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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO ASSIST WITH RANSOMWARE CRYPTANALYSIS

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Before



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Problem: Ransomware Analysis

Ransomware attack investigation questions:

- Which cipher was used in an attack?
- How does a ransomware generate encryption key(s) and where stores them for future decryption?
- Is it possible to obtain or generate a decryption key or create a decryption tool?

Problem - 2

Custom or hardcoded ciphers in ransomware



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The young researcher

Kateryna Vitiuk - a master student at NURE, Ukraine

- Studies Cyber Security at NURE
- Interested in anti-ransomware research

- Is developing a distributed ledger-based system for her graduation work.

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Scope

Ransomware with hardcoded ciphers

- AES-NI, XData
- Locky
- **TeslaCrypt**
- **GlobeImposter**
- **MoneroPay**
- GandCrab
- ...

Out of scope

- AES-NI
- XData
- Locky

```
__asm
{
  aesenc  xmm2, xmm4
  aesenc  xmm0, xmm4
}
v20 += 16;
_XMM4 = _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)v20);
__asm
{
  aesenc  xmm2, xmm4
  aesenc  xmm0, xmm4
}
a3 -= 32;
v20 += 16;
_XMM4 = _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)v20);
__asm
{
  aesenc  xmm2, xmm4
  aesenc  xmm0, xmm4
}
v20 += 16;
_XMM4 = _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)v20);
__asm
{
  aesenc  xmm2, xmm4
  aesenc  xmm0, xmm4
}
v20 += 16;
_XMM4 = _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)v20);
```

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TeslaCrypt 2.1 - File encryption

Session AES-256-CBC key is generated and stored in the memory





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TeslaCrypt 2.1 - C&C traffic encryption



Hardcoded AES-256-CBC key:



IV: DEADBEEF0000BEEFDEAD0000BEEFDEAD

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GlobeImposter - Config extraction

```
v0 = AllocMem(32);
SHA256(
  (int)"B231B717113902E9F788C7BD0C7ABABAF9B173A7F6B432076B82CBCB7C8149F3CF2F55A8C
  0x200u,
  v0,
  0);
dword_40CFE8 = sub_40264F(1331152, 2048);
dword_40CFEC = sub_40264F(1333224, 2048);
dword_40CFE0 = sub_40264F(1335304, 2484);
unk_146008 = 0;
GetModuleFileNameW(0, 1331152, 2048);
GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"temp", 1333224, 2048);
DecryptConfig(v0, (int)dword_4013E0, 34, 0x20u);
DecryptConfig(v0, (int)dword_401404, 38, 0x20u);
dword_40CBC0 = sub_40968A((int)dword_4013E0, 0);
dword_40CBC8 = DecryptConfig_2((int)dword_401148, (int)&dword_40CBC4, v0, 661);
dword_40D098 = DecryptConfig_2((int)dword_401430, (int)&dword_40CA98, v0, 512);
if ( !GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"appdata", &v17, 2048) )
  goto LABEL_2;
lstrcatW(&v17, L"\\");
v1 = PathFindFileNameW(1331152);
lstrcatW(&v17, v1);
v2 = lstrcmpiW(1331152, &v17);
v16 = (int)&v17;
if ( v2 )
{
  LOBYTE(v3) = GetFileAttributes((int)&v17);
  if ( !v3 && !CopyFileW(1331152, &v17, 0) )
    goto LABEL_8;
  v16 = (int)&v17;
}
AddToAutorunKey(v16);
```



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GlobeImposter - File encryption

