

Covering the global threat landscape

VBWEB COMPARATIVE REVIEW WINTER 2020

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Together with email¹ the web is one of the two major malware infection vectors through which organizations and individuals get infected with malware. Most organizations use security products to minimize the risk of malware making it onto the network this way, thus avoiding having to rely on security products running on the endpoint.

In the VBWeb tests, which form part of *Virus Bulletin*'s test suite, we measure the performance of web security products against a range of live web threats. We publish quarterly reports on the performance of the products that have opted to be included in our public testing. The reports also include an overview of the current state of the web-based threat landscape.

THE WINTER 2019/20 WEB THREAT LANDSCAPE

Winter 2019/20 continues to be more interesting than previous years when it comes to exploit kits, and we are still seeing new kits emerging. At least 11 kits² are currently active and in this test we caught eight of them: RIG, Fallout, Spelevo, Underminer, KaiXin, Purplefox, Capesand and Lewd.

The most recent kits to emerge were Capesand³, found by researchers from *Trend Micro* delivering njRat, and Bottle⁴, found by @nao_sec delivering a stealer that targets users in Japan.

Other malware downloaded by the various exploit kits included: Danabot, Smokeloader, Trickbot, Raccoon, Dridex, Hidenbee and Qakbot.

⁴ https://nao-sec.org/2019/12/say-hello-to-bottle-exploit-kit.html.

# ^	RequestMethod	Protocol	Result	Host	URL	Body	Content-Type	Comments
& > 49	GET	HTTP	200	invenipp.com	1	1,456	text/html	
<>> 50	GET	HTTP	200	invenipp.com	/favicon.ico	1,163	text/html	
\$ ≥51	GET	HTTP	200	invenipp.com	/Default.html	862	text/html	
52	GET	HTTP	302	ddaltime 14.com	1	0	text/html	
∢ ≱ <mark>53</mark>	GET	нттр	200	invenipp.com	/ad.html	11,339	text/html	KaiXin EK [HTML/JS] (Landing Page)
∛ \$4				invenipp.com	/banner.html	33,415	text/html	KaiXin EK [HTML/JS] (Landing Page)
<>> 55	GET	HTTP	200	invenipp.com	/ads.html	14,997	text/html	
57 58 58	GET	HTTP	200	invenipp.com	/swfobject.js	12,624	application/x-javascript	
58	GET	HTTP	200	invenipp.com	/jquery.js	15,728	application/x-javascript	
159	GET	HTTP	200	invenipp.com	/login.swf	85,789	application/x-shockwave-flash	
🕋 60	GET	HTTP	200	fpdownload2.macromedia.com	/get/flashplayer/update/current/xml/version_en_win_ax.xml	1,548	text/xml	
\$ ≱61	GET	HTTP	200	invenipp.com	/favicon.ico	1,163	text/html	
^{css} {62	GET	HTTP	200	www.invenr2.com:8080	/style.css	172,774	text/css	
^{css} {63	GET	HTTP	200	www.invenr2.com:8080	/style.css	172,774	text/css	
119	GET	HTTP	200	www.invenr2.com:8080	/mian.swf	65,024	application/octet-stream	
123	GET	HTTP	200	154.197.27.79:8080	/googla.dll	233,527	application/octet-stream	

KaiXin exploit kit traffic.



¹See the regular VBSpam reports on the email-based threat landscape and email security products' ability to protect email accounts: https://www.virusbulletin.com/testing/vbspam/.

² https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2019/11/ exploit-kits-fall-2019-review/.

³ https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/newexploit-kit-capesand-reuses-old-and-new-public-exploits-and-toolsblockchain-ruse/.

We also saw more than 800 instances of malware downloads from around 90 families including Emotet, Trickbot, Ursnif, Mirai and Ransomshade. Fortunately, the tested products had very few problems blocking malware in any of these categories.

And as was the case in the Autumn 2019 test, products also had few problems blocking phishing pages.

RESULTS

It should be noted that one of the products included in this VBWeb test is a cloud-based product. As with the other products hosted in our lab, we replay previously recorded requests through cloud-based products⁵, but as we do not control the connection between the product and the Internet, we cannot replay the response.

Thus it is possible that a request that results in a malicious response in our test lab results in a non-malicious response when replayed through a cloud-based product. We consider such cases full blocks, as this is the user experience, but because a cloud-based product isn't always served the malicious content by the exploit kits, for the purpose of calculating block rates we only count these instances with a weight of 0.5. However, in the case of the particular cloud-based product included this test, all exploit kits were blocked, meaning that the weighting would not have made a difference.

