Fighting malware and spam

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Aleksander P. Czarnowski
AVET, Poland

JAVA SECURITY IN THE ERA OF BYOD

Recent in-the-wild exploitation of the CVE-2013-0422 and CVE-2012-3174 Java vulnerabilities (which together I will refer to as the MBeanInstantiator.findClass vulnerability) has led me to some interesting thoughts about security, especially in the era of BYOD.

Even though the use of Java inside web browsers is dying out (at least it should be), the number of potential targets is still large enough for malware writers to search for vulnerabilities and put them into commercial malware packages. With the ever increasing number of devices that can run a web browser (and run Java), it is likely that if even less than 1% of them are vulnerable, it is worth the bad guys investing in vulnerability research.

When introducing important changes or new features to software, it is important always to remember to double-check your code. The root of the MBeanInstantiator.findClass vulnerability is a change in reflection API as a result of the introduction of new functionality. The ability of the exploit to bypass policies and security checks enforced by Java SecurityManager comes from the fact that not all security-related code has been upgraded to the new API correctly – in a world where the complexity of software is increasing constantly, and new releases have to be pushed out ever more quickly, security often falls by the wayside.

How many host-based IDS systems trace and can block the Java call ‘System.setSecurityManager(null)’ – which removes all Java security from the process? How many of those can stop the latest exploit without a signature update?

Whether you love or hate Java, the fact is that the number of programs that run in some kind of virtual machine on our devices is rising. As computing power and memory resources increase, this trend will become ever more prevalent. Most of these technologies (including .NET, for example) provide some form of reflection-like API and allow access to complex internal runtime structures that reach a lot further than just a bytecode representation. Things like security managers and reflection APIs are hard to get right from a security perspective. When designing such a solution you have to take into account many different situations, a lot of which are hard to imagine without proper education and relevant experience.

What does BYOD have to do with any of this? We are now in the habit of converting all our programs to mobile applications, which in many cases means converting to HTML5 and running a tablet web browser disguised as a dedicated application. HTML5 might be immune to some of the problems that plagued previous web technologies, but users tend to change their behaviour over the years, and we should take the time to learn from the past.

It concerns me greatly that my young daughter’s favourite tablet game requires access to Wi-Fi, contacts, the operating system, etc. I wonder how many hours the game’s developer dedicated to pen testing this game. Probably none. These apps are not written in assembly language but in high-level frameworks which have complex APIs like Java reflection. If I were a bad guy, I would target a high-profile game that runs with extremely high privileges (check out your app store, most of them do). Now imagine that all the employees at your workplace bring in the devices their children have been playing on – complete with malware kits already installed.

This is just the tip of the iceberg. Users are always keen to install the latest apps on their devices, so the constant patch/update cycle is alive and kicking. However, the problem comes when the time frame for fixing a high-profile vulnerability is big enough for the bad guys to make a buck on it: in some cases even a couple of hours can be long enough. Now I’m off to delete pictures from my wife’s phone since they are taking up too much space for the latest 1.6GB system update.
NEWS

RANSOMWARE BACKS UP ITS MESSAGE

The German Federal Police (Bundeskriminalamt, or BKA) warned last month about a piece of ransomware that uses its logo and claims to have suspended use of the victim’s computer on grounds of unauthorized network activity, including the viewing of child pornography. To make its claim seem more credible, the malware displays four images of child pornography (which it alludes to having found on the machine). A fine of 100 euros is demanded (with payment to be made via digital payment service uKash or Paysafecard) in order for an unlocking code to be sent to release the machine. The BKA has been at pains to point out that the message is the result of malware and is not in any way associated with the police – and stresses that under no circumstances should users pay the fine.

Meanwhile, another piece of police ransomware, dubbed ‘Kovter’, goes to even greater lengths to make its scam seem more believable – by using information gathered from the victim’s browser history.

The malware displays a (fake) warning purporting to be from the US Dept of Justice, the US Dept of Homeland Security and the FBI, claiming that the victim’s computer has been used to download and distribute illegal content. The message contains details including the computer’s IP address, its host name, and a website from which the illegal material was allegedly downloaded. The malware checks the victim’s browser history against a list of pornography sites, and if it finds a match it will display the details of the site the user has visited in the message – thus making it seem more credible. (If no match is found, the malware simply includes the details of a random pornography site.)

Ransomware is not a new phenomenon – primitive, floppy-disk-based ransomware appeared as early as 1989 – but with the perpetrators constantly refining their attack mechanisms, both technically and in social engineering terms, many experts have asserted that it will be one of the top security concerns for 2013.

CIOs SPENDING MORE TIME ON SECURITY

A recent survey of 100 UK CIOs has found that four in 10 have increased their company’s security budget compared to three years ago – and of those, more than a half (55%) have increased it by more than 25%. On average, CIOs report that they spend almost a quarter of their time managing IT security, with 37% saying the time they spend managing security has increased ‘somewhat’ or ‘significantly’ compared with three years ago. The survey, conducted on behalf of recruitment agency Robert Half Technology, found that more than three quarters of CIOs consider managing IT security to be challenging for their business.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prevalence Table – February 2013[1]</th>
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<tr>
<td>Malware Type</td>
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<td>Adware-misc</td>
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<tr>
<td>Autorun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heuristic/generic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Java-Exploit</td>
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<tr>
<td>OneScan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sirefex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crypt/Kryptik</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heuristic/generic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conficker/Downadup</td>
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<tr>
<td>Injector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iframe-Exploit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encrypted/Oblfuscated</td>
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<td>Agent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dorkbot</td>
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<tr>
<td>bProtector</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNK-Exploit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Potentially Unwanted-misc</td>
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<td>Downloader-misc</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramnit</td>
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<td>BHO/Toolbar-misc</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heuristic/generic</td>
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<td>Virut</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brontok/Rontokbro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crack/Keygen</td>
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<td>Backdoor-misc</td>
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<td>Autot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others[2]</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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</table>

[2] Readers are reminded that a complete listing is posted at http://www.virusbtn.com/Prevalence/.
MALWARE ANALYSIS 1

OGEE WHIZ
Peter Ferrie
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The programming of General-Purpose Graphics Processing Units (GPGPU) has become a common way to take advantage of the great power available on video cards. The programs, known as ‘shaders’, have a language that has evolved over the years to become something so high-level that it resembles a dialect of the C programming language. Many things can be implemented using shader programs, including the decryption of arbitrary data, and now we have a virus that does exactly that. We call it W32/Ogee.

STACKING THE DECK
The virus begins by pushing the RVA of the host entry point onto the stack, along with a pointer to the Process Environment Block. Both of these values are used in the final stage. The virus then retrieves the base address of kernel32.dll. It does this by walking the InLoadOrderModuleList from the PEB_LDR_DATA structure in the Process Environment Block (the address of kernel32.dll is always the second entry on the list). If the virus finds the PE header for kernel32.dll, it resolves the addresses of the required APIs.

The virus uses hashes instead of names, but the hashes are sorted alphabetically according to the strings they represent. This means that the export table needs to be parsed only once for all of the APIs instead of once for each API, as is common in some other viruses. Each API address is placed on the stack for easy access, but because stacks move downwards in memory, the addresses end up in reverse order in memory. This becomes important later on.

The virus resolves the addresses of just four APIs from kernel32.dll: GetProcAddress(), GetProcAddress(), LoadLibraryA() and VirtualAlloc(), but then uses only three of them (GetProcAddress() is not used). It uses the LoadLibrary() API to load glu32.dll. The address of only one API is resolved from here: gluOrtho2D(). The virus uses the GetProcAddress() API to access the copy of gdi32.dll that is loaded implicitly by glu32.dll. It is not clear why the virus doesn’t use the LoadLibrary() API instead, to avoid the need to import the GetProcAddress() API. The virus resolves the addresses of two APIs from gdi32.dll: ChoosePixelFormat() and SetPixelFormat(). It uses the GetProcAddress() API again to access the copy of user32.dll that is also loaded implicitly by glu32.dll. Once again, it is not clear why the LoadLibrary() API was not used instead. The virus never frees the DLLs, so the increased reference count should not affect anything. In fact, even if the virus attempted to free the DLLs, the behaviour of the nVidia video drivers, for example, would prevent the action from succeeding – the drivers intercept calls to the ChoosePixelFormat() API, and create a thread which does not terminate until the process does.

The virus resolves the addresses of five APIs from user32.dll: CreateWindowExA(), DefWindowProcA(), DestroyWindow(), GetDC() and ReleaseDC(). The virus uses the GetModuleHandle() API to access the copy of opengl32.dll that is loaded implicitly by glu32.dll, and resolves the addresses of 21 APIs, including wglGetProcAddress(). All of the resolved API addresses from all of the loaded DLLs are placed on the stack.

The virus caches the value of the stack pointer in a register in order to access the existing APIs as well as the APIs that are subsequently loaded. This allows the virus to access stack elements, such as the APIs, without having to keep track of the value of the stack pointer. It also has a benefit in terms of the size of the code, provided that no more than 32 DWORD elements exist above or below the cached pointer value. Of course, the value of the cached pointer can be biased at the time it is calculated, such that it points into the middle of the block of values to access, in order to maximize the number of elements that remain within the +/-32 DWORD range. There is also a secondary benefit here, but it is minor in comparison: it provides a neater way to free an accumulation of stack parameters below the cached value, simply by assigning the cached value back to the stack pointer (biased by whatever value was applied when it was cached in the first place).

WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
The virus creates a window with a width and height of zero pixels, using the class-name ‘EDIT’. The window is made as small as possible because it cannot be made invisible during the creation stage – it can only be hidden by the use of an additional API call, which presumably the virus writer wanted to avoid. ‘EDIT’ is the smallest built-in class-name, and conveniently fits within a single DWORD. The virus chooses a pixel format for the window which is intended to be 32 bits of 8/8/8/0 in RGBA format, but there is a bug in the structure layout. The bug probably results from a miscounting of the zero bytes during the dynamic structure construction, so the green shift is assigned eight bits, and the blue channel is assigned zero bits instead. Fortunately for the virus writer, this has no practical effect on the behaviour of the virus code, because the virus does not write anything to the window. In fact, none of the channels needed to be specified at all, and even the colour bit-count could have been zero. The virus sets the returned
pixel format for the window, and uses it to create the GL context.

It resolves the addresses of 18 GL APIs by name. Since opengl.dll does not export these functions in a table that the virus can parse, it must use the wglGetProcAddress() API. Interestingly, the list of names does not contain an explicit sentinel. Instead, the virus relies on the fact that a double zero appears later in the code, with no single zero in between. This makes the code extremely fragile – and could cause some trouble for any wannabe virus writers who try to alter it. The reliance on the double zero allows the virus to fetch a ‘fake’ API address which is placed on the stack automatically, and which is used as a placeholder for the next API call. All this to save a single byte of code.

The virus creates a new framebuffer object and binds to it, and then proceeds to use old-style rendering initialization, via the MatrixMode() and LoadIdentity() APIs. These APIs have been deprecated since OpenGL 3.0, but are needed to maintain compatibility with older software. This is probably another example of the extreme legacy support that the virus exhibits later.

The virus creates a square orthographic projection space that is equal to the size of the texture. This is used to hold the texture data during projection mode. The size of the texture is calculated by the first-generation sample, and never changes. To calculate the size of the texture, the virus takes the size of its code, doubles it, takes its square root to derive the size of the square that would hold the code, divides the square root by four to produce the number of DWORDs in that square, and then rounds up the result to avoid truncation. It then reloads the model view identity. Presumably, the virus avoided using the PushMatrix() and PopMatrix() APIs because it would have increased the number of APIs in use, and thus the number of elements on the stack. Increasing the number of elements on the stack could result in some elements being outside of the +/-32 DWORD range from above.

The virus creates a viewport which is used to specify the affine transformation between the internal representation and the window that it has created. The virus requires a one-to-one mapping between the two representations, to avoid scaling or wrapping of the texture. If the virus had created the window with the proper dimensions, then the viewport would have been assigned the proper dimensions too, when the context was created – in that case, there would be no need to create the viewport explicitly. Furthermore, the preceding initialization code could have been replaced by just three API calls from glut32.dll.

However, despite that DLL being present on many Windows systems, it is not installed by default – which, presumably, is the reason the virus writer did not attempt to make use of it.

