UNPACK YOUR TROUBLES: .NET PACKER TRICKS AND COUNTERMEASURES

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Other: motorbiker, mountain hiker, climber



Outline

- Object-oriented file format
- .NET analysing
- LoadAssembly
- UserString
- API





Object-oriented file format

Program structure is kept in executable:

- Object (classes, methods, fields) in tables
- Referenced with tokens in CIL
- User method names



Object-oriented file format

Program structure is kept in executable:

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IL_0026: callvirt instance void bigTestSample.TestCases::WriteStringOnConsole(string)

_00000026:

6F 04 00 00 06

callvirt 0x06000004



ESET ENJOY SAFER TECHNOLOGY

Analysing .NET samples

• Static analysis (decompilers)

good for non-protected samples, bad (or imposible) for obfuscation

• Deobfuscators

support for every new version problem with patched or custom packers



Analysing .NET samples

• <u>Debugging</u>

symbols, runtime sources
winDbg + sos.dll plugin (!bpmd, !dumpmd)

• Other

emulating, profiling, ...



Packer – next layer loading

- Like old-fashioned native packer decrypt & execute next layer
- .NET has special API Assembly.Load()

```
byte[] rawAssembly;
using (MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream())
{
    manifestResourceStream.CopyTo(memoryStream);
    rawAssembly = memoryStream.ToArray();
}
Assembly assembly = Assembly.Load(rawAssembly);
Console.WriteLine("Assembly loaded\n");
assembly.EntryPoint.Invoke(null, new object[]
{
    args
});
Console.WriteLine("Assembly invoked\n");
```

(some packers, bladabindi malware family, ...)



wikipedia.org

Packer – next layer loading

Assembly.Load() – solution – catching next layer MZ during loading

bp mscorwks!CLRMapViewOfFileEx + 0x26 "da eax" /
bp clr!AssemblyNative::LoadFromBuffer "dd (edx - 4) l1; da edx"

- NFT $\sim \sqrt{10}$

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κ.																			

- 1 0 20210



clr

Packer – next layer loading

next hint (AV):

Loaded MZ is kept in memory – it can be monitored:

- New-allocated memory region
- Mapped, RW
- MZ at the begin

Probably it is executable loaded with a call to Assembly.Load() \bigcirc



User strings



#US (UserString stream):

Offset	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	- 7	8	- 9	A	В	С	D	Е	F	Ascii
00000000	00	55	2E	00	6E	00	65	00	74	00	20	00	74	00	65	00	.Un.e.tt.e.
00000010	73	00	74	00	53	00	61	00	6D	00	70	00	6C	00	65	00	s.t.S.a.m.p.l.e.
00000020	20	00	2D	00	20	00	63	00	6F	00	6E	00	73	00	6F	00	c.o.n.s.o.
00000030	6C	00	65	00	20	00	76	00	65	00	72	00	73	00	69	00	l.ev.e.r.s.i.
00000040	6F	00	6E	00	20	00	2D	00	20	00	76	00	31	00	2E	00	o.nv.1
00000050	30	00	ΟA	00	ΟA	00	01	25	73	00	74	00	72	00	69	00	0 %s.t.r.i.

User strings - obfuscation

ldstr ".net testSample - console version - v1.0\n\n"

- call string 'D'::'D'(string, int32)
- Every *ldstr* opcode is changed into call to decrypt method.
- Crypted strings are kept in:
 - Manifest resources
 - Static data fields
 - #US stream (crypted)



User strings - obfuscation

DecryptString methods are similar – they use:

- !<u>bpmd</u> mscorlib.dll System.String.CreateStringFromEncoding (confusers, eziriz, smartAssembly, cryptoobfuscator, codewall)
- !<u>bpmd</u> mscorlib.dll System.String.Intern (yano, babel)

* used also by runtime

!bpmd - (sos.dll) breakpoint for NGENed method

Ngen.exe - The Native Image Generator



User strings - obfuscation

Classic strings (*ldstr* opcode)

bp mscorwks!GlobalStringLiteralMap::GetStringLiteral \
 bp clr!StringLiteralMap::GetStringLiteral

```
01204032 ".net testSample - console versio"
01204072 "n - v1.0.."
eax=0053d6a0 ebx=0033e42c ecx=0053d6a0 edx=0053d6ac esi=0053c940 edi=00000000
eip=792314d5 esp=0033e3b0 ebp=0033e3f0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000206
mscorwks!GlobalStringLiteralMap::GetStringLiteral:
```



API – in CIL code

Obfuscation:

- Hide CIL code
 - Restore with Module::.cctor()
 - Restore with CompileMethod() hook
- Flow obfuscation
 - Confuse decompilation and byte patterns



API – in CIL code

Hide CIL code - solution – catching API during JIT resolving

bp mscorwks!MethodTable::MapMethodDeclToMethodImpl "!<u>dumpmd</u> dwo (esp+4)"
bp clr!MethodTable::MapMethodDeclToMethodImpl "!<u>dumpmd</u> ecx"

```
!DumpMD <Method Descriptor>
   -> Shows Method Descriptor info. We can see Code Address if method
   is jitted.
```

Method Name:	System.Math.Max(UInt32,	UInt32)
Class:	721b2db4	
MethodTable:	725d09cc	
mdToken:	06000f22	
Module:	72121000	
IsJitted:	ves	
CodeAddr:	72c34070	
Transparency:	Transparent	

How to use it?

- Windbg scripts https://bitbucket.org/marcin_hartung/vb_unpackyourtroubles
- VB whitepaper

```
$$ runtime 4.0 - set breakpoint for display calls
.block
{
    $$ comment - load with $$><c:\wdbg\api_v4.wds
    sxe ld clr
    g
    .cordll -u -1
    .loadby sos clr
    bp clr!MethodTable::MapMethodDeclToMethodImpl "!dumpmd ecx"
}</pre>
```



How to use it?

- Next work standalone analyser (with hooking)
 - Internal runtime methods hook by byte patterns
 - *!bpmd* problem NGENed functions (undocumented, complicated)
 - *!dumpmd* problem Method Descriptor object must be parsed



References

- CFF explorer
- ILSpy
- Msdn
- .NET sources

More in the whitepaper...