Generated AES-256 file keys using SHA-256

IV = SHA256 (File size & 8000000Fh4)

```
v3 = a1;
v4 = *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 4);
v5 = *(_DWORD *)v4 ^ (*(_BYTE *)a2 | ((*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 1) | ((*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 2) | (*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 3) << 8)) << 8)) << 8));
v32 = *(_DWORD *)v4 ^ (*(_BYTE *)a2 | ((*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 1) | ((*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 2) | (*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 3) << 8)) << 8)) << 8));
v6 = *(_DWORD *)(v4 + 4) ^ (*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 4) | ((*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 5) | ((*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 6) | (*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 7) << 8)) << 8)) << 8));
v4 += 8;
v35 = *(_DWORD *)v4 ^ (*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 8) | ((*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 9) | ((*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 10) | (*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 11) << 8)) << 8)) << 8));
v33 = v6;
v4 += 4;
v7 = *(_DWORD *)v4 ^ (*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 12) | ((*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 13) | ((*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 14) | (*(_BYTE *)(a2 + 15) << 8)) << 8)) << 8));
v8 = v4 + 4;
v37 = v7;
for ( i = (*(_DWORD *)v3 >> 1) - 1; i > 0; --i )
{
  v9 = *(_DWORD *)v8 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v5] ^ dword_40B570[v37 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v33 >> 8] ^dword_40B170[((unsigned int)v35 >> 16) & 0xFF];
  v10 = v8 + 4;
  v11 = v9;
  v12 = *(_DWORD *)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v33] ^ dword_40B570[(unsigned int)v5 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v35 >>8] ^ dword_40B170[(v37 >> 16) & 0xFF];
  v10 += 4;
  v13 = v12;
  v14 = *(_DWORD *)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v35] ^ dword_40B570[v33 >> 24] ^ dword_40B170[((unsigned int)v5 >> 16) & 0xFF] ^dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v37 >> 8];
  v10 += 4;
  v15 = *(_DWORD *)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v37] ^ dword_40B570[(unsigned int)v35 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v32 >>8] ^ dword_40B170[(v33 >> 16) &
0xFF];
  v10 += 4;
  v16 = *(_DWORD *)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v11] ^ dword_40B570[(unsigned int)v15 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v12 >>8] ^ dword_40B170[((unsigned int)v14
>> 16) & 0xFF];
  v10 += 4;
  v32 = v16;
  v17 = *(_DWORD *)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v13] ^ dword_40B570[v11 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v14 >> 8] ^dword_40B170[((unsigned int)v15 >> 16) &
0xFF];
  v10 += 4;
  v33 = v17;
  v35 = *(_DWORD *)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v14] ^ dword_40B570[v13 >> 24] ^ dword_40B170[(v11 >> 16) & 0xFF] ^dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v15 >> 8];
  v10 += 4;
  v18 = dword_40B570[(unsigned int)v14 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v11 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[(v13 >> 16) & 0xFF];
  v5 = v32;
  v19 = *(_DWORD *)v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v15] ^ v18;
  v8 = v10 + 4;
  v37 = v19;
}
```

MoneroPay (SpriteCoin)



MoneroPay

- A victim’s computer name (%COMPUTERNAME%)
- A user name (%USERNAME%)
- A user profile strings (%USERPROFILE%)
- C&C address: jmqapf3nflatei35.onion



Salsa20 session key

Encrypting:



Decrypting:



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Signature-based detection

Ransomware	Symmetric cipher	Data source	Signature detection (Yara, KANAL PEiD)
GlobeImposter	AES-256-CBC; RC4, 16-byte key	PE file	List of primes, Big numbers, CryptGenKey import
		Memory dump	List of primes, Big numbers, CryptGenKey import, Rijndael_AES_CHAR, Rijndael_AES_LONG
TeslaCrypt	AES-256-CBC	PE file	N/A
		Memory dump	CryptGenKey import, Big numbers
MoneroPay	Salsa20, 32-byte key	PE file	N/A
		Memory dump	N/A

The proposed method

1. Obtaining patterns of the ciphers in ASM
2. Code normalization
3. Matching the crypto pattern in ransomware using the Bitap algorithm
    - diff_match_patch.match_main(code, pattern, expected location)
    - diff_match_patch.Match_Threshold = 0.5 (default)
    - diff_match_patch.Match_Distance = 1000 characters (default)
4. Obtaining diffs vectors using the Myer's algorithm for the matched patterns
5. Calculating the Levenshtein distance for diffs vectors
6. Comparing the found Levenshtein distances with the matching threshold
7. If the code is matched, add it to the library of the crypto patterns

Crypto patterns generation problem

Different compiler options:

- Optimization
  - \O1 - Minimize size
  - \O2 - Maximize speed
  - \Ox - Full optimization
- Security check (/GS-)
- Calling convention
  - _stdcall (/Gz)
  - _cdecl (/Gd)
  - _fastcall (/Gr)
  - _vectorcall (/Gv)
- Platform (x86/x64)