A QUESTION OF TEXTURE

The virus creates three texture arrays: one to hold the encrypted code, one to hold the decryption keys, and one to hold the decrypted code. During the infection phase, the roles of the first and third texture arrays are reversed. The virus binds the three texture arrays, and then sets parameters for each texture: min filter, mag filter, wrap s and wrap t. These parameters correspond to the filters for minifying, magnifying and wrapping of a texture. Interestingly, none of these parameters is needed, since the texture will never need to be scaled, and it will always fit within the coordinate space. It seems likely that this code was copied blindly from a tutorial. The virus defines the parameters for a texture image, but does not point it to any data. Instead, in non-ATI mode, the virus defines the parameters for a texture sub-image which overlaps the parent image entirely. This sub-image points to the texture data, but since the sub-image completely covers the parent image, it is not needed at all, and the data could have been supplied by the parent image alone. It seems likely that this code was also copied blindly from a tutorial. There is an indication that the virus supports an alternative method for the texture generation for ATI cards, but this has not been verified. Finally, the texture environment is set to copy the values exactly, so that no blending or interpolation occurs.

FIFTY SHADES OF CODE

The virus creates a new program and shader object, then binds the shader source to the shader object. The shader source is very simple, and implements the formula ‘x=a+b*c’, where ‘a’ is the texture array that holds the encrypted code, ‘b’ is the texture array that holds the decryption keys, and ‘c’ is a randomly chosen modifier value. The shader source is compiled and attached to the program object, then the program is linked. The virus determines the locations of the three variables within the compiled program in order to assign them the appropriate values. It is unclear why the virus does this at this time, given that they will still be available later – one possible reason is that the register that is used to locate the variables is used for a different purpose later. However, it seems that the virus author overlooked the fact that there was a spare register that could have been used instead. By using the spare register, the virus would also have avoided the need to cache the variable locations, and that would have saved three stack elements.

PRIMITIVE GEOMETRY

The virus attaches the input and output textures to the framebuffer object, and adds the program to the rendering
pipeline. It activates a texture unit, binds the decryption key texture array to it, and then assigns the texture index to the ‘b’ variable. The virus assigns the modifier value to the ‘c’ variable. This value is selected during the infection phase. The virus selects the colour buffer for the drawing target, activates a texture unit, binds the encrypted code texture array to it, and then assigns the texture index to the ‘a’ variable. The virus defines the vertices of the primitive as a quadrilateral, defines the vertices for the square, and then initiates the rendering (decryption). It selects the colour buffer for the output, reads the decrypted code into the buffer, and then decodes the decrypted code. The need to decode the decrypted code is because the encoded form uses 32 bits to store each value, but the virus requires only the low 16 bits. After decoding the code, the virus runs it. The code begins by detaching and deleting the shader object, and deleting the program and framebuffer objects, the texture arrays and the context, and the window. At this point, the main virus body is reached.

SHARE AND ENJOY

The main virus body begins by allocating some memory and copying itself to that memory. It registers a Structured Exception Handler in order to intercept any errors that occur during infection. It also initializes the random number generator by reading a value directly from the KUSER_SHARED_DATA structure in memory, instead of using an API such as GetTickCount(). The reason for this behaviour is because no APIs were resolved earlier that could be used as the seed for the random number generator, and the virus has not resolved any additional APIs at this point. The virus chooses a random number and assigns it to the modifier value. It then generates the table of decryption keys and encrypts the code at the same time.

The Random Number Generator (RNG) is interesting in itself, since it is neither the usual GetTickCount()-based randomizer nor the Knuth-inspired algorithm. Instead, the virus uses a complex RNG known as the ‘Mersenne Twister’, named after the kind of prime number at its heart. The virus author has used this RNG in almost all of his viruses for which he requires a source of random numbers.

If either of these attempts succeed, then the virus resolves the SfcIsFileProtected() API. The reason the virus attempts to load both DLLs is that the API resolver in the virus code does not support import forwarding. The problem with import forwarding is that while the API name exists in the DLL, the corresponding API address does not. If a resolver is not aware of import forwarding, then it will retrieve the address of a string instead of the address of the code. In the case of the SfcIsFileProtected() API, the API is forwarded in Windows XP and later from sfc.dll to sfc_os.dll.

CULTURAL AWARENESS

The virus retrieves both the ASCII and Unicode versions of the required APIs. Due to the way in which the virus uses the APIs, it must swap the address of the CreateFileW() API and the CreateFileMappingA() API on the stack, even though this goes against the alphabetical ordering. The reason for the swap is that the virus requires the ASCII and Unicode versions of any given API to be sequential on the stack. This allows for transparent use of the appropriate API.

Specifically, the virus calls the GetVersion() API to determine the current Windows platform, and uses the result to select the appropriate API set (ASCII for Windows 9x/Me, and Unicode for Windows NT and later). Despite some of the virus author’s more recent creations that support only Windows NT and later, this virus still supports Windows 95! This is because the infection engine used here is the same as the one we first saw the virus author use in 2002. In fact, the only updates to the code are the addition of support for Data Execution Prevention for Windows XP and later (by setting the executable bit in the section characteristics), and the DLL imagebase resolution for Windows 7 and later (by walking the InLoadOrderModuleList list instead of the Structured Exception Handler list).

The GetVersion() API returns a bit that specifies whether the platform is Windows 9x-based (1) or Windows NT-based (0). The virus multiplies this value by four, adds the stack pointer value to it, and places the result in a register. Now, whenever the virus wishes to use an API which exists in the two forms, it simply calls the function relative to the register. As such, there is no need ever to check for the platform again. For example, the virus can call ‘[ebp+CreateFile]’, where ebp contains the platform-specific value. If ebp is zero, the CreateFileW() API is called, and if ebp is four, the CreateFileA() API is called. This is why the reverse alphabetical order is important for the API addresses on the stack, and why the CreateFileW() and the CreateFileMappingA() API addresses had to be swapped.
FILTRATION SYSTEM

After finishing with the API trickiness, the virus searches for files. The virus searches for files in the current directory and all subdirectories, using a linked list instead of a recursive function. This is important from the point of view of the virus author, because the virus infects DLLs, whose stack size can be very small. The virus avoids any directory that begins with a ‘.’. This is intended to skip the ‘.’ and ‘..’ directories, but in Windows NT and later, directories can legitimately begin with this character if other characters follow. As a result, those directories will also be skipped.

Files are examined for their potential to be infected, regardless of their suffix, and will be infected if they pass a very strict set of filters. The first of these filters is that the file must not be protected by the System File Checker that exists in Windows 98/Me, and Windows 2000 and later. Since directory searching on the Windows 9x/Me platforms uses ANSI paths, and since the SfIsFileProtected() API requires a Unicode path, the virus converts the path from ANSI to Unicode, if appropriate, before calling the API.

The remaining filters include the condition that the file being examined must be a Windows Portable Executable file, a character mode or GUI application for the Intel 386+ CPU, that the file must have no digital certificates, and that it must have no bytes outside of the image. Additionally, if the file is a DLL, then it must have an entry point.

TOUCH AND GO

When a file is found that meets the infection criteria, it will be infected. The virus resizes the file by a random amount in the range of 4KB to 6KB in addition to the size of the virus. This data will exist outside of the image, and serve as the infection marker. Interestingly, despite its reliance on exceptions during the infection process, the virus does not check that exceptions are allowed by the host – the NO_SEH (No Structured Exception Handling) flag is not cleared in the header. If the flag is not cleared, Windows will terminate the application at the moment an exception occurs.

If relocation data is present at the end of the file, the virus will move the data to a larger offset in the file and place its own code in the gap that has been created. If no relocation data is present at the end of the file, the virus code will be placed there. The virus checks for the presence of relocation data by checking a flag in the PE header. However, this method is unreliable because even though the flag causes Address Space Layout Randomization to be disabled if it is set, Windows will ignore it and use the base relocation table directly if the image must be relocated due to address conflict.

The virus increases the physical size of the last section by the size of the virus code, then aligns the result. If the virtual size of the last section is smaller than its new physical size, then the virus sets the virtual size to be equal to the physical size, and increases and aligns the size of the image to compensate for the change. The virus also changes the attributes of the last section to include the executable and writable bits. The executable bit is set in order to allow the program to run if Data Execution Prevention is enabled, and the writable bit is set to allow the decryptor to write directly to the image.

The virus alters the host entry point to point to the last section, and saves the original entry point RVA in the virus body. This allows the virus to support both Address Space Layout Randomization and the proper infection of DLLs.

Once the infection is complete, the virus calculates a new file checksum, if one existed previously, before continuing to search for more files. Once the file searching has finished, the virus will allow the host code to execute by forcing an exception to occur, which transfers control to the handler that the virus registered. This technique appears a number of times in the virus code and is an elegant way to reduce the code size, in addition to functioning as an effective anti-debugging method. Since the virus has protected itself against errors by installing a Structured Exception Handler, the simulation of an error condition results in the execution of a common block of code to exit a routine. This avoids the need for separate handlers for successful and unsuccessful code completion. The handler unregisters itself, converts the original entry point from an RVA to a VA by adding the value from the ImageBaseAddress field in the Process Environment Block, and then transfers control to it.

CONCLUSION

The use of the GPU presents unimaginable challenges for anti-malware emulators, especially given that there are two major execution environments which have quite different behaviours, and there is no easy way to determine which one is intended to be used. Fortunately, the requirement for shaders to be stored in plain text in order to be compiled means that they can be extracted by anti-malware engines and treated like scripts. When combined with the data that uses the shader, an acceptable detection becomes reasonably straightforward, even in the absence of a complete decryption.
MALWARE ANALYSIS 2

A DEEPER LOOK INTO THE ZEROACCESS CLICKBOT
Wayne Low
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Automated systems for clicking on advertisements that are displayed online for monetary gain – essentially, click fraud – has been one of the biggest concerns for online advertisers for many years. The major advertising networks, such as Google’s AdWords/AdSense, put significant effort into developing pattern recognition and detection mechanisms to identify the click patterns typically used by spammers and/or botnets engaging in click fraud.

To avoid being detected by such mechanisms, the methodology for click fraud used by botnets such as ZeroAccess (also known as clickbots) has been evolving steadily. While there are plenty of comprehensive analyses of ZeroAccess (e.g. [1]), there has been no detailed elaboration of how the ZeroAccess clickbot works internally – looking at its actions on the client machine and how it performs the click fraud operation.

The purpose of this article is to dissect the internal workings of ZeroAccess’s click fraud module and to highlight the following details of the botnet’s click fraud implementation:

- How it uses a ‘traditional’ method to initialize socket functions for overlapped I/O operations, which allows simultaneous connections that can also serve as an anti-debugging feature.
- How it only targets specific countries, most likely because it is targeting country- or region-specific advertising networks.
- How it includes functionality to randomize the clicks performed, preventing an unnaturally regular pattern that could alert suspicion from advertisers or the advertising networks.
- How it uses a window-less browser to mimic legitimate clicks, making it appear as though the fraudulent clicks came from real users.

Note: The analysis that follows uses a click fraud sample (sha1: 223b257f1e810bf106819e0ec33387712a56e175) that was downloaded from the botnet in January 2013 and differs from samples examined in previous ZeroAccess-related papers. As such, some details mentioned here, such as the TCP port, will vary from previous reports.

CLICKBOT LOADER ROUTINE

The ZeroAccess malware can arrive on a client machine via many different routes, but it does so most commonly through a dropper that includes the malware as part of its payload. Once the dropper has successfully infected the machine, it downloads additional plug-in files – including the click fraud module, which has the file extension ‘@’.

This module acts as a loader for the click fraud binary, which is embedded immediately before the memcpy function. The binary is compressed as a Microsoft Cabinet file and encoded using a simple rotate left XOR algorithm with the key 0x12345678:

```
key = 0x12345678u;
do{
    *(DWORD*)szClickfraudCode ^= key;
    key = key << 1;
    szClickfraudCode = (char *)szClickfraudCode + 4;
    --dwClickFraudCodeSize;
}while ( dwClickFraudCodeSize );
```

After the decoding operation, the binary will be decompressed using Cabinet API functions. The result of the decompression consists of a single binary file named noreloc.cod.

