

Sizing Cybercrime: incidents and accidents, hints and allegations



Stephen Cobb, CISSP Senior Security Researcher



Stop wasting money on measuring cybercrime Spend it on the police instead.

Ross Anderson, 2013





Sizing cybercrime?

How much is there?

TOO MUCH!

What does it cost us?





The total cost of cybercrime?







Why measure crime?

- 1. Inform crime reduction initiatives
- 2. Enhance local and national responses to crime
- 3. Identify gaps in response to crime
- 4. Provide intelligence and risk assessment
- 5. Identify preventative measures
- 6. Educate and inform the public






ENJOY SAFER TECHNOLOGY"


Fafinski, S., Dutton, W. and Margetts, H. (2010) Mapping and Measuring Cybercrime, Oxford Internet Institute Working Paper No. 18, SSRN Working Paper Series.

Risk managers need to know














MARKETS	MOTIVES	METRICS
Law Makers		
Law Enforcers		Type of crime
Judiciary	Strategy	Impact
Policy Makers		Prevalence
Victims - Persons	Resources	
Victims - Groups		Type of deterrence
Public and Press	Performance	Cost
Security Managers		Effectiveness
Solution Providers		



And there could be good news



Based on FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Data






When did we start measuring crime?

- André-Michel Guerry
 - On moral statistics of France 1832
- Correlated statistics from all districts

 Number of persons receiving education
 Reports of property crime
- Shocker! Areas with highest rates of property crime matched areas of higher education
- The world's first crime maps and infographics





ENJOY SAFER TECHNOLOGY

Many challenges in counting crime

- What counts?
 - Crimes reported to authorities
 - Crimes investigated
 - Crimes proven in a court of law
- US and UK track crimes reported
- But they also survey households
- The "dark figure" of crime will persist

a certain unknown number of crimes of all kinds are undetected

Dr. Michel Kabay



Measuring computer crime

- Began with SRI collecting cases of "abuse"
- Donn Parker's Crime by Computer book: 1976
- First Survey of Computer Crime Studies: 1980
 - John Taber identified several issues
 - Crimes and abuses were confused
 - Crime stories persist even if erroneous
 - Taber advised skepticism
 - Multiple parties may benefit from construing computer crime as problematic





Computer surveys past

- UK Audit Commission 1981
- CSI Computer Crime & Security Survey 1996
- Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) 2000
- CERT-CSO-USSS (Microsoft Deloitte PWC) 2004
- U.S. National Computer Security Survey 2005

 Cybercrime Against Businesses







NCSS 2005 was largest ever

- Response rate 23% with 8,000+ firms
- CSI/CERT/PwC averaged 15% and 500
- Despite size: "not sufficient to support national or industry-level estimates"
- 22 million security incidents reported
 - But 20 million were defined as "other"
 - "spyware, adware, phishing, and spoofing"
- NCSS was never repeated

 DoJ now refers you to CERT-CSO-USSS-PwC





Use and abuse: 2003

- Ryan & Jefferson: The Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Statistics in Information Security Research
- Analyzed 14 different surveys
 - 12 compounded erroneous extrapolations of data by failing to limit responses to one per company
 - Cost figures problematic
 - If 497 of 500 report less than \$100K lost to security incidents but 3 report \$200 million lost the what is the average loss for the population?
 - If those 3 are from the same firm





Sex, lies, and cybercrime surveys

- 2012 Florêncio & Herley
- Rip into methodology
- Outliers and exaggeration

 The lifetime sex partner problem
- Solution?
 - Large stratified random samples are necessary if you want to generalize results
 - But even 8,000 may not be enough

Can any faith whatever be placed in the surveys we have? No, it appears not.

> Florêncio and Herley





Any upside to surveys?

- Asking people what they think about crime is a safer bet, and can be useful
 - For example: the EU Barometer, Blackhat survey
- Reports about things that actually happened

 Can be instructive if used appropriately
 For example: Verizon DBIR
- But we're still in trouble if there's a 250X discrepancy in cost per record breached
 - Ponemon says \$145 but Verizon says \$0.58





A sad story

US cybersecurity: Progress stalled Key findings from the 2015 US State of Cybercrime Survey

July 2015







A code of conduct?


- I will never cite cybercrime statistics without the appropriate caveats
- I will always state exactly what is being measured and by whom
- Let's write the rest...

Add cool stock photo here to spice things up for the VB 2015 audience. Maybe mention lunch time?





But I still say we need metrics




Based on FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Data





Even if the news is bad



Based on FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Data





Thank you, enjoy lunch!

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