Size does matter

Salsa20 QR

No opt vs. Minimize size (O1)

```
; void __stdcall s20_quarterround(unsigned int *y0, unsigned int *y1, unsigned int *y2, unsigned int *y3)
s20_quarterround proc near              ; CODE XREF: s20_rowround+32↓p
                                        ; s20_rowround+67↓p ...

y0              = dword ptr  8
y1              = dword ptr  0Ch
y2              = dword ptr  10h
y3              = dword ptr  14h

                push    ebp
                mov     ebp, esp
                push    7               ; shift
                mov     eax, [ebp+y0]
                mov     ecx, [eax]
                mov     edx, [ebp+y3]
                add     ecx, [edx]
                push    ecx             ; value
                call    rotl
                mov     ecx, [ebp+y1]
                xor     eax, [ecx]
                mov     edx, [ebp+y1]
                mov     [edx], eax
                push    9               ; shift
                mov     eax, [ebp+y1]
                mov     ecx, [eax]
                mov     edx, [ebp+y0]
                add     ecx, [edx]
                push    ecx             ; value
                call    rotl
                mov     ecx, [ebp+y2]
                xor     eax, [ecx]
                mov     edx, [ebp+y2]
                mov     [edx], eax
                push    0Dh             ; shift
                mov     eax, [ebp+y2]
                mov     ecx, [eax]
                mov     edx, [ebp+y1]
                add     ecx, [edx]
                push    ecx             ; value
                call    rotl
                mov     ecx, [ebp+y3]
                xor     eax, [ecx]
                mov     edx, [ebp+y3]
                mov     [edx], eax
                push    12h             ; shift
                mov     eax, [ebp+y3]
                mov     ecx, [eax]
                mov     edx, [ebp+y2]
                add     ecx, [edx]
                push    ecx             ; value
                call    rotl
                mov     ecx, [ebp+y0]
                xor     eax, [ecx]
                mov     edx, [ebp+y0]
                mov     [edx], eax
                pop     ebp
                retn    10h
s20_quarterround endp
```

Salsa20_cut_sizeopt.txt - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

```
; =============== S U B R O U T I N E =======================================

; Attributes: bp-based frame

; void __stdcall s20_quarterround(unsigned int *y0, unsigned int *y1, unsigned int *y2, unsigned int *y3)
s20_quarterround proc near              ; CODE XREF: s20_doubleround+16↓p
                                        ; s20_doubleround+2B↓p ...

y0              = dword ptr  8
y1              = dword ptr  0Ch
y2              = dword ptr  10h
y3              = dword ptr  14h

                push    ebp
                mov     ebp, esp
                mov     edx, [ebp+y1]
                mov     ecx, [ebp+y2]
                push    esi
                mov     esi, [ebp+y3]
                push    edi
                mov     edi, [ebp+y0]
                mov     eax, [edi]
                add     eax, [esi]
                rol     eax, 7
                xor     [edx], eax
                mov     eax, [edi]
                add     eax, [edx]
                rol     eax, 9
                xor     [ecx], eax
                mov     eax, [edx]
                add     eax, [ecx]
                rol     eax, 0Dh
                xor     [esi], eax
                mov     eax, [ecx]
                add     eax, [esi]
                ror     eax, 0Eh
                xor     [edi], eax
                pop     edi
                pop     esi
                pop     ebp
                retn    10h
s20_quarterround endp
```

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Crypto patterns

Salsa20 QuarterRound crypto block in MoneroPay ransomware

‘rol eax, 7’ != ‘rol ebx, 7’



Normalization

Replace all CPU registers names with ‘operand’ string



Myer's diff algorithm



Fig. 1. An edit graph

```
@@ -390,7 +396,7 @@ def run_test_payload(test_type):
390  396              print "ERROR: Error happened when preparing the test. Shadows w
391  397
392  398      if test_type in ['MODIFY_SYSREGISTRY', 'LOCKY', 'THOR']:
393       -          final_status = add_registry_key()
     399  +          registry_status = add_registry_key()
```

