


# "I am not the D'r.0,1d You are Looking For": An Analysis of Android Malware Obfuscation

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# Making a Hash of it?



Default detection strategy  
Checksums & Cloud-lookups



Resource limitations  
Memory, Disk space, Power




Relatively primitive obfuscation  
Previously...

# Metamorphosis




Windows style...

# Typical APK Structure



# Obfuscating Classes.dex via the Build



# String Manipulation: Android.Obad.A

## String Decryptor

```

[011b9c] com.android.system[011b9c] com.android.system.admin.oC11c11.oC11c11:(II)Ljava/lang/String;
011bac: d806 0662      |011bac: d806 0662      |0000
011bba: 2200 0700      |011bba: 2200 0700      |0002
private static String oC11c11(int iParam1, int iParam2)
{
    int j;
    byte[] arrayOfByte2 = o11c1c1c;
    int i = 0;
    byte[] arrayOfByte1 = new byte[11];
    int k;
    iParam1 = iParam1 + 98;
    if (arrayOfByte2 == null)
        k = 11;
    for (j = 0; ; j = arrayOfByte2[iParam2])
    {
        iParam2++;
        iParam1 = -1 + (k + j);
        arrayOfByte1[i] = (byte)iParam1;
        i++;
        if (i >= 11)
            break;
        k = iParam1;
    }
    return new String(arrayOfByte1, 0);
}

```

```

add-int/lit8 v6, v6, #int 98 // #62
new-instance v0, Ljava/lang/String; // type@0087
sget-object v5, Lcom/android/system/admin/oC11c11;<snip>
const/4 v4, #int 0 // #0
const/16 v1, #int 11 // #b
new-array v1, v1, [B // type@00a0
if-nez v5, 0015 // +000a
const/16 v2, #int 11 // #b
const/4 v3, #int 0 // #0
add-int/lit8 v7, v7, #int 1 // #01
add-int/2addr v2, v3
add-int/lit8 v6, v2, #int -1 // #ff
int-to-byte v2, v6
aput-byte v2, v1, v4
add-int/lit8 v4, v4, #int 1 // #01
const/16 v2, #int 11 // #b
if-lt v4, v2, 0023 // +0007
const/4 v2, #int 0 // #0
invoke-direct {v0, v1, v2}, Ljava/lang/String;<snip>
return-object v0
move v2, v6
aget-byte v3, v5, v7
goto 0010 // -0016

```

**Randomised & tokenised variables**



The diagram illustrates the mapping between high-level code and assembly instructions:

- `byte[] arrayOfByte2 = o11c1c1c;` maps to `sget-object v5, Lcom/android/system/admin/oC11c11;<snip>`
- `byte[] arrayOfByte1 = new byte[11];` maps to `new-array v1, v1, [B // type@00a0`
- `iParam1 = iParam1 + 98;` maps to `add-int/lit8 v6, v6, #int 98 // #62`
- `iParam1 = -1 + (k + j);` maps to `add-int/lit8 v6, v2, #int -1 // #ff`
- `arrayOfByte1[i] = (byte)iParam1;` maps to `int-to-byte v2, v6` and `aput-byte v2, v1, v4`
- `return new String(arrayOfByte1, 0);` maps to `invoke-direct {v0, v1, v2}, Ljava/lang/String;<snip>`

# Proguard

“... **obfuscates** your code by removing unused code and **renaming classes, fields and methods** with **semantically obscure names**. The result is a smaller sized .apk file that is more **difficult to reverse engineer**”

- <http://developer.android.com/tools/help/proguard.html>

- Classes: `.myclass(es) -> .a(,b,c,d,...)`
- Methods & variables: explicit string references stripped