Figure 1: Decompressed embedded DLL module with shellcode.
Noreloc.cod consists of a shellcode and an embedded DLL file (see Figure 1). This binary file will be injected into the svchost.exe process job created by the plug-in module.

In older ZeroAccess variants, the shellcode was only found in the malware dropper. In more recent variants, similar shellcode can also be found in the click fraud module. Whatever the location, in general, it serves two purposes:

- Deploying an anti-debugging feature
- Loading an embedded MZ PE executable file.

The shellcode will register a vectored exception handler (VEH) using RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler. An exception must be triggered to invoke this exception handler. In order to achieve this, the shellcode sets a hardware breakpoint at debug register Dr3 through a context structure. This context is then set to the thread using ZwSetContextThread.

The purpose of VEH is to intercept ZwMapViewOfSection in order to impersonate a legitimate process running malicious code (see Listing 1).

LdrLoadDll has a function prototype as follows:

```c
NTSTATUS NTAPI LdrLoadDll(
    IN PWSTR DllPath OPTIONAL,
    IN PULONG DllCharacteristics OPTIONAL,
    IN PUNICODE_STRING DllName,
    OUT PVOID *DllHandle
);
```

When the shellcode executes the function LdrLoadDll with ‘smss.exe’ (Session Manager Subsystem) as the DllName, the hardware breakpoint on ZwMapViewOfSection will

```
.text:0100392F /*
.text:0100392F Set DEBUG_REGISTER (Dr3) to ZwMapViewOfSection function addr
.text:0100392F */
.text:0100392F xor eax, eax
.text:01003931 lea edi, [ebp+ Context]
.text:01003937 mov ecx, 0B3h
.text:0100393C rep stosd
.text:0100393E mov [ebp+ Context.ContextFlags], CONTEXT_DEBUG_REGISTERS
.text:01003948 mov [ebp+ Context.Dr7], 40h ; L3 bit set => local breakpoint (dr3) enabled
.text:01003952 call GetZwMapViewOfSectionString
.text:01003957 push eax ; eax = "ZwMapViewOfSection"
.text:01003958 call _GetFunctionAddrByName
.text:0100395D mov [ebp+ Context.Dr3], eax ; eax = Function address of ZwMapViewOfSection
.text:01003963 push eax
.text:0100396A push 0FFFFFFFEh
.text:0100396C call _CallZwSetContextThread
.text:01003971 pop ecx
.text:01003972 pop ecx
.text:01003973 call _GetSmssExecStr
.text:01003978 push 10h
.text:0100397A mov esi, eax
.text:0100397C pop eax
.text:0100397D call _StackspaceAlloc0
.text:01003982 lea eax, [ebp+usSmss]
.text:01003985 push esi
.text:01003986 push eax
.text:01003987 call _CallRtlInitUnicodeString
.text:0100398C lea eax, [ebp+SmssAddrSpace]
.text:01003990 push eax
.text:01003993 push eax
.text:01003994 xor esi, esi
.text:01003996 push esi
.text:01003997 push esi
.text:01003998 call _CallLdrLoadDll
.text:0100399D mov edi, eax
.text:0100399F lea eax, [ebp+Context]
```

Listing 1: Code that intercepts ZwMapViewOfSection.
be hit. The reason the breakpoint is hit can be seen in the following call stack:

```
0007cc08 7c91c3da 0000006c ffffffff 0007ce00
ntdll!ZwMapViewOfSection
0007ccfc 7c916071 00000000 0007cd88 00000000
ntdll!LdrpMapDll+0x330
0007cfbc 7c9162da 00000000 00000000 00000000
ntdll!LdrpLoadDll+0x1e9
0007d264 00090314 00000000 0007d618
ntdll!LdrLoadDll+0x230
```

WARNING: Frame IP not in any known module. Following frames may be wrong.

```
0007d650 0009046f 00090688 0007ffa4 7c900000 0x90314
0007fff0 7c816fd7 00000000 00000000 0x9046f
0007ffff 00000000 00090000 00000000 78746341 kernel32
!BaseProcessStart+0x23
```

If there is a debugger present and it handles the exception, no VEH will be triggered – ZwMapViewOfSection will continue execution and eventually, LdrLoadDll will return the original value of smss.exe in DllHandle. If a debugger is present, VEH will take over ZwMapViewOfSection’s execution flow and return the attacker’s desired DllHandle value to shellcode. This value holds the click fraud code and will be executed at the end of the shellcode.

After the shellcode has accomplished its task, it will load and pass execution control to smss.exe, as shown in a process environment block (PEB) of svchost.exe (Listing 2).

The PEB result shows that the malware has successfully disguised the Session Manager Subsystem running the click fraud code; indeed the PEB output raises the following questions:

- Why is a process address space allowed to contain two executable images?
- Shouldn’t only one instance of smss.exe be running as an independent process?

On the other hand, these occurrences could be used as indicators that the machine has been infected.

**YET ANOTHER HARDWARE BREAKPOINT ANTI-DEBUGGING ROUTINE**

Once the click fraud routine has gained execution control, we immediately see another anti-debugging routine similar to the previous one; this routine, however, is slightly more straightforward. Again, it sets a hardware breakpoint at debug register Dr3, pointing to the WSPStartup function address (see Listing 3).

Upon calling WSA像个Socket, a breakpoint exception will be triggered due to the previously set hardware breakpoint. If there is no debugger attached, the malware has the chance to handle the exception and execute its assigned code. Otherwise, the debugger will stop the program execution at the WSPStartup function, as shown in Figure 2. (Figure 2 also shows the call stack for WSA像个Socket.)

```
Figure 2: Call stack for WSA像个Socket.
```

The intention of the exception handler is to initialize Windows socket callback functions. These callback functions are responsible for pre-processing the network data (for example, the data sent to the C&C server) and post-processing the data received from the server.

**WHAT IS ‘Z00CLICKER3’?**

ZeroAccess’s clickbot is a multi-threaded DLL module that performs monetizing clicks. The main thread holds the major codes that generate huge numbers of clicks at regular intervals. It includes the following functionalities:

- Determines whether the clients originate from specific geographic locations
- Retrieves click fraud URLs from the C&C server
- Executes click fraud based on the URLs retrieved from the C&C server
- Sends click results to another remote server.

In order to carry out its click fraud routine effectively, the module registers a class named ‘z00clicker3’, which acts as a core function in the whole click fraud operation. The main thread interacts closely with z00clicker by sending messages to it. For instance, when the main thread successfully receives ad URLs from the C&C server, it sends a message to tell z00clicker to carry out the click fraud routine. The main thread is run in a loop that will be terminated under certain conditions.

**Blocking client access by regions**

One of the routines found in the main thread indicates that z00clicker only targets certain countries and is capable of
kd> !peb

PEB at 7ffde000

InheritedAddressSpace: No
ReadImageFileExecuteOptions: No
BeingDebugged: No
ImageBaseAddress: 00100000
Ldr 001a1e90
Ldr.Initialized: Yes
Ldr.InInitializationOrderModuleList: 001a1f28 . 001a35e0
Ldr.InLoadOrderModuleList: 001a1ec0 . 001a35d0
Ldr.InMemoryOrderModuleList: 001a1ec8 . 001a35d8

Base TimeStamp   Module
1000000  41107ed6 Aug 04 14:14:46 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe
7c900000  411096b4 Aug 04 15:56:36 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll
7c800000  46239bd5 Apr 16 23:52:53 2007 C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
77dd0000  411096a7 Aug 04 15:56:42 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
77e70000  46923520 Jul 09 21:16:16 2007 C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll
6f880000  4110968e Aug 04 15:55:58 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\AppPatch\AcGeneral.DLL
7e410000  45f02d7c Mar 08 23:36:28 2007 C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll
77100000  47bcdd9 Feb 20 14:51:05 2008 C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDIT32.dll
76b40000  411096d6 Aug 04 15:57:10 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINMM.dll
77ae0000  4e5eb93 Jul 26 12:39:47 2005 C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll
77c10000  411096a5 Aug 04 15:59:14 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcrtd.dll
77120000  4759ea94 Dec 05 02:38:12 2007 C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
77be0000  411096cf Aug 04 15:57:03 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSACM12.dll
77c00000  411096b7 Aug 04 15:56:39 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\VERSION.dll
79c90000  42716027 Oct 26 11:33:59 2007 C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHELL32.dll
77fe0000  45091361 Sep 14 16:31:29 2006 C:\WINDOWS\system32\COMCTL32.dll
5d090000  44ef1b33 Aug 25 23:45:55 2006 C:\WINDOWS\system32\comctl32.dll
77d30000  44ef1b36 Aug 25 23:45:58 2006 C:\WINDOWS\system32\COMCTL32.DLL
5d090000  44ef1b33 Aug 25 23:45:55 2006 C:\WINDOWS\system32\COMCTI32.DLL
6b0000  505ebd88 Sep 23 15:43:04 2012 C:\WINDOWS\system32\smss.dll
71ab0000  411096e2 Aug 04 15:57:38 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2_32.dll
71aa0000  411096f3 Aug 04 15:57:39 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2HELP.dll
78130000  480eb81c Apr 23 12:16:28 2008 C:\WINDOWS\system32\urlmon.dll
78000000  480eb822 Apr 23 12:16:34 2008 C:\WINDOWS\system32\iertutil.dll
72d20000  411096c6 Aug 04 15:56:54 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\wdmaud.drv
71a50000  41109758 Aug 04 15:59:20 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\mswsock.dll
746c0000  45516526 Nov 08 13:03:34 2006 C:\WINDOWS\system32\msls31.dll
76bf0000  411096ca Aug 04 15:56:58 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\PSAPI.DLL
626b0000  411096a0 Aug 04 15:56:16 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\hnetcfg.dll
71a90000  411096fd Aug 04 15:57:49 2004 C:\WINDOWS\system32\wshtcppip.dll

SubSystemData: 00000000
ProcessHeap: 00000000
ProcessParameters: 00020000
CurrentDirectory: '\C:\WINDOWS\system32\'
WindowTitle: '\C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'
ImageFile: '\C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'
CommandLine: '\\\globalroot\systemroot\Installer\{5e0dd525-1703-4a82-4e5e-73ea03452de4}\U'

Listing 2: Smss.exe loaded in svchost.exe by shellcode.
locating a victim’s geographic location. The initial country code and time stamp of the malware’s installation date are stored by another plug-in DLL, 80000000.@, in the Extended Attribute (EA) of z00clicker's root directory:  
\\globalroot\systemroot\Installer\{5e0dd525-1703-4a82-4e5e-73ea03452de4}\U

The country code is retrieved from a third-party GeoIP location service provider every time the thread is executed.

If the installation date is older than one day, the country code will be renewed. The renewal country code and current date will be saved to the EA of the U directory again.

After the country code is determined, it is compared against the predefi ned string ‘USGBAUCADEINESFRITSGMYNLSE’, which appears to be a list of country codes. The click fraud operations appear to be targeting online advertising networks that are highly specific to these countries.

Listing 3: Code that sets up second anti-debugging hook.
Table 1: Country codes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country code</th>
<th>Country name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MY</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The predefined string also indicates that IP addresses from those countries are permitted to contact the C&C server. If it is determined that the victim’s system resides in a country outside of this list, the main thread will be aborted and no click fraud operation will be carried out.

In fact, it appears that even if researchers manage to forge the country code by using proxy servers, the main thread will not perform its click fraud operation as the C&C server refuses to respond to any queries sent from the client. Clearly, the remote server has another layer of integrity checking to ensure that only actual infected clients in the targeted countries can perform the click fraud operation.

COMMUNICATING WITH THE C&C SERVER

Assuming the request from the victim machine is accepted, the response from the C&C server consists of URLs needed to perform the click fraud. An overview of how the clickbot performs this is shown in Figure 3.

Before any of this can happen, however, the click fraud module on the infected machine has to find and communicate with one of the C&C servers.

C&C server IP addresses

The C&C server’s IP addresses are encoded and stored in the third IMAGE_RESOURCE_DATA_ENTRY in the resource section of the 00000001.@ plug-in DLL file saved in the U directory (Figure 4). These IP addresses are decoded using a simple XOR algorithm with the key 0x2CB7F6D5.
An IP address is chosen randomly from the pool of addresses and stored in a global variable that will be used later in the click fraud operation.

