

USING GAME THEORY TO ASSESS THE STRENGTH OF AN AV SYSTEM AGAINST EVOLVING OFFENCES

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
Northwestern State University

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
University of Louisiana at Lafayette



White List + Black List = ?




White List + Black List = ?




White List + Black List = ?



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
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White List + Black List = ?



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
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
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
Composition Experiences

- Choices reflect composition ideas in AV
 - Which choices do we use?
- We were experimenting with composition
 - We were building tools for analysis and detection
 - Could compose and integrate in variety of ways
- Ran into some interesting questions along the way...


Vilo Composition

- Vilo:
 - Automated classifier / detector
 - Analyzes binaries
 - Constructs generic matcher
 - Applications
 - Black list: use malware for training
 - White list: use benign for training
- Question:
 - How to integrate Vilo into AV systems?

Composition: Vilo in Sequence



Composition: Vilo in Parallel



Normalizer/Filter Composition


■ Mutant Normalizer:

- Converts mutants/variants to a single form
- Perform ordinary scan on normalized form
- Concern:
 - Relatively expensive
- Solution:
 - Apply only on files likely to be mutants
 - We developed fast filter to identify likely mutants

■ Question:


- How to integrate Normalizer/Filter into AV system?

Composition: Filter/Normalizer




Composition Choices


Sequence



Parallel



Select



Composition: a Way of Life

- Multiple identification methods in AV scanners
 - Crypto checksum
 - X-ray scanning
 - Static behaviour-based patterns
 - Emulation-based behavior matching
 - Heuristic analysis
- ...
- Common to be combined in AV system
 - Including composition using selection logic

Important Questions

- Compositions raise important questions
 - How do we know a composition is any good?
 - How do we tune the composed system for optimal performance?
 - If two classifiers are optimally tuned, will their composition also be optimal?
- Game theory can yield insight into such composition problems

Some Interesting Results

- For a particular selector/classifier architecture it can be shown that:
 - Adding another classifier to a scanner will not always make a scanner better
 - better *only if* the cost of “stealthing” the selector is above a specific threshold
 - AV designer is always advised to deter “stealthing” the selector
 - by increasing the spread in the detection rates of the classifiers

Steps To Enlightenment

- Introduce general game theory approach
- Show application to two common architectures
- Derive analysis of game strategies

Game Theory: General Approach

- Game Theory:
 - Aid to analyze strategic choices of adversaries
- Basic idea:
 - Model adversary interaction as game
 - Associate payoffs (costs/benefits) to outcome
 - Mathematical manipulation to analyze strategies
 - Search for optimal strategies

Game Theory Modeling Process

- Four steps
 1. Identify agents
 2. Identify game parameters
 3. Develop game tree
 4. Analyze tree to compute expected payoffs


- Two step introduction using two games:
 - Simple: One classifier
 - Complex: Selector/Classifier

Step 1: Agents & Roles

- Normal User (NU)
 - Presents uninfected files to the system
 - Wants to use system to derive positive utility
- Malware Author (MA)
 - Presents infected files to system
 - Wants to attack system to derive positive utility
- Security Analyst (SA)
 - Attempts to provide optimal system, including:
 - Detect and thwart MA's malware
 - Minimize AV system's total cost

Step 1: Game

- Simple game setup
 - Single classifier



Step 2: Classifier Parameter

- Many classifiers have a tunable parameter
 - Parameter trades off between
 - P_D : true positive rate
 - P_F : false positive rate
 - ROC curve shows relation between P_D and P_F

ROC Curve




Figure 2: A ROC curve
Virus Bulletin Conference 2008 10/3/2008




Step 2: Classifier Parameter

- Parameters are settings the SA can control
 - These define the SA's moves in the game
 - Need to choose parameter to model ROC
- Typical ROC curves follow power function
 - $P_D = P_F^r, 0 < r < 1$
 - r can be used as model parameter
 - i.e., SA chooses r as part of the game strategy


Step 2: Outcomes and Payoffs

- Actual payoffs for agents are their *benefits less costs* given a particular game outcome
- Define the game based on analysis of SA, MA, and NU payoffs

Step 3: Construct Game Tree



Step 4: Expected Payoff Analysis



Step 4: Expected Payoff Analysis

- The expected payoffs for all agents:

$$\text{NU: } (\mu_N - \beta)p_F + \mu_N(1-p_F) = \mu_N - \beta p_F$$

$$\text{MA: } \mu_H(1-p_D) + \mu_L p_D$$


$$\text{SA: } v - (d+v)\lambda - c(1-\lambda)p_F + (d-c)\lambda p_D$$

Step 4: Strategy Analysis

- Optimal solution for SA:

$$p_D = \left(\frac{\xi}{r} \right)^{\frac{r}{r-1}} \text{ where } \xi = \frac{c}{d-c} \times \frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda}$$

Selector Game



- SA
 - Sets up system
 - Tunes it
- MA
 - Chooses anti-AV technique
 - Sends cloaked file
- Question:
 - Optimal parameters?