Fortinet FortiGate

Drive-by download rate	100.0%	Vb
Malware block rate	99.9%	VERIFIED
Phishing block rate	96.1%	WEB
Cryptocurrency miner block rate	100.0%	Virusbuilcom
False positive rate	0.0%	

Fortinet's *FortiGate* appliance extends its unbroken run of VBWeb awards after having blocked all drive-by download cases (exploit kits) and having missed only one of more than 800 direct malware downloads. With over 96 per cent of phishing sites blocked, this kind of malicious site isn't a significant problem for *FortiGate* either.

iBoss

Drive-by download rate	100.0%	Vb
Malware block rate	99.1%	VERIFIED
Phishing block rate	96.8%	WEB virusbtn.com
Cryptocurrency miner block rate	100.0%	
False positive rate	3.0%	

iBoss once again blocked all drive-by download cases (exploit kits) in this test, as well as all but a few directly downloaded malware samples. *iBoss* also blocked almost 97 per cent of phishing sites. A fourth VBWeb certification is thus fully deserved.

Kaspersky Web Traffic Security

Kaspersky's web security product was also tested. Unfortunately, a routing issue caused by *Virus Bulletin* resulted in the product being unable to download updates – something that wasn't discovered until the end of the test. Indeed, even in this setting *Kaspersky* performed so well it easily achieved another VBWeb certification, but we do not think it



fair to include the numbers. We look forward to seeing *Kaspersky*'s real performance in the next test.

APPENDIX: THE TEST METHODOLOGY

The test ran from 15 November to 1 December 2019, during which period we gathered a large number of URLs (most of which were found through public sources) which we had reason to believe could serve a malicious response. We opened the URLs in one of our test browsers, selected at random.

When our systems deemed the response sufficiently likely to fit one of various definitions of 'malicious', we made the same request in the same browser a number of times, each with one of the participating products in front of it. The traffic to the filters was replayed from our cache within seconds of the original request having been made, thus making it a fully real-time test.

⁵The requests are replayed in near real time.


FortiGate 300D FC	T3HD3915807276	[1]	⑦ [] admin	
Applications Cloud Applications Web Sites	125 Threat Score	5 minutes	1 hour 24 hours 🔅	
Threats Threat Map FortiSandbox Failed Authentication	75 Threat Score 75 Threat Score 25 Threat Score 75 Threat Score 0 Threat Score 10:00	02:00 04:0		
System Events Admin Logins VPN	Threat RIG Exploit Kit.signature Uncategorized Exploit Kit.signature	Category IPS IPS	Threat Level Critical Critical	
 ↔ Network ♦ System 	MS.OLE.VBScript.CMD.REDIM.Array.Unbounded.Memory.Corruption.signature Generic.Exploit Kit.Detection signature Generic.JavaScript.Cryptocurrency.Mining.Script.signature	IPS IPS IPS	Critical Medium Medium	
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▲ User & Device ❤ WiFi & Switch Controller	> >			
Monitor			Þ	

Fortinet FortiGate.

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1/21/2019 2:42 PM		Default	www.v2vapour.co.uk/idevaffiliate/idevaffiliate.php?id=373&url=244			1.136.243.94		Alcohol/Tobacco	Blocked	No	
1/21/2019 2:34 PM	*81.136.243.94	Default	xiaowangzhan.net/contact.html?kcnyts=csqiw2		8	1.136.243.94		Not Rated Site	Blocked	No	
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1/21/2019 2:31 PM	*81.136.243.94	Default	alden.bebelusaanjelica.xyz/2q0f69ousmrad9/muture-beckinsale-carmella		a 8	1.136.243.94		Not Rated Site	Blocked	No	
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1/21/2019 2:34 PM	*81.136.243.94	Default	xiaowangzhan.net/contact.html?kcnyts=csqlw2			8	1.136.243.94		Not Rated Site	Blocked	No
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1/21/2019 2:30 PM	*81.136.243.94	Default	www.kuncidunia.com/		1.136.243.94		Not Rated Site	Blocked	No		
1/21/2019 2:31 PM	*81.136.243.94	Default				a 8	1.136.243.94		Not Rated Site	Blocked	No
			xiaowangzhan.net/contact.html?kcnvts=csoiw2								

iBoss.

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Kaspersky Web Traffic Security					Detected (objects)		
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	Last 10 threats						
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Administrator >	HEUR Exploit Script Generic	Block	01 Dec 15:48:58				



We did not need to know at this point whether the response was actually malicious, thus our test didn't depend on malicious sites that were already known to the security community. During a review of the test corpus some days later, we analysed the responses and discarded cases for which the traffic was not deemed malicious.

In this test, we checked products against 700 drive-by downloads (exploit kits), 864 direct malware downloads and 441 phishing sites, a category which also includes sites that trick the user into calling a phone number. To qualify for a VBWeb award, the weighted average catch rate of these two categories, with weights of 90% and 10% respectively, needed to be at least 80%.

The test focused on both HTTP and HTTPS traffic. It did not look at extremely targeted attacks or possible vulnerabilities in the products themselves.

Data for the test was provided by various public sources as well as an API provided by *Active Defense*⁶.

TEST MACHINES

Each request was made from a randomly selected virtual machine using one of the available browsers. The machines ran either *Windows XP Service Pack 3 Home Edition 2002* or *Windows 7 Service Pack 1 Ultimate 2009* and all ran slightly out-of-date browsers and browser plug-ins.

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⁶ https://www.activedefense.co.jp/adctd-api-spec/.