**First contact with the C&C server**

The first step of the click fraud operation is to send the victim system’s information, retrieved from the Windows native API ZwQuerySystemInformation, to a C&C server on TCP port 12757. Each C&C IP address obtained from the resource section is attempted until a TCP response is received from the server (see Figure 5).

After that, the data will be obfuscated using a XOR algorithm with key 0x72 before sending it to the randomly selected remote server that was previously stored in the global variable.

To avoid network latency, the main thread is suspended for a predetermined length of time specified in ZwDelayExecution. The suspended thread is resumed either when the time interval expires or when an alert is received from the ZwAlertThread API if the TCP data has been received and decoded successfully (see Listings 5 and 6).

**Z00CLICKER’S FRAUDULENT CLICK METHOD**

The TCP response on port 12757 is merely a raw data set that needs to be pre-processed before the actual click fraud happens.

**Sorting the raw TCP data**

The data consists of a set of ‘referrer’ URLs, each with at least one accompanying ad URL, for example: [referrer URL A][ad URL A.1][ad URL A.2], [referrer URL B][ad URL B.1][ad URL B.2]. After all the URL sets have been parsed, a new array of data structure is populated in which every referrer string is associated with an ad URL.

This data structure is then sorted in descending order based on the aggregate click counter of an ad URL (at offset 0x04) (see Figure 6), which is itself the result of the multiplier value (at offset 0x08) multiplied by the click counter at offset 0x0c+strlen(Referrer string) (see Listing 7).

The first pair of referrer and ad URLs (on memory addresses 0x963694 and 0x96370d, respectively) is selected from the sorted data structure for use in the click fraud operation. This is considered a preliminary step to reduce the chances of having the clicks distributed too heavily on a particular URL – an unnatural pattern that may lead to the clicks being detected.

**The referrer and ad URLs**

It has been observed that the referrer URL always contains the strings ‘afdt’ and ‘search’ in its parameters. Based on our observation, the referrer appears to be the domain names owned by the botnet operator, although we have not been able to verify this as the registrant information has been protected. These domains do, however, have one thing in common: they are parked domains [2] that use very similar structures and page designs, even down to the colours used.

The ad URL contains common strings such as ‘click’, ‘click2’, ‘clid’, ‘/feed/go.php’, etc., and is a redirection URL hosted on ad redirection servers. The redirection URL starts off a chain of HTTP redirections, and usually
there are three HTTP redirections before the ad server – the search engine platform operated by the advertising network – is reached.

**Click fraud with a window-less browser**

A ‘traditional’ fraudulent click can be implemented in many ways. The most common ones used are:

1. Intercepting *Windows* network APIs such as send, recv, WSPSend, WSPrecv, HTTPSendRequest, InternetReadFile, etc.
2. Installing malicious browser add-ons to hijack search results.

TDL, Redyms and Bamital are examples of malware families that perform *Windows* network API interception. Medfos and Simda are examples of malware that will install...
Figure 6: Parsed URL set data structure before (left) and after (right) sorting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offset</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>Click counter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>Aggregate click counter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>URL set identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0c</td>
<td>Ads URL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>Referrer string</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Example referrers and ad redirection URLs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example of referrer</th>
<th>Example of ads redirection URL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://folkartstore.com/?afdt=tccchozb2v52nxvw1heuh8wd3ir3uvolv5c890kusavg&amp;x=7&amp;y=10&amp;search=dentist+in+orange">http://folkartstore.com/?afdt=tccchozb2v52nxvw1heuh8wd3ir3uvolv5c890kusavg&amp;x=7&amp;y=10&amp;search=dentist+in+orange</a></td>
<td><a href="http://95.211.216.156/?clid=gt71pprpqqg0">http://95.211.216.156/?clid=gt71pprpqqg0</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://romantictouch.com/?afdt=4gn7s65lp6xqr256y98ze2z6q6jk4gxrrwww5a5mbsx&amp;x=6&amp;y=10&amp;search=toner+skrivare">http://romantictouch.com/?afdt=4gn7s65lp6xqr256y98ze2z6q6jk4gxrrwww5a5mbsx&amp;x=6&amp;y=10&amp;search=toner+skrivare</a></td>
<td><a href="http://95.211.193.166/?clid=15p31p02h3z0">http://95.211.193.166/?clid=15p31p02h3z0</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://fillpositions.com/?afdt=lb03hi7eo9tsh6lnmbv2vxxzidgr1b0709e0yy1mco&amp;x=18&amp;y=18&amp;search=industrial+hearing+loss">http://fillpositions.com/?afdt=lb03hi7eo9tsh6lnmbv2vxxzidgr1b0709e0yy1mco&amp;x=18&amp;y=18&amp;search=industrial+hearing+loss</a></td>
<td><a href="http://46.229.160.175/click2.php?c=3dknGLO5eGQYDPtHRYWg434m%2FNlNfNtyXhzoNICY">http://46.229.160.175/click2.php?c=3dknGLO5eGQYDPtHRYWg434m%2FNlNfNtyXhzoNICY</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://itcopyright.com/?afdt=six9ixxvg5a5hff6qonw5iq2wvjy3ti77a2px1e8gw30rl&amp;x=6&amp;y=11&amp;search=power+juicing">http://itcopyright.com/?afdt=six9ixxvg5a5hff6qonw5iq2wvjy3ti77a2px1e8gw30rl&amp;x=6&amp;y=11&amp;search=power+juicing</a></td>
<td><a href="http://216.172.54/*.feed/go.php?id=%5Brandom_GUI_ID%5D&amp;sid=%5B32_random_hexadecimal%5D&amp;n=n-%5Brandom_number%5D&amp;ttd=%5Brandom_number%5D&amp;s=3548">http://216.172.54/*.feed/go.php?id=[random_GUI_ID]&amp;sid=[32_random_hexadecimal]&amp;n=n-[random_number]&amp;ttd=[random_number]&amp;s=3548</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Listing 8: The main thread sends a ‘click fraud action’ message.
malicious browser extensions. However, ZeroAccess uses neither of these methods.

ZeroAccess’s click operation is carried out by the ‘z00clicker3’ callback function when it receives a message sent by the main thread (see Listing 8).

Upon receiving the message, z00clicker initiates an HTTP GET request using a random fake host name (which always contains the ‘.cm’ TLD, which was retrieved from the first TCP connection). The GET query is a Base64-encoded string generated by first running the ad redirection URL through a XOR algorithm (without the HTTP protocol prefix, with key 0x69) and then encoding the result using the algorithm. The GET request is sent through the Windows socket API, together with a fake host name, to the C&C server address instead of sending the request to the non-existent host name. The C&C server replies with an HTTP 303 [3] response that contains the same ad redirection URL in the Location HTTP header field.

The URL in the HTTP Location header field indicates the botnet’s ad redirection server address. A separate GET request needs to be sent by the clickbot, which results in a series of HTTP 301/302 redirections that will reach the ad server.

An interesting thing found in z00clicker is its ability to mimic the way users interact with the ad server. It is able to do so without using Internet web browsers, which makes it unusual among clickbots. This is implemented with the following steps:

1. A COM object instance of IHTMLDocument2 is created using CoCreateInstance.
2. A URL moniker is created from the ad URL using CreateURLMonikerEx.
3. A bind context object named ‘__DWNBINDINFO’ is registered using ole32!CBindCtx::RegisterObjectParam. An important parameter in this function is a pointer to a data structure with various defined fields, most crucially the callback functions pointer. These callback functions ensure the attacker’s desired referrer string is set in the HTTP header before the ad redirection URL is loaded. Once the click has completed, it reports the result of which ad redirection URL has been clicked to another server on UDP port 123.
4. The ad redirection URL is loaded via the IPersistMoniker::Load() function. Using this COM method, the clickbot is able to emulate user interaction with the websites by using a combination of three or four HTTP redirections.

5. After the ad redirection URL is loaded, the ad redirection server will be contacted, followed by multiple HTTP redirections to reach the ad control server. The ad control server determines which destination ad server the traffic will be forwarded to. The random search query specified in the referrer string will be processed from the ad server.

A simplified overview of the redirections and servers involved in this process can be seen in Figure 8.

CONCLUSION

ZeroAccess has undoubtedly introduced a lot of innovative ways of achieving its goals, so a dissection of the click fraud module provides an interesting insight into how it differs from other ‘traditional’ clickbots. Highlights of the analysis include the country-specific targeting of the ZeroAccess click fraud, and the methods it uses to perform its fraudulent clicks without triggering the detection mechanisms used by search engines and online advertisers.

One of the remaining challenges in analysing the click fraud module involves circumventing the regional check implemented by the clickbot on both the client and the server’s side. Without more in-depth knowledge of how the client interacts with the server, researchers – and the online advertising networks – are hampered in recognizing and developing detection algorithms to identify the click fraud generated by ZeroAccess.

REFERENCES


MALWARE ANALYSIS 3

PUSHDO’S NEW SECOND GENERATION

Neo Tan, He Xu & Kyle Yang
Fortinet, Canada

Pushdo is a persistent botnet, having been active in the wild since January 2007. To date, there have been three main generations. The first generation of Pushdo used a clear text (with many different parameters) HTTP request to communicate with its C&C servers. This was encrypted (using RC4) in the second generation. The second generation of Pushdo also generated lots of fake SSL traffic to legitimate websites, trying to hide its communication data amongst it. The third generation of Pushdo changed dramatically: a binary data structure was introduced, along with many custom encryption algorithms to secure the communication with C&C servers. In this article, we will mainly focus on three different variants of a new, more advanced version of Pushdo’s second generation.

PUSHDO MAIN DOWNLOADER

Installation process

When the Pushdo bot is running on a compromised machine, it will first create the following registry entries and randomly generate 0x10 bytes as key data in binary format:

HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Management” = [0x10 random bytes]
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\xoznacaxmejazap” = [0x10 random bytes]

‘Xoznacaxmeja’ and ‘zap’ are both hard-coded strings. The ‘xoznacaxmeja’ string will be used as this instance’s mutex name and new file name. After creating the infected flag registry entries, it will copy itself to %userprofile%\xoznacaxmeja.exe and then create the following autorun registry entry:

HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run “xoznacaxmeja” = “[%userprofile%\xoznacaxmeja.exe]”

Then, it will load additional modules and try to communicate with its C&C servers.

Extract and deploy the ad clicker module

The bot starts to decrypt data in a specific location of the binary into a binary template of the clicker module without the domain names, and decrypts another location of the binary into a list of domains; in both cases the data
is decrypted using XORs with changing modifiers. The decrypted domains will be copied to the clicker’s binary template at a specific location; in this case, it is marked using the string ‘XNG7’. This tag is later used by a function in Pushdo and the clicker module to update the domain list. After the binary template has been filled with the domain names, it is loaded into memory and executed as a child thread of the bot.

Legacy communication routine
The bot decrypts the data – which contains not only the C&C server domain names, but also the names of many other legitimate domains. Obviously, the author is trying to hide the C&C server domain amongst the many other legitimate domain names to make it hard to pick out during static analysis. It also tries to hide its communication data amongst other legitimate website traffic when undergoing dynamic analysis.

Next, it randomly chooses one domain from the list, appends ‘https://’ to create an Internet connection and sends an ‘Accept: */*’ request to it. If there is no response, or if the response size is less than 0x400 bytes, it will pick another domain randomly from the list and try that one, or else it will try to parse the response. It looks for a fake HTML tag pattern that is base64-encoded in the Pushdo binary:

`'PGltZyBzcmM9ImRhdGE6aW1hZ2UvanBlZztiYXNlNjQs'`.

After base64 decoding, it becomes the following:

```
<img src="data:image/jpeg;base64,
```

If it finds a match for this pattern in the response data, it will decrypt the data that comes after the comma and then inject it into a newly created svchost.exe process. This is probably one way of providing a PPI (Pay Per Install) service, since we didn’t see its own module or update binary going through this. But, in certain conditions, there is a possibility for it to get a binary update or new module in this way. However, we believe that this routine is not the C&C server domain of the older version of Pushdo, where it was used as the main communication protocol. In the next part, we’ll dissect the communication protocol and encryption algorithm for the three more recent variants of the Pushdo bot.