Game Theory Steps - Revisited


■ Four steps

1. Identify agents
2. Identify game parameters
3. Develop game tree
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
Step 2: Outcomes and Payoffs (Δ)

Outcomes		Benefits			A	Costs		
		SA	NU	MA		SA	NU	MA
Normal	Alarm	v	μ_N			c	β	
	No Alarm	v	μ_N					
Malware (normal)	Alarm			μ_L		c		
	No Alarm			μ_H		d		
Malware (stealth)	Alarm			μ_L		c		Δ
	No Alarm			μ_H		d		Δ


Step 2: Parameters (t_{NU} and t_{MA})



Step 3: Game Tree (no Stealth)



Step 3: Game Tree (w/ Stealth)



Step 4: Strategy Analysis

- Game tree analysis yields expected payoffs

$$\text{NU: } t_{\text{NU}}((\mu_N - \beta)p_F^{\text{NU}} + \mu_N(1 - p_F^{\text{NU}})) + (1 - t_{\text{NU}})(p_F^{\text{MA}}(\mu_N - \beta) + (1 - p_F^{\text{MA}})\mu_N)$$

MA if not using anti-AV:

$$(1 - t_{\text{MA}})(\mu_l p_D^{\text{NU}} + \mu_h(1 - p_D^{\text{NU}})) + t_{\text{MA}}(\mu_l p_D^{\text{MA}} + \mu_h(1 - p_D^{\text{MA}}))$$

MA if using anti-AV:

$$(1 - t_{\text{NU}})((\mu_l - \Delta)p_D^{\text{MA}} + (\mu_h - \Delta)(1 - p_D^{\text{MA}})) + t_{\text{NU}}((\mu_l - \Delta)p_D^{\text{NU}} + (\mu_h - \Delta)(1 - p_D^{\text{NU}}))$$

$$\text{SA: } p(\text{selected as normal, alarm}) * [p(\text{normal file} \setminus \text{selected as normal, alarm}) * v - c] + p(\text{selected as normal, no alarm}) * [p(\text{normal file} \setminus \text{selected as normal, no alarm}) * v - p(\text{malware} \setminus \text{selected as normal, no alarm}) * d] + p(\text{selected as malware, alarm}) * [p(\text{normal file} \setminus \text{selected as malware, alarm}) * v - c] + p(\text{selected as malware, no alarm}) * [p(\text{normal file} \setminus \text{selected as malware, no alarm}) * v - p(\text{malware} \setminus \text{selected as malware, no alarm}) * d]^1$$

Step 4: Optimal Solutions

■ Optimal solution for SA:

If $\Delta \geq \text{Threshold}(r)$ then $p_D^{\text{MA}} = f(r)$ and $p_D^{\text{NU}} = g(r)$

If $\Delta < \text{Threshold}(r)$ then
$$p_D^{\text{MA}} - p_D^{\text{NU}} = \frac{\Delta}{(\mu_H - \mu_L)(t_{\text{MA}} + t_{\text{NU}} - 1)}$$

and
$$(1 - t_{\text{NU}})(p_D^{\text{MA}})^{\frac{1-r}{r}} + t_{\text{NU}}(p_D^{\text{NU}})^{\frac{1-r}{r}} = \frac{r}{\xi}$$

Where

$$\text{Threshold}(r) = (t_{\text{MA}} + t_{\text{NU}} - 1)(f(r) - g(r))(\mu_H - \mu_L)$$

$$f(r) = \left(\frac{\xi}{r} \times \frac{1 - t_{\text{NU}}}{t_{\text{MA}}} \right)^{\frac{r}{r-1}} \quad \text{and} \quad g(r) = \left(\frac{\xi}{r} \times \frac{t_{\text{MA}}}{1 - t_{\text{MA}}} \right)^{\frac{r}{r-1}}$$

Step 4: Insights

- For a particular selector/classifier architecture it can be shown that:
 - Adding another classifier to a scanner will not always make a scanner better
 - better *only if* the cost of “stealthiness” the selector is above a specific threshold
 - AV designer is always advised to deter “stealthiness” the selector
 - by increasing the spread in the detection rates of the classifiers
- Have equations for setting parameters

Conclusions

- Introduced way to analyse AV systems using Game Theory
- Showed it may lead to interesting, possibly counter-intuitive results
- Mathematically derive optimal configurations

Thanks!