# Massaging the DEX Header

Strong  
content  
validation

No  
timestamp

No  
unused  
metadata  
fields

| Entry                  | Type             | Description  |
|------------------------|------------------|--|
| Signature              | BYTE[0x8]        | DEX_FILE_MAGIC. Currently "dex\n035\0"                         |
| Checksum               | DWORD            | adler32 data corruption check                                  |
| Hash                   | BYTE[0x14]       | SHA1 data security check                                       |
| File_size              | DWORD            | Size of entire file on disk                                    |
| Header_size            | DWORD            | Currently 0x70   |
| Endianness_flag        | DWORD            | 0x12345678 (little-endian) or 0x78563412 (big-endian)          |
| Link_size              | DWORD            | Link section size, or 0 if not statically-linked               |
| Link_raw_offset        | DWORD            | Offset from start of file or 0 if not statically-linked        |
| Map_raw_offset         | DWORD            | Offset from start of file to map item, 0 if absent             |
| String_ids_sz_off_pair | { DWORD, DWORD } | Size and location from start of file to string id list         |
| Type_ids_sz_off_pair   | { DWORD, DWORD } | Size and location from start of file to type id list           |
| Proto_ids_sz_off_pair  | { DWORD, DWORD } | Size and location from start of file to prototype id list      |
| Field_ids_sz_off_pair  | { DWORD, DWORD } | Size and location from start of file to field id list          |
| Method_ids_sz_off_pair | { DWORD, DWORD } | Size and location from start of file to method id list         |
| Class_def_sz_off_pair  | { DWORD, DWORD } | Size and location from start of file to class definition list  |
| Data_sz_off_pair       | { DWORD, DWORD } | Size (aligned) and location from start of file to data section |

# DEX Byte-code Obfuscation: **Nop**

## Original byte code

```
0009e0: 0000          |0000: nop // spacer *****
0009e2: 1a01 0000     |0001: const-string v1, ""
0009e6: 1200          |0003: const/4 v0, #int 0
0009e8: 0000          |0004: nop // spacer *****
0009ea: 6e10 2800 0700 |0005: invoke-virtual {v7},
Ljava/lang/String;.length: ()I
0009f0: 0a04          |0008: move-result v4
```


# DEX Byte-code Obfuscation: **Goto**

## Original byte code

```

0009ee: 3440 0300 |0007: if-lt v0, v4, 000a // +0003
0009f2: 1101      |0009: return-object v1
0009f4: 280c      |000a: goto 0016 // +000c <----- *****
0009f6: 1304 4100 |000b: const/16 v4, #int 65 // #41
0009fa: 3442 0600 |000d: if-lt v2, v4, 0016 // +0006
0009fe: 1304 5a00 |000f: const/16 v4, #int 90 // #5a
000a02: 3742 0a00 |0011: if-le v2, v4, 001e // +000a
000a06: 1304 6100 |0013: const/16 v4, #int 97 // #61
000a0a: 2806      |0015: goto 001b // +0006 <----- *****
000a0c: 6e20 2700 0700 |0016: invoke-virtual {v7, v0},
Ljava/lang/String;.charAt
000a12: 0a02      |0019: move-result v2
000a14: 28f1      |001a: goto 000b // -000f <----- *****
000a16: 3442 0800 |001b: if-lt v2, v4, 0020 // +0008

```



# DEX Byte-code Obfuscation: **Move & Binop**



Original byte code

```
000a14: 1309 3a00 |001a: const/16 v9, #int 58 // #3a
000a18: d098 4000 |001c: add-int/lit16 v8, v9, #int 64 // #40
000a1c: 0184      |001e: move v4, v8
000a1e: 3642 0a00 |001f: if-gt v2, v4, 0029 // +000a
000a22: e006 0208 |0021: shl-int/lit8 v6, v2, #int 8 // #08
000a26: d766 0090 |0023: xor-int/lit16 v6, v6, #int -28672 //
#9000
000a2a: d762 00b0 |0025: xor-int/lit16 v2, v6, #int -20480 //
#b000
000a2e: e102 0208 |0027: shr-int/lit8 v2, v2, #int 8 // #08
000a32: 8e23      |0029: int-to-char v3, v2
```

# DEX Byte-code Obfuscation: **Invoke**


Dynamic method call via reflection

```
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
//Some other directives here
try {
Class cls = Class.forName("com.some.ClassName");
Object obj = cls.newInstance();
//Inspect class for method and invoke
Method mthd = cls.getDeclaredMethod(decr_mthd_str, null);
mthd.invoke(obj, null);
```

# DEX Byte-code Obfuscation via JNI

Source: 'Code Protection in Android' – Schulz, uni-bonn.de


## The Dropper



# DEX Byte-code Obfuscation via JNI

Source: 'Code Protection in Android' – Schulz, uni-bonn.de

## The Self-modifier



# Detection Strategies



Checksums will not work very well  
But judicious parsed object matching possible



Cloud scan: time lag and confidentiality issues



Dexopt: updated to flag non-standard code/data



IEEE Taggant System: Dexguard, Arxan, etc  
But what about free Proguard?

# Queries