Communication protocol and encryption algorithm

Find real C&C server domain
Previously in Pushdo’s second generation, before the final contact with the server there was a routine involving another list of domains hiding another C&C server among them. However, this has gone from the latest version (found in December 2012). This time, contact with the server is persistent, as the bot wants to keep exchanging information with or downloading updates from it. The C&C server is once again hidden in a second decrypted domain list. The bot calculates each domain’s hash and compares them to a pre-stored hashing value: 9D0B0400h (Figure 1). The one that matches is the C&C server.

Form sending data
After gathering information from the victim’s PC, the bot prepares a message for sending. The structure of the plaintext message evolved between October and December 2012. There are three different data structures.

```
struct _PlainTextMessageV1andV2 {
    DWORD staticDword1; //static 01
    DWORD staticDword2; //may change in
    //variants
    DWORD staticDword3; //static 01
    DWORD staticDword4; //static 00
    DWORD staticDword5; //static 00
    DWORD staticDword6; //may change in
    //variants
    BYTE[0x10] randGenData; //random generated
    //data
    BYTE[0x10] localGenData; //generated data
    //using volume info
    //and adapter info
    DWORD installFlags; //bit flags
    SendBlockV1 dataBlock;
}
```

```
struct _SendBlockV1 {
    DWORD size;
    BYTE domainHash[size];
}
```

The first variant contains some static data with the hash value of the C&C domain at the end.
dataBlock is always 4 because the calculated hash value of the C&C domain is a DWORD. The second variant contains a little more information than the first in the data block – the bot’s binary hash value and the server domain string are also included:

```
Struct _SendBlockV2 {
    DWORD size;
    DWORD domainHash;
    DWORD botBinHash;
    BYTE serverDomain[size-8];
}
```

The latest variant has undergone several changes and contains even more data:

```
struct _PlainTextMessageV3 {
    DWORD staticDword1;
    DWORD staticDword2;
    DWORD staticDword3;
    DWORD staticDword4;
    DWORD installFlags; //bit flags
    QWORD reserved;
    DWORD staticDword5;
    DWORD botBinHash; //hash of the bot binary
    BYTE serverDomain[0x28];
    SendBlockV1 mutexName;
    SendBlockV1 parentName; //parent process
    SendBlockV1 botPath; //current file path
    SendBlockV1 clsid; //CLSID generated using
                       //local system info
    BYTE garbage[0 to 0x50];
}
```

The trend is to include an increasing amount of local environment information so that the server is able to decide how to deal with the bot. For example, in Figure 2, if the server checks the parent process, which is ‘flyODBG.eXe’ (the ‘legitimate’ parent process is svchost.exe), it can easily deduce that the bot sending this message is being debugged.

The message shown in Figure 2 contains a lot of garbage data, some of which is hard coded in the bot binary – such as the first four DWORDs and the eighth DWORD – and some of which is generated randomly, such as the 10 bytes at the end (highlighted in grey). The random garbage data can be any size between 0 and 0x50 bytes. The first meaningful part starts at the 5th DWORD at location +0x10 of this structure: 0x1D, which describes the installation log. It is in bit flags format and has not changed much between the variants. Starting from the lowest to the fifth bit, they are described as shown in Figure 3.

Thus, 0x1D in our example tells the C&C server that the autorun registry entry is set, the mutex ‘xoznacaxmeja’ has been created, the AppManagement and the xoznacaxmeja registry entries are set, that this system can access urlmon GZIP decompress APIs, and that the CRC32 hash of the current bot executable is calculated. The DWORD 0xED4e4133 at location +0x20 is the hash – this can be used to identify if the executable has been tampered with. It can also be used to check if the current bot needs an update. Starting at +0x24 is the container for the C&C server domain name, the (fixed) size of which is 0x28 bytes. Starting at +0x24 are the strings/value, with the first byte describing the length of each. In order, they are: the mutex name (0xC bytes), the current bot’s parent process (0x1C bytes), the full path of the bot (0x1A bytes), a hard-coded value (0xC bytes) and the CLSID generated using the victim’s system volume information and adapter information (0x24 bytes).

**Encryption routine**

The encryption routine is the thing that differs the most between the variants. In the first and second variants, the encryption uses RC4 and is defined as follows:

```
Figure 3: Installation bit flags.
```

![Encryption routine](image-url)
struct _MessageToSend V1and2{
    DWORD magic;
    DWORD key;
    DWORD hash;
    BYTE encryptedMessage[totalContentSize - 0x8];
}

The first DWORD is generated using a random generating algorithm such that the remainder of dividing 0x1ECB will always be 1. The second DWORD is the RC4 key, and the third is the hash value of the message body.

Figure 4: Encrypted message in first and second variants.

However, it gets complicated in the third variant. The encryption process involves two steps. At first, it makes use of the Microsoft Cryptography functions from the ADVAPI32 library. After calling CryptAcquireContext with pszContainer = ‘Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0’ to acquire the new key container, it calls CryptGenKey to generate the RC4 session key. Then it calls CryptExportKey to export the RC4 session key to a PLAINTEXTKEYBLOB struct. The structures are defined as follows:

struct PLAINTEXTKEYBLOB {
    BLOBHEADER hdr;
    DWORD dwKeySize;
    BYTE rgbKeyData[];
}

Figure 5 shows an example of the exported PLAINTEXTKEYBLOB. The yellow highlighted area is the BLOBHEADER, describing the format and algorithm of the key (0x6801 means CALG_RC4), and the green highlighted area is the RC4 session key.

Next, it calls CryptImportKey to import a 0x94 bytes keyblob that is hard coded in the binary. This is the C&C server’s public key. Again, it calls CryptExportKey to export the RC4 session key, but this time it is exported into the SIMPLEBLOB data structure and using the imported server public key to encrypt the exporting key. The SIMPLEBLOB data structure is defined as follows:

struct SIMPLEBLOB {
    BLOBHEADER hdr;
    ALG_ID algid;
    BYTE encryptedKey[0x80];
}

Figure 6 shows an example of the exported SIMPLEBLOB. The DWORD 0xA400 (highlighted in orange) describes that this exported key is encrypted using RSA public key encryption. The encrypted session key’s algorithm is CALG_RC4 and highlighted in green.

Thus, the RC4 session key has been exported twice, and on the second occasion it is encrypted by the server’s public key so that it can be used for communication. It calls CryptAcquireContext again to create a new key container, imports the plaintext RC4 key and uses it to encrypt the message. In fact, the plaintext key exporting and importing is not necessary since it can just re-use the previously created key handle that is pointing to the session key generated by CryptGenKey. Although the exported key is encrypted using the server’s public key with RSA, it seems the author still wanted to ‘double-tap’ it to make sure the key is secure. It appends four DWORDs to the beginning of the exported SIMPLEBLOB, as shown in Figure 7. They are, in order: magic word, key to encrypt the keyblob, reserved DWORD for hashing the value of the following data, and keyblob size. The magic DWORD
value is generated randomly but using an algorithm that means the remainder of dividing 0x1ECB will always be 2.

Next, it encrypts the keyblob with its size using the algorithm described in the following pseudo code, XOR with modified key:

```
    i = 0;
    j = 0;
    if ( data && dataSize && key ) {
        sKey = 0x19660D * key + 0x3C6EF35F;
        totalCount = dataSize / 4;
        if ( dataSize / 4 > 0 ) {
            j = 4 * totalCount;
            do {
                data[4 * i] ^= sKey;
                sKey = 0x19660D * sKey + 0x3C6EF35F;
                ++i;
            } while ( i < totalCount );
            remain = dataSize % 4;
            if ( dataSize % 4 ) //if the data size can't be divided exactly by 4
                {
                temp = 0;
                remainStart = (data + 4 * i);
                memcpy(&temp, (data + 4 * i), remain);
                temp ^= sKey;
                memcpy(remainStart, &temp, remain);
                j += remain;
            }
        }
    }
```

Finally, it appends the encrypted message to the end of the encrypted keyblob and calculates the hash value of the block. The calculated hash value is stored in the reserved place at +0x8 of this structure. The packet it is going to send to the C&C server can be defined as follows:

```
    struct _MessageToSendV3 {
        DWORD magic;
        DWORD key;
        DWORD hash;
        DWORD sessionKeyLenEncrypted;
        BYTE encryptedSessionKey[sessionKeyLen];
        BYTE encryptedMessage[totalContentSize-0x10-
                        sessionKeyLen];
    }
```

Searching and parsing response data

The response from the C&C server tries to disguise the commands in an HTML page. The commands are surrounded by HTML comment tags and a special tag string that looks like this:

```html
<!--img src="data:image/jpeg;base64,[C&C server commands]"-->
```

The server commands are encoded into base64 so they can be transported properly in the HTML page. Then the same decryption routine as used by the older version of Pushdo is called. After base64 decoding, the commands block contains a fake JPEG header, of size 0x14 bytes. After removing the fake header, the data structure is exactly the same as the encrypted sending packet.

In the first and second variants it is the same as struct _MessageToSendV1and2: the magic DWORD, RC4 key, hash value of the message and the message body. After being decrypted using the RC4 key, the plaintext response message structure is defined as:

```
    struct _ReceivedCommandsV1andV2 {?
        DWORD staticDword1;
        DWORD staticDword2;
        DWORD staticDword3;
        DWORD staticDword4; //they are the same as the sending message
        DWORD cmdType;
        DWORD reserved1;
    }
```
DWORD reserved2;
DWORD dataSize;
BYTE data[dataSize]; //the downloaded file may be compressed
}

The first 0x10 bytes are the same as the sending message. The cmdType is also in bit flags format, and indicates what to do with the data file (which we will explain in detail in the third variant since it doesn’t change much).

In the third variant, the encrypted responding message contains the magic DWORD, key to encrypt the keyblob, hash of the following data, encrypted session key and encrypted message.

**Decrypting response data**

The decryption procedure is the reverse of the encryption we described above:

1. Check the magic word and the hash value.
2. Use the XOR algorithm to decrypt the DWORD that contains the length of the session key.
3. Use the same algorithm to decrypt the session key.
4. Calculate the size of the rest of the data using the total content size minus 0x10 and the size of the session key, and import the session key to decrypt the commands.

The decrypted message structures are described as follows:

```c
struct _ReceivedCommandsV3 {
    DWORD cmdCount;
    _Command command[cmdCount];
};

struct _Command {
    DWORD cmdSize;
    DWORD cmdType;
    DWORD isUpdate;
    DWORD cmdFlags; //bit flags
    BYTE data[cmdSize-0x10]; //the downloaded file may be compressed
};
```

The ‘cmdType’ can be either 1 or 2. 1 means this data is a download module. If it is 2, this means the following data is an update, then if ‘isUpdate’ is 1, it will write the data to a temporary file and execute it. It will also uninstall the current Pushdo completely, including the registry entries. The ‘cmdFlags’ are defined as shown in Figure 9.

If the ‘Do Injection’ flag is not set, it will create a thread to load the data file into memory then call its entry point. If the ‘Is not active’ flag is set, the command will not be processed. If the ‘Re-extract Clicker’ flag is set, it will re-extract the clicker from the current binary, including the domain lists. This is useful when the data file can access and update the current bot’s domain list (located after the tag ‘XNG7’) and the clicker. If the ‘Inject if parent terminated’ flag is set, it will create a thread to monitor the current process. If it is terminated for any reason, the thread will create and inject svchost.exe with the data file. If the ‘Is GZIP-compressed’ flag is set, this means the data file is compressed.

For example, in Figure 10, the cmdFlags = 0x1D (which is 00011101 in binary). It will decompress the data, inject it to svchost.exe, create a monitor thread to monitor the current process, and re-extract/deploy the clicker.

![Figure 10: Beginning of the decrypted received commands.](image)

**SPAM ENGINE – CUTWAIL**

Cutwail is the spam module that Pushdo usually downloads. It can either be injected into a process or spawned as a child thread of Pushdo, depending on the cmdFlags. It creates an autorun registry entry:

```
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Regedit32 = %Windows%\system32\regedit.exe
```

![Figure 9: cmdFlags.](image)
and will drop itself to that location so it can run independently.

