Vulnerability Exploitation Trends

Exploring the impact of software mitigations on patterns of vulnerability exploitation



### This can't be good...

 46% of Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities exploited before patch available in 2012

Source: Software Vulnerability Exploitation Trends



#### ...and remember this?

- Dec 2012 Jan 2013
- The watering hole attack

















## There is no flashy fix.



### Priorities, priorities





#### Back to basics


- Get re-acquainted with our environments
- Start using the tools we already have
- Focus on what matters



#### Hardening

- Usually only done high level
- Not that effective anymore
- Why don't we do it to software?







### Learning from history

- Where?
- What?
- Exploitability?
- Protection?



### Software hardening

- Exploit mitigation
  - ASLR, DEP, EMET, etc.
- Secure configuration
  - Software Restriction Policy
  - Native security settings



#### Does it work?

- The Exploit intelligence Project
- Statistics for 2009-2010:

Exploit and related defenses	No. of exploits
Memory corruption	19
Defeated by data execution prevention	14
Defeated by address space layout randomization	17
Defeated by the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit	19
Logic flaws	8
Defeated by not using Java in the Internet zone	4
Defeated by not including EXEs in PDFs	1
Defeated by not using Firefox or Foxit Reader	2



#### Does it work now?


- Better native defenses
  - WinXP vs Win7
  - IE7 vs IE9
- Reduced # of attack vectors being used in mass attacks

Source: The Exploit Intelligence Project



### Exploit origins

- All memory corruption exploits came from APT campaigns or the VUPEN blog
- All Java exploits came from security researchers




Source: The Exploit Intelligence Project

APT CampaignsSecurity Researchers



#### Are we secure yet?





### More hardening

- System
- Network
- People and process






### Reducing exposure



 Hardening will proactively reduce the risk scale of the Window Of Exposure.




But what about when things inevitably change?





#### Threat intel





## Plug the gaps






#### To summarize

- Priorities is key
- We need to get back to working with our environments
- This work is never done



### Finally



(where it counts)



#### Questions?

#### Contact

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- Twitter: @addelindh
- Phone: +1-555-YEAHRIGHT

#### Sources:

- Software Vulnerability Exploitation Trends:
   <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=39680">http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=39680</a>
- The Exploit Intelligence Project / Dan Guido:
   <a href="http://www.trailofbits.com/research/#eip">http://www.trailofbits.com/research/#eip</a>