Source: https://neil.fraser.name/writing/diff/myers.pdf

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Diffs vectors & Levenshtein distance

(0, 'functionprocnearpushoperandmovoperand,operand')
(-1, 'movoperand,operandmovoperand,operandpushoperandmovoperand,')
(1, 'push')
(0,'operandpushoperandmovoperand,operandmovoperand,operandaddoperand,operandroloperand,7xoroperand,operandmovoperand,operandaddoperand,operandroloperand,9xoroperand,operandmovoperand,operandaddoperand,')
(1, 'operandmovoperand,')
(0, 'operandroloperand,0Dhxoroperand,operandmovoperand,operandaddoperand,operand')
(-1, 'ror')
(1, 'pop')
(0, 'operand')
(-1, ',0Ehxoroperand,')
(1, 'pop')
(0, 'operandpopoperand')
(-1, 'pop')
(1, 'roroperand,0Ehxor')
(0, 'operand')
(-1, 'pop')
(1, ',')
(0, 'operandret')
(-1, 'n10h')
(0, 'functionendp')

Levenshtein distance: 118 characters

Results

Recognizing AES (key expansion) in the TeslaCrypt ransomware

Iteration No	1	2	3	4	5
Expected location	0	1500	3000	10000	20000
Matched location	115	1473	2986	10006	19953
Levenshtein distance	95	**60**	93	76	75
Correct match in ransomware	FALSE	**TRUE**	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

Results

Recognizing AES (key expansion) in the GlobeImposter ransomware

Iteration No	1	2	3	4	5
Expected location	100	1000	4400	10000	20000
Matched location	399	999	4425	9968	19991
Levenshtein distance	61	113	**50**	132	91
Correct match in ransomware	FALSE	FALSE	**TRUE**	FALSE	FALSE

Results

Recognizing RC4 (PRGA) in the GlobeImposter ransomware

Iteration No	1	2	3	4	5
Expected location	0	500	800	1000	1500
Matched location	340	340	828	1063	1553
Levenshtein distance	**20**	**20**	76	75	83
Correct match in ransomware	**TRUE**	**TRUE**	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

Results

Recognizing Salsa20 (quatterround) in the MoneroPay ransomware

Iteration No	1	2	3	4	5
Expected location	0	100	1000	1500	3000
Matched location	2	100	1000	1500	3094
Levenshtein distance	**118**	146	177	619	389
Correct match in ransomware	**TRUE**	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

Limitations

- Obfuscated code
- Packed code
- Differences in call trees (function hierarchy) require code roll out
  - [Workaround]: only small code patterns can be used
- The method strongly depends on the expected location of the crypto code

Conclusion

- It is possible to find the crypto primitives in ransomware with the given limitations.
- Master students can conduct research on malware and AI
- Using open source libraries prevents reinventing the wheel and boosts the research process

Acknowledgements

- Google
  - The Diff-Match-Patch libraries contributors
  - VirusTotal team
- Vlad Kolbasin, an AI/ML guru, GlobalLogic
- Dr. Anders Carlsson, General Manager of ENGENSEC project, BTH
- Prof. Vladimir Hahanov and Prof. Svetlana Chumachenko, NURE

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References

@Alex_Ad

- Research results: https://github.com/AlexanderAda/NioGuardSecurityLab/tree/master/RansomwareAnalysis/DiffMatchPatterns
- The Google's Diff-Match-Patch libraries repository, https://github.com/google/diff-match-patch
- Crypto Yara rules:
  - https://github.com/Yara-Rules/rules/tree/ae82fb6e1e3145a85f52c4856985f7743796aae6/Crypto
  - https://github.com/x64dbg/yarasigs
  - https://github.com/polymorf/findcrypt-yara
- PEiD Tool, http://peid.has.it
- Ransomware samples
  - TeslaCrypt: 9e3827dffc24d1da72cb3d423bddf4cd535fa636062e4ea63421ef327fec56ad
  - GlobeImposter: a0e5bced56025f875721043df981c400fc28e4efc68ffe42ac665633de085ab1
  - MoneroPay: ababb37a65af7c8bde0167df101812ca96275c8bc367ee194c61ef3715228ddc

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