**Load pre-configuration**

All of the configuration except for the spam template is hard coded, and most of the crucial/sensitive strings are encrypted in the binary. When Cutwail first loads the settings, it calls a routine with the index of the setting as the parameter to get the decrypted string value. For example, 0xDA is the index of the C&C server of this spam module, so getValue(0xDA, *p_out) outputs a pointer to string ‘46.4.98.52’ top_out. This routine is also used to decrypt strings such as SMTP commands, library names and system process paths. The decryption algorithm is byte-XOR with a 0x22 bytes string:

‘rwivhuo3xAKDmVJm7NVCSEkT9MpVypKd’

for the first 0 to 0x1CF4 bytes (index 0 to 0xD9) and byte-XOR with another 0x46 bytes string:

‘91GzKGXXQ6kXFHrgKJKTJuP1AQjbrxs8l0vW2xo XK 43HahzP8JCT4rVe0cFtnxYGsQ’ for the rest (index 0xDA to the end). The key strings vary across different variants. Figure 11 shows part of the decrypted string records. The highlighted area is the record at index 0. Each record is 0x22 bytes long for the records from index 0 to 0xD9 and 0x46 bytes long for the records from index 0xDA to the last. After decryption, the string ends with a null byte indicator, ‘00’, and the rest of the 0x22/0x46 records are junk bytes.

![Figure 11: Decrypted strings.](image)

The pre-configuration includes addr, port, knockdelay, checksmtpdelay, maxconn, udpsockcount, constconnect, udprecvtimeout, maxudptry, and the confid is set to 1.

It spawns some threads checking connections to legitimate SMTP servers such as mxs.mail.ru and gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com, monitoring max UDP connections, checking DNS responses from root name server querying .com, .org and .de. After spawning a thread checking if there is a spam template available to spam, it connects its C&C server to get commands.

**Communicates with Cutwail C&C servers**

The C&C server is hard coded in the binary. The structure of the message being sent is defined as follows, size 0x1C bytes:

```c
struct _SendData {
    DWORD currInstallVer;
    DWORD localIP;
    DWORD altPort;
    DWORD configVer;
    DWORD emaillistID;
    DWORD localOSVer;
    WORD  settingFlags;
    WORD  respSMTPcount;
};
```

The currInstallVer is the Cutwail version installed in the current system. It is initially zero and will be updated by the C&C response with cmdType 5, then written to the registry key:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OSVersion

The localIP is the local machine’s IP, which can be a LAN IP. The altPort is the alternated port this module uses, which is hard-coded to 0x1AC. The configVer is the configuration version. This will be updated if the response from the C&C server contains configuration settings (cmdType = 7). The emaillistID is the email list ID, which will be updated if the response from the C&C server contains a new email list (cmdType = 8). The localOSVer is the return value of the API call: GetVersion. The respSMTPcount is the count of active responses from the legitimate SMTP servers in the check SMTP thread. The settingFlags is defined as shown in Figure 12; only four bits are used.

![Figure 12: settingFlags.](image)
The ‘Is Preset Loaded’ bit is set if the pre-configuration is loaded successfully. The ‘Restart’ bit is set if the machine is restarted. The ‘ReverseDNSSuc’ bit is set if the local machine’s external IP can be reverse-DNSed to get the domain name – if not, the ‘ReverseDNSFail’ bit is set. These two bits are not set if the C&C server cannot obtain the local machine’s external IP. The receiving data structure is defined as follows:

```c
struct _RecvData {
    DWORD cmdType;
    BYTE  data[];
};
```

The responding cmdTypes are always in the order: 7, 5, 8, 6 and 1. After receiving the response from the server, it will append or modify the sending message to indicate that. Missing any one of them from the server will result in the bot falling back to send the previous request.

1. If cmdType is 7, the data contains the new configuration. Figure 13 shows an example of the response.

The new configuration is saved in the memory with the new ‘configver’. This configuration update can also update the C&C server IP and port. Ports 25 (SMTP) and 443 (SSL) are preferred so that the communication blends into other traffic.

2. If the cmdType is 5, the data[] will be 0x10 bytes long. The first DWORD in data[] is the current installed version, which will update the value under the registry HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OsVersion. It will also update the currInstallVer field of the next message sent to the C&C server. The second DWORD is the current machine’s external IP. This is resolved from the C&C server so it is not the LAN IP if the local machine is behind a router. It will run a reverse DNS look-up against this IP to get the current machine’s domain name. This affects the lowest two bits of the settingFlags of the next sending message. The domain name is then stored and may be used in spam later. The third DWORD of the data[] is a timestamp of this message; the last DWORD is always 0.

3. If the cmdType is 8, the data[] contains the list of email addresses which will be used by the spam bot as senders. These email addresses appear to be dummies. The first DWORD of the data[] is probably the id of this list, so that the lists can be stored and identified in memory. It updates the emaillistID field of the next sending message. The count of the email addresses in each list is a fixed number: 5,022. Each email record starts with a 00 byte and ends with 0000FFFF.
4. If the cmdType is 6, the data[] contains the vendor ID and the template. The ID is the first DWORD of the data[].

The example shown in Figure 14 is a template of some kind of scam (probably pyramid selling) in Russian, the email body is in the Koi8-r character set. The template variables are enclosed in brackets. For example, [Sem_tel7] is the topic and a telephone number and [799_d] is the date. The bot appends the vendor ID to the end of the next sending message to indicate that the template has been received.

5. If the cmdType is 1, the data[] contains the email addresses that will be used as spam receivers. The first DWORD of the data[] is the same vendor ID, followed by the size of the email address entries in bytes.

Figure 15 shows an example of the beginning of cmdType 1, the domain name begins with FF FFFFFF 00 000000, and the user name begins with the symbol ‘|’. These email addresses are the victim email accounts. After receiving this command, the bot appends the domains to which the spam emails have been sent, and keeps receiving more victim email addresses.

```c
j = 0;
while (dataSize != 0)
{
    if (dataSize<= keyLength)
    {
        data[ total] = ~ data[total];//not operation
        total ++;
        dataSize--;
    }
    else
    {
        j = 0;
        k = total;
        //xor key string backwards
        for (j = 0; j < keyLength; j++)
        {
            temp[j] = sKey[keyLength-1-j]^data[total];
            total ++;
        }
        total = k;
        //reverse result
        for (j = 1; j <= keyLength; j++)
        {
            data[ total] = temp[keyLength - j];
            total ++;
        }
        if((k&1) != 0)//total is odd
        {
            total = k;
            for (j = 0; j < keyLength; j++)
            {
                data[total] = ~ data [total];//not operation
                total++;
            }
        }
        dataSize -= keyLength;
    }
}
```

Figure 15: Receiver emails (the domain is altered to protect the victim).

**Encryption & decryption algorithms**

Both the encryption and decryption of the sending and receiving data use the same algorithm as described by the following pseudo code. When it is sending, it uses the key string 'turyqioikalrtaotsorpnehcoote' backwards and appends a DWORD 0 in front of the encrypted message to make it a total size of 0x20 bytes. When it is receiving, the first DWORD is the total message size.

```c
j = 0;
while (dataSize != 0)
{
    if (dataSize<= keyLength)
    {
        data[ total] = ~ data[total];//not operation
        total ++;
        dataSize--;
    }
    else
    {
        j = 0;
        k = total;
        //xor key string backwards
        for (j = 0; j < keyLength; j++)
        {
            temp[j] = sKey[keyLength-1-j]^data[total];
            total ++;
        }
        total = k;
        //reverse result
        for (j = 1; j <= keyLength; j++)
        {
            data[ total] = temp[keyLength - j];
            total ++;
        }
        if((k&1) != 0)//total is odd
        {
            total = k;
            for (j = 0; j < keyLength; j++)
            {
                data[total] = ~ data [total];//not operation
                total++;
            }
        }
        dataSize -= keyLength;
    }
}
```

**OTHER DOWNLOADED MODULES**

During December 2012, Pushdo downloaded only one module other than Cutwail – a DDoS module which had its own self-updating function.

**CONCLUSION**

The author(s) of Pushdo are not likely to stop the development of their bot. In the future, we will probably see more modules being downloaded by new versions of Pushdo.
SHELLCODING ARM: PART 3
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In the previous parts of this series we discussed the background information needed to understand the principles of ARM shellcoding [1] and dissected some previously crafted shellcode [2]. In this follow-up piece we will look at some more advanced topics such as polymorphic shellcode and methods for its analysis.

ANALYSING POLYMORPHIC ARM SHELLCODE

All of what we’ve done so far has been in preparation for the more challenging task of analysing polymorphic ARM shellcode with IDA Pro. Before we go any further, let’s start with a bit of theory.

Polymorphic shellcode is clearly possible on ARM, and the principles are almost the same as in the case of x86/x64 architectures. For the decryption loop, simple operations such as subtraction, addition and exclusive-or are used. The latter is the most commonly exploited due to its nature (the encryption loop becomes a decryption loop on the next run).

The basic polymorphic shellcode layout is the same on ARM as on x86 – see Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Generic ARM polymorphic shellcode layout.](image1)

It is worth mentioning that the decryption loop can be attached to any other basic shellcode – this means that encrypted shellcode can repeat the GetPC operation and switch back and forth between ARM and Thumb mode, ignoring any actions taken earlier by the decryption loop (also called a decryptor). There are two issues each time self-modifying code emerges: cache and memory protection – but both, for various reasons, are beyond the scope of this tutorial.

Obviously, to fully analyse polymorphic shellcode you have to decrypt the encrypted sections. This can be done using one of four different approaches:

1. Try to execute the decryption loop in order to decrypt the rest of the code.
2. Try to emulate the decryption loop in order to decrypt the rest of the code.
3. Try to rewrite the decryption algorithm and re-implement it with IDC or IDAPython.
4. Try to brute force the decryption loop and check for reasonable disassembly output (for example, in userland ARM shellcode for Linux, you can expect there to be an SVC call).

In many cases the fourth method may not be feasible. On the other hand, executing code on real hardware can be tricky. Rewriting the decryption loop can be done quickly in the case of simple algorithms and a single decryption
layer, but with an increase in algorithm complexity and/or number of encryption layers, this could become time consuming and prone to error. The emulation approach seems promising, but unfortunately the ida-x86emu plug-in [3] does not support ARM platforms. However, IDA Pro provides another emulation option for ARM architectures: the qemu plug-in. Qemu comes with a gdb stub which can be controlled remotely from IDA Pro. We will be using this option from this point on, but first we need to find a reasonable target. As a comparison to our previous target we will use different, polymorphic execve() ARM Linux shellcode [4]. At 78 bytes it is not too long for our exercise:

1. Compile the shellcode wrapper and dump the shellcode to file with the IDAPython script provided. Alternatively, you can extract the shellcode bytes directly from the source file (which will be quicker).
2. Start a new IDA Pro session and open your polymorphic shellcode dump.
3. When loading the binary file, set the processor to ARM, as shown in Figure 2 – IDA will prompt for this setting automatically.
4. After selecting the processor family IDA will ask for the memory layout, as shown in Figure 3. Create a ROM section and place it at an even address that will be easy to calculate (remember all ARM CPU instructions are either two or four bytes long – this is quite different from x86/AMD64 architecture). 0x1000 seems to be a good choice since ARM should not be keeping any structures in this address space. Do not use 0x00 or a very high address since you can locate your code at the interrupt vector table. Also set the ‘Load address’ field in the ‘Input file’ frame accordingly. Note that IDA will use the file size to calculate the ‘ROM size’ and ‘Loading size’ fields. Unless you have a nop slide that you don’t want to analyse, set the ‘File offset’ form field to 0x0. This will load the whole dump at the starting address.
5. IDA will warn you of its inability to detect an entry point (see Figure 4). Accept this, since we assume that 0x1000 is our entry point.
6. When the file finishes loading, convert the shellcode dump into code (‘C’ key from disassembly view).
7. Now select GDB from the ‘Debugger’ menu, as shown in Figure 5 (note that if you were to load an ARM ELF file you would get a third option: Remote ARM Linux/Android debugger).
8. Next, select ‘Debugger’->’Debugger options…’->’Set specific options’ and in the ‘GDB configuration’ window (see Figure 6) tick the ‘Run the program before debugging starts’ check box.

This will enable the ‘Choose a configuration’ button. Click it. This will cause the next window to appear, as shown in Figure 7: ‘Choose the device name’.

9. Select the ‘QEMU:ARM Versatile/PB’ option and click ‘OK’.
10. The command line and initial SP fields in the ‘GDB configuration’ window should now be filled automatically. Click the ‘OK’ button. Make sure that you have the correct localhost and ports settings, as shown in Figure 8.
11. Start the debugger by pressing F9 – you will see a couple of warnings regarding the dangers of running untrusted code etc. Accept those and wait for a message informing you that the debugger has been connected successfully (Figure 9).

12. The PC register should be pointing at the 0x1000 address and parts of the code should be disassembled, as shown in Figure 10.

13. Now enable ‘Instruction tracing’ from the ‘Debugger’->’Tracing’ menu – later this will allow us to analyse how the shellcode decrypted the rest of its sections. We are now ready to analyse the shellcode.

One of the nice features of recent versions of IDA is the ‘proximity view’ [5]. We can use it to visualize the execution flow of the shellcode, as shown in Figure 11. Note that without additional manual help, IDA will not be able to recognize the shellcode entry point as a function and therefore the graph view will not be available. However, we can use the graphs feature when we enter the decryption loop starting at 0x1008 (sub_1008). Take a look at the graph in Figure 12.

What is missing from the graph is a loop exit using the BXHI LR instruction based on the R4 register value comparison. Nevertheless, IDA does a great job of graphing out of the box. This is another thing we could fix either manually or through a plug-in, but in this case there is no point.

Now we can start debugging using the ‘Single-Step’ option (F7 key). First, the GetPC trampoline construction must
be executed. Figure 13 shows the instruction trace log (thanks to the ‘Instruction tracing’ option which we enabled immediately after running the debugger).

Next is the decryption loop, as shown in Figure 12, and a quick analysis, even without debugging, reveals that it is based on an exclusive-or operation with a key value of 0x58. The following instruction:

```
0x1018 LDRB R5, [LR,R4]
```

uses the LR register as a base pointer to the shellcode data section, and this instruction:

```
0x1020 STRB R5, [LR,R4]
```

writes back data after XOR’ing with 0x58. The LR register is used again as a base pointer. The R4 register is used as a counter and, together with the LR register, forms the final pointer for the decryption process. This is why the previous BX->BL trampoline construction was used.

Single stepping through the encryption loop will not provide us with any more details, so we can use the first loop iteration to set a breakpoint at the first decrypted instruction. Using the LR register value we know that the correct address is 0x1030. Place a breakpoint at this address and run a decryption loop (F9 key). The first decrypted instruction is:

```
0x1030 ADR R3, 0x1039
```

Move the cursor down and convert the rest of the unencrypted shellcode to code (‘C’ key). The next instruction is a well known BX:

```
0x1034 BX R3 ; loc_1038
```

This time BX is not really used as a branch instruction but just to switch from ARM to Thumb mode again. This is because the BXHI instruction switched from Thumb to ARM when exiting the decryption loop. Starting from 0x1038 (the first instruction following the BX branch), another well known construction is used to load registers with proper values to prepare for the system call (the SVC 1 instruction). The data section containing the string for the system call is located after the SVC instruction starting from 0x1046. Since the R7 register in the Linux calling convention contains function number (0x0B), in this case we already know this is execve().

If you continue single stepping and try to execute the SVC instruction, the PC register will point to the 0x000C address (Figure 14).

This address contains the ANDEQ R0, R0, R0 instruction, which is encoded as four zeros. In a true system, however, this location is part of the ARM exception vector table. An example of how this table should be set up is shown in Figure 15. Obviously this table can be used by malware to hook critical system operations as well. The table is set up by firmware during the power-on cycle, however our system is just a simple emulation based on qemu with no kernel image or bootloaders/firmware image loaded. For more advanced analysis tasks you can either set up your...
Figure 14: Empty exceptions vector table.

Figure 15: Example of a properly set up exception vector table.

Figure 16: List of segments created for qemu debugging session.
own table or load true firmware and kernel images into the appropriate address space. Also note that the exception vector table can start either from the beginning or from the top of system memory – the location on system start-up is a configurable option for ARM and can differ from one ARM-based System on Chip (SoC) to another.

When we reach the end of the shellcode we should save our work. In order to synchronize the IDA disassembly database with the debugger and import the decryption loop results we need to edit segments by opening the ‘Segments’ sub-view (Shift+F7) and pressing Ctr+E after selecting the ‘ROM’ segment, as shown in Figure 16.

In the ‘Change segment attributes’ window (Figure 17) tick ‘Loader segment’ and make sure that the ‘Debugger segment’ checkbox is disabled, since debugger segments are discarded automatically when leaving the IDA debugger. Now we are ready to take a memory snapshot. When you choose the ‘Take memory snapshot’ option, a message (Figure 18) will be displayed: select ‘Loader Segments’ in order to save proper code areas into the database. Note that if you skip the segment edition this option would not be available unless some segments were marked earlier for one reason or another. Your work is done.

ALPHANUMERIC SHELLCODE

You might be wondering whether alphanumeric shellcode is possible on ARM architecture. The answer is yes, and there are a few good publications that discuss it [6–8]. [8] shows how to analyse the shellcode presented in [6] using IDA Pro. The analysis process does not differ from what has been discussed so far and all techniques described apply to alphanumeric shellcode as well.

SUMMARY

ARM can be a strange platform both for newcomers and for diehard x86 assembly language programmers. Once you get a grasp of a few differences and tricks it becomes nice, easy and predictable. Sooner or later you will come to love the constant length of instructions. Compared with x86 there is quite a limited set of options for writing reliable shellcode for particular operating platforms. This may be disappointing if you are looking for a long-term challenge because after a certain number of shellcodes the next thousand will look similar if not exactly the same – but isn’t that the case with other types of malware as well?

REFERENCES

PHISHING AND FRAUD: THE MAKE-BELIEVE INDUSTRY
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Bitdefender, Romania

The digitization of shopping and banking, the increasing use of social media, and the popularity of the Internet have made users more vulnerable to phishing, identity theft and other forms of online fraud. In 2012, phishing caused losses of $1.5 billion globally, according to security firm RSA [1], and the number of attacks launched under this umbrella last year was 59% higher than in the previous year.

Cybercriminals’ earnings are likely to be a lot higher, as these figures were determined based only on registered incidents. Statistics from the Internet Crime Complaint Center [2] reveal that the most common complaints refer to police impersonation scams, identity theft and advance fee fraud.

The majority of e-threats are commercially driven, but differences exist between the targets and methods used to trick unwary users. Phishing, for instance, may have immediate, direct monetization objectives, but the initial goal of other fraudulent schemes, such as employment scams, may be identity theft or the recruitment of money mules.

This paper aims to outline some subtle differences between two of the fastest growing online traps, phishing and fraud, and to shed light on the mechanisms that fool people into placing their sensitive data and money into the hands of the attackers.

1. PHISHING

1.1 Definition

Phishing is a money-making social engineering scam whereby users have their personal details stolen through fake websites that mimic the websites of real organizations. Hundreds of fake websites are created and thousands of users are tricked every day.

Credit card details, social security numbers, usernames and passwords are among the many details mined through phishing attacks. Relying on finely tuned persuasive techniques and heavily exploiting the psychological triggers of online behaviour, phishing has been around for over 16 years, and is likely to remain a top threat for the foreseeable future.

1.2 How do they do it?

Scammers create a sense of urgency by warning users that they will have their accounts suspended or lose their money or personal data, or by making an incredible-sounding offer that is set to expire within a short period (e.g. 24 hours).

The sense of urgency encourages victims to respond to the bait, in doing so delivering their sensitive details to the criminals’ databases.

According to McGrath and Gupta’s study on the modus operandi of phishing [3], a phishing domain is live on average for three days, 31 minutes and eight seconds. Though phishing attack numbers continue to climb, the median attack duration (uptime) decreased in 2012 from 15.3 hours per attack to 11.72 hours per attack [4]. The RSA H1 2012 report [5] concluded that ‘Had attack medians remained the same, the monetary losses to phishing in H1 2012 would have exceeded US$897 million.’

1.3 Industries at gunpoint

Financial institutions, payment and retail services are the industries that are most commonly targeted by phishers. According to Bitdefender, some of the most well known brands used for phishing purposes include PayPal, Visa, Citibank, Bank of America, AOL, Wells Fargo and MasterCard – but cybercriminals also keep popular social networks and gaming platforms at gunpoint. The list of affected companies grows continuously, taking in countless brands and industries.

Most phishing web pages are placed under hacked URLs and are spread rapidly through spam, social media scams and poisoned web searches. In addition, highly targeted attacks such as spear phishing or whaling are directed at specific organizations and individuals.

More than half of the respondents of a Proofpoint survey [6] in June 2012 believed that, in the past year, their organization had been targeted by a spear phishing attack designed specifically to trick its employees.

The US is still the country that hosts the greatest number of phishing URLs, which can be explained by the fact that it hosts most of the world’s websites and domains. According to the Bitdefender GeoIP analysis, the UK, Brazil, Canada and Germany are also the source of a significant number of phishing sites.

1.4 Phishing arsenal

Cybercriminals employ an extensive range of techniques to acquire sensitive information. In addition to typosquatting
and manipulating subdomains, phishers also use link descriptions that suggest a trustworthy destination: in more complex attacks, the descriptive text is displayed when users hover the cursor over a link in the browser. An alternative trick uses JavaScript commands, which enable phishers to place an image of a genuine URL over the address bar, thus obscuring the phishing URL, or to open a new address bar containing a legitimate URL, once again obscuring the real phishing address.

Another tactic exploits vulnerable servers that host several websites. By adding a phishing page to each of the domains on the server, hundreds of phishing URLs can be created at different online locations and the scam will spread more efficiently.

Users may also be brought to phony websites through ‘tabnabbing’, a computer exploit and phishing technique which silently redirects them to the phishing location after manipulating multiple browser tabs.

2. FRAUD

In the past couple of years, an increasing number of fraudulent websites have appeared impersonating hotels, banks, law firms, shops, online casinos, rental and escrow firms. Categories of scams include advance fee fraud, employment scams, conference fraud, money loan, pay per click, piracy, lottery and pet scams. These types of fraud tend to be more targeted than (classic) phishing and the attackers make their money from small, gradual attacks. The average term for the registration of a fraudulent domain is one year.

2.1 Fake banks

Fake banks reign supreme in the online fraud category. Many of the websites are made to look very realistic, with logos and banners that are identical to those of their genuine counterparts, as well as very similar names and URLs.

Some of the recent fake bank URLs we have seen include capitalfinancebank.com, bancogulfbank.net, emspostonline.com and bancosantanderempresas.com. While carefully orchestrated bank phishing requires the exact design of a genuine website to be copied, fake bank sites tend to focus on copying logos and banners, giving a twist to the look and feel of authentic sites. Fake banks may be used to bolster the claims of a scammer who is usually engaged in other fraud such as a standard advance fee fraud. The financial brands that fake websites are currently most commonly based around are HSBC, Santander, Wells Fargo and Sun Trust.

2.2 Fake law firms

Some scammers register websites for fake legal firms – claiming to specialize in particular areas of practice such as petroleum and gas, banking, finance or taxation. They then attract users with links spread through targeted attacks. Commonly, fake law firms contact victims with demands for payment of fines, debt collection, cease-and-desist notices and so on.

2.3 Fake hotels

Fraudsters also set up fake hotel websites. One of the most common ways in which these are used is in job scams.
– through the ‘careers’ section of the site, innocent users are tempted with the prospect of job vacancies. Fake hotel sites are often used to recruit money mules via this method: victims unwittingly transfer illegally gained money on behalf of the scammers to make it untraceable, or become accomplices for a percentage of the revenues.

Other ways in which fake hotel sites are used to generate income for the scammers include asking victims to make an advance payment for the booking of a (non-existent) room.

Many fake websites are even better crafted than some legitimate ones, but an attentive eye will catch clues as to their lack of authenticity. For instance, one fake hotel site listed a phone number that was located in the US, while the address took users to a park in Montréal, Canada (see Figure 3).

2.4 Lottery scams

Lottery scams are among the most common scams on the Internet, targeting users who are apparently unaware that they first have to play the lottery in order to win it.

Fraudsters inform victims that they have won a lottery or sweepstake, but in order to receive the lump sum payout, they must first pay some taxes and processing fees. Lottery scams tend to be more effective when promoted through fake websites rather than widespread spam campaigns.

2.5 Russian oil scams

This fraud targets people looking for investment opportunities. Some Russian oil scams use fake banks to issue bogus cheques and facilitate advance fee payments which the scammers claim are customary in Russia. Criminals may also set up fake law firms, shipping companies and even government websites to give the process a more legitimate feel. The purpose is to fool the victim into paying advance fees for (non-existent) oil or other commodities.

2.6 Rental scams

Fake property rental sites are used by scammers to lure users searching for accommodation. Fake listings are posted to various property search sites, which link to fake sites that are made to look genuine by including property descriptions, photographs and addresses. The scammers make their money by insisting that the prospective tenants make a payment (often via money transfer) and/or submit their personal details, either as a reservation fee for the property or as an upfront payment of housing expenses.

2.7 Fake shops

As sales figures for online shopping continue to rise, users should be aware of an increasing number of fake stores. Fraudsters attract victims by offering low prices, incredible offers that will expire within a short time frame, or claiming to have goods in stock that are in short supply elsewhere.

2.8 Escrow scams

Internet escrow services are used as an intermediary between buyers and sellers when they don’t know (or trust)
each other. With the growing popularity of these services, scammers are setting up an increasing number of fake escrow websites to deliver ‘secure’ transactions.

The scammer poses as the recipient of money/seller of goods and then requests the use of an escrow service to complete the transaction – which is, in fact, the scammer’s own service. The victim sends money to the escrow service, at which point the scammer closes the site down, pocketing the money.

Genuine escrow sites are specifically set up to handle users’ money, so the involvement of third parties such as MoneyGram or Western Union should be a warning sign.

Figure 5: Fake escrow service.

Another sign to look out for is a secure server connection (SSL) – legitimate escrow websites will use secure connections to protect their customers, so it is wise to check for https:// in the browser address bar. (However, fraudulent websites have been known to ‘borrow’ the logo of SSL verification services such as VeriSign, so users should always check that the site is listed by the relevant authentication company.)

2.9 Advance fee fraud

Advance fee fraud (also known as ‘foreign money transfer scams’ or ‘419 fraud’) is a method used by scammers to make quick money and sometimes to steal users’ identities. It involves the victim paying an initial sum of money (sometimes in several instalments), on the understanding that not only will it be refunded, but that they will receive a share of a much larger sum once the initial transfer (usually to a foreign country) has been made. Western Union and MoneyGram are the two most popular money transfer services used by scammers wanting to obscure their trail.

Victims may be duped into parting with their money after receiving a ‘business proposal’, usually describing some urgent need to transfer a large sum of money out of the country, and requesting assistance in doing so.

2.10 Pet scams

Buying or adopting pets online has become a risky business, as scammers have infiltrated legitimate services. They advertise animals (often particularly popular breeds, at very competitive prices) via various online services and usually claim that the animal has to be shipped to the recipient, requiring various fees to be paid up front. Of course, in reality the animals do not exist.

2.11 Loan scams

Loan scammers trick victims with the lure of very low interest rates. They entice them to fake websites, then request advance fees for setting the loan up, citing reasons such as insurance, deposits, certificates or registration.

2.12 Employment scams

In employment scams, scammers posing as recruitment agencies or employers offer attractive job opportunities but require the applicant (victim) to make advance payments for things such as work visas, travel expenses, finder’s fees and so on. Names, addresses, banking information and other personal details obtained throughout the ‘recruitment’ process may also be used for identity theft.

2.13 Warez and piracy

Fake warez and piracy websites usually appear in search results when users are looking for pirated software or ‘original’ software for a lower price than is available on the legitimate market. The sites usually take the users through several loops to reach a download link – which is fake. Either the promised software doesn’t exist, or it has malicious components. Users risk having their money and credit card details stolen, and may end up with malware on their devices as well.

2.14 Pay-per-click fraud

In pay-per-click advertising, publishers display clickable links in exchange for a fee for each time someone clicks on the link, taking them through to the advertiser’s website.

Fake pay-per-click companies target advertisers seeking to increase the volume of visitors to their website. Victims are asked to pay a fee and hand over their details in advance.
Fake hits are then created either manually or by automated means.

2.15 Conference scams
Fake conference websites are set up to collect fees and personal details from potential conference participants. Targeted emails are sent inviting the recipient to the fictitious conference and including a link to the fake conference website. Typically, participants are asked to provide their personal details and to make an upfront payment, either as a conference registration fee, for the reservation of hotel accommodation, or even for assistance with visa application processing and travel booking.

The scammers go to considerable lengths to make the fake websites look authentic, and target their scams carefully – examples of conferences scams seen recently include conferences on climate change, human rights issues and biochemistry, NGO workshops and many more.

3. PHISHING AND FRAUD: DIFFERENCES
Phishing and fraud may be driven by the same money-making goals, but subtle differences between their mechanisms justify separate classification and blacklisting processes.

3.1 Uptime
One important distinction focuses on the median attack duration (uptime). The average length of time that a phishing attack is online is shorter than the uptime of a targeted fraud or fake website created from scratch.

This may be due to the fact that organizations and hosting companies have become better at detecting phished URLs that damage their brand and reputation. In registering and creating a website from scratch for a completely fictitious organization, fraudsters rarely affect renowned brands. With fake banks, the potential for damage is greater, as fraudsters often try to pose as the local offices of legitimate financial institutions.

Individual users rarely have the know-how or power to fight targeted fraud, and even financial institutions do not always put up their best weapons in the battle against fraud. Europol's 2012 payment card fraud report stated: ‘Acceptable levels of fraud and expected net profit for banks are more important than the real prevention of fraud that would lead to depriving criminals of the huge amounts of money they are stealing using EU payment cards.’ [7, 8].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Differences</th>
<th>Phishing</th>
<th>Fraud</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Uptime</td>
<td>Short period of time</td>
<td>Longer period of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Domain</td>
<td>Hijacked</td>
<td>Specially designed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Promotion</td>
<td>Spam widespread campaigns</td>
<td>Social media targeted campaigns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1: Differences between phishing and fraud.

Different promotion strategies also allow fraudulent websites to have a longer uptime, while phished websites are taken down more rapidly. Depending on how heavily they are promoted, some fraudulent URLs persist for longer than others.

3.2 Domain and URL management
Phishing web pages aim to replicate the exact content of websites owned by real organizations – most commonly a bank or a payment service – usually on a hacked or compromised domain. Cases of fraud, however, often have bogus entities created from scratch, using domains bought anonymously and registered for a longer period.

Another contrast between phishing and fraud is the manipulation of addresses. For instance, the URL of a legitimate hotel’s website, ‘http://realandnicehotel.com’, might be used as the basis for a fake website, ‘http://real-and-nicehotel.com’.

When creating URLs, cybercriminals sometimes aim to create the impression that the fake site is affiliated to a legitimate company. Meanwhile, (most) phishing URLs are less well crafted, as they are usually placed on compromised legitimate domains.

To make the scams more believable, more than 90% of fake banks and financial institutions are registered on the top level domain ‘.com’. The second choice for fraudsters is ‘.net’ (almost 4%), followed by ‘.biz’, ‘.org’ and ‘.uk’, each with 2% of the overall fake banks registered.

Many fraudulent websites (over 90%) are registered for just a year, which is something to check using the WHOIS tools available on the Internet. In most cases, a one-year registration combined with a webmail address for the registrant (e.g. Yahoo!, Gmail or Hotmail) is a strong indication of a scam.

3.3 Promotion techniques
Phished pages are promoted intensively through spam and social media, while fraudulent sites rely on more targeted techniques which attract less attention, as attackers want
to avoid having their websites taken down by hosting companies.

4. GUIDELINES

The following are some tips to help users stay away from fraud and phishing attacks:

- Before making any payment online, booking a hotel room or hiring a law firm, check the WHOIS information for the website, which will give you clues about the website’s domain registration, hosting and online activity. Remember that more than 90% of fake websites are registered for just one year. Also, fraudsters tend to use registrant emails that offer anonymity, such as ‘contact@privacyprotect.org’ or ‘contact@myprivateregistration.com’, as well as free webmail addresses from providers such as Yahoo!, Hotmail, and Gmail. A legitimate organization is unlikely to do this. According to Bitdefender, 19.09% of all fake banks are registered to the email address contact@privacyprotect.org, while almost 6% are registered to support@namecheap.com.

- Always be on guard when making an online payment, and don’t use your credentials unless you are 100% sure it’s a genuine website.

- An unclear web address, spelling errors and poor grammar might be clues that point to a phishing attack. Typing the legitimate URL directly into the browser rather than clicking a link in an email may also help you stay away from scams.

- Check the list of unauthorized banks [9] in your country when dealing with a financial organization you haven’t heard of before.

- Double check a banker’s or seller’s identity when he calls or sends you a targeted email. Remember that scammers may go as far as creating a fake website to trick a single user, making money out of small, but successful attacks.

- Be on your guard when using social networks. Select online ‘friends’ carefully and consider the information you share, and the way you interact with applications.

- ‘UK global redirecting’ numbers that start with +4470 are a major warning of a scam. Though the country code ‘+44’ may look like a British number, the ’70’ prefix means the phone call will be redirecting to a number which may be in any country but the UK.

CONCLUSIONS

With minimal investment in technology and time, phishing and fraudulent websites provide endless income for cybercriminals. Though many organizations strive to create a safer online environment, victims are still sending their financial information and money to unknown destinations all over the world.

Use of an anti-virus solution will help protect users not only from malware, but also from phishing, identity theft and targeted fraud attacks. User education and raising awareness of phishing and targeted fraud may also help contribute to a safer online environment and a drop in cybercrime revenues.

REFERENCES


END NOTES & NEWS

EBCG’s 3rd Annual Cyber Security Summit will take place 11–12 April 2013 in Prague, Czech Republic. See http://www.ebcg.biz/ ebcg-business-events/15/international-cyber-security-master-class/.

SOURCE Boston takes place 16–18 April 2013 in Boston, MA, USA. For details see http://www.sourceconference.com/boston/.

Digital Shield Summit 2013 takes place 21–22 April 2013 in Abu Dhabi, UAE. For details see http://www.digitalshieldme.com/.

The Commonwealth Cybersecurity Forum will be held 22–26 April 2013 in Yaoundé, Cameroon. For details see http://www.cto.int/events/upcoming-events/commonwealth-cybersecurity-forum/.

Infosecurity Europe will be held 23–25 April 2013 in London, UK. For details see http://www.infosec.co.uk/.


2nd Annual Cyber Security Summit UAE 2013 will be held 13–14 May 2013 in Dubai, UAE. For more information see http://www.cybersecurityuae.com/.

The 7th International CARO Workshop will be held 16–17 May 2013 in Bratislava, Slovakia. See http://2013.caro.org /


2nd Annual Cyber Security for the Chemical Industry Europe takes place 29–30 May 2013 in Frankfurt, Germany. For details see http://www.cybersecuritychemicals.com/.

The 22nd Annual EICAR Conference will be held 10–11 June 2013 in Cologne, Germany. For details see http://www.eicar.org/.

Digital Enterprise Europe will be held 11–12 June 2013 in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. For information about the event see http://www.revolution1plus.com/Digital_Enterprise_Europe_Website/.

CISO Roundtable and Summit will be held 12–14 June 2013 in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. For more information see http://www.ciso-summit.com/europe/.

NISC13 will be held 12–14 June 2013. For more information see http://www.nisc.org.uk/.

The 25th annual FIRST Conference takes place 16–21 June 2013 in Bangkok, Thailand. For details see http://conference.first.org/.


DIMVA 2013 takes place 18–19 July 2013 in Berlin, Germany. For details see http://dimva.sec.t-labs.tu-berlin.de/.

Black Hat USA will take place 27 July to 1 August 2013 in Las Vegas, NV, USA. For more information see http://www.blackhat.com/.

The 22nd USENIX Security Symposium will be held 14–16 August 2013 in Washington, DC, USA. For more information see http://usenix.org/events/.

VB2013 takes place 2–4 October 2013 in Berlin, Germany. The conference programme will be announced shortly. For more details including registration can be found at http://www.virusbtn.com/conference/vb2013/.

VB2014 will take place 24–26 September 2014 in Seattle, WA, USA. More information will be available in due course at http://www.virusbtn.com/conference/vb2014/. For details of sponsorship opportunities and any other queries please contact conference@virusbtn.com.

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