EXPLAIN ETHEREUM SMART CONTRACT HACKING LIKE I AM FIVE

Zoltan Balazs
2018 October

MRG Effitas
Efficacy Assessment & Assurance



Is there anything malware related in this talk?

NO

This is like the “skateboarding dog” at the end of the news.
Totally not relevant, but probably funny …

Questions

Hands up if you know something about blockchain

Hands up if you have ever tried to explain Bitcoin to your parents/colleagues/kids

Hands up if it ended: “it is complicated”

Hands up if you have ever interacted with a Smart Contract

Why am I talking about this?

ITSEC folks laugh about Blockchain a lot

They believe it is

- not happening
- not important
- not working

Bad news: it is happening!

Trust me, this is an important topic

I will calculate losses in Lamborghinis – 200K USD

So who am I to talk about this topic?



I don’t give advice on investing/ selling/ HODLing cryptocurrencies


Everything you don't understand about money combined
CRYPTOCURRENCIES
with everything you don't understand about computers

Smart Contracts



Assume you have a basic understanding of cryptocurrencies in general

Let's take a deep dive into **Smart Contracts**

Bitcoin is also capable of doing Smart Contracts

Ethereum YAC (Yet Another Cryptocurrency) was designed for Smart Contracts

Smart Contracts

You want to sign and get a countersign of the contract

carve the contract into stone
contracts carved into the stone
cannot be modified

In the smart contract world, the **stone** is the **blockchain**

it is powered by the time and energy spent on solved math challenges

Code is universal

Ethereum Virtual Machine

Bytecode: it is not a machine code, thus you need a VM to execute it

Solidity: compile JavaScript-like code into **EVM** bytecode

Source code can be published - creates trust

Solidity source code compiles into the same bytecode (reproducible)

At least with the same parameters and same compiler version


Extensions
More Extension Results
ADDED
METAMASK
MetaMask
offered by https://metamask.io
Ethereum Browser Extension
RATE IT
Productivity
(952)


Main Network
METAMASK
enter password
LOG IN
Restore from seed phrase


Wallet address
0x
Email *
Nickname
If you have trouble signing in or editing your account, send us a message at
meow@cryptokitties.co.
Make sure to save your MetaMask login information and account recovery details! We can't help you regain access if you lose it.
Save account info


CONFIRM TRANSACTION
Main Network
Sign Message
Account...
ADDRESS
0x
BALANCE
0.33 ETH
MESSAGE
Cryptokitties
Cancel
Sign

Secure | https://www.cryptokitties.co/kitty/888

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Smart contracts are code

By Andrew Quentson MAY 17, 2016

DAO Makes History, Raises $130 Million, Breaking All Records

The millennial generation is experiencing history in the making as they flock in amazing numbers - almost 5,000 members on the DAO slack channel - to fund one of the most promising decentralized autonomous organizations.

More Ethereum Attacks: Race-To-Empty is the Real Deal

09 JUNE 2016 on ethereum, smart contracts, security, solidity

Chriseth at github casually pointed out a terrible, terrible attack on wallet contracts that I had not considered. If there were a responsible disclosure avenue for ethereum contract developers, I would use it, but there doesn't seem to be. Not only that, this code has been out and published on github for long enough that I wanted to get the news out there quickly.

In Brief: Your smart contract is probably vulnerable to being emptied if you keep track of any sort of user balances and were not very, very careful.

As always, I'm available for smart contract review and audit, email me. You can read about other security considerations on my blog here.

Stephan Tual Follow
Slock.it Founder, Blockchain and Smart Contract Expert, Former CCO Ethereum
Jun 12, 2016 · 3 min read · Unlisted

No DAO funds at risk following the Ethereum smart contract 'recursive call' bug discovery

Our team is blessed to have Dr. Christian Reitwießner, Father of Solidity, as its Advisor. During the early development of the DAO Framework 1.1 and thanks to his guidance we were made aware of a generic vulnerability common to all Ethereum smart contracts. We promptly circumvented this so-called "recursive call vulnerability" or "race to empty" from the DAO Framework 1.1 as can be seen on line 580:

The important takeaway from this is: as there is no ether whatsoever in the DAO's rewards account—this is NOT an issue that is putting any DAO funds at risk today.

The DAO: Recursive call + race condition

June 18th, 2016

Attacker transfers Ether worth $250 million from DAO

That is 1250 Lamborghinis

Reentrancy at the splitDAO function



The DAO hack

You can interrupt the bank teller while he is giving you money

The bank teller only updates your balance at the end

The DAO hack …

```
// INSECURE  --- this is not DAO code, but similar so it is easy to understand

function withdrawBalance() public {                         // 1st line

    uint amountToWithdraw = userBalances[msg.sender];       // 2nd line

    require(msg.sender.call.value(amountToWithdraw)()); // 3rd line. At this point, the caller's code is executed, and can call withdrawBalance again

    userBalances[msg.sender] = 0;               // 4th line

}
```


Look how much I have.
Can I hold it?
crypto-comics.com

The solution?

Rewrite the past and pretend it didn’t happen

Attacker got away with his ETH Classic

worth $67.4 million – 337 Lambos

An Open Letter To the DAO and the Ethereum community

chris4210 (66) in ethereum • 2 years ago

===== BEGIN SIGNED MESSAGE =====
To the DAO and the Ethereum community,

I have carefully examined the code of The DAO and decided to participate after finding the feature where splitting is rewarded with additional ether. I have made use of this feature and have rightfully claimed 3,641,694 ether, and would like to thank the DAO for this reward. It is my understanding that the DAO code contains this feature to promote decentralization and encourage the creation of "child DAOs".

I am disappointed by those who are characterizing the use of this intentional feature as "theft". I am making use of this explicitly coded feature as per the smart contract terms and my law firm has advised me that my action is fully compliant with United States criminal and tort law. For reference please review the terms of the DAO:

"The terms of The DAO Creation are set forth in the smart contract code existing on the Ethereum blockchain at 0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413. Nothing in this

Multi-signature wallets

“Captain planet, the world’s first multi-factor authentication” © dnet

Shared vulnerable library + reinit - 2017 July 20

$31M stolen – 155 Lambos

A lot more was in danger, but good guys were faster

Lot of shared libraries exists in the blockchain

Save gas

Contracts now share the same vulnerabilities

Parity multi-signature wallets

Teh code

NON LIBRARY CODE

```
function() payable {  // someone called a function we don't have?
  if (msg.value > 0)            // some ether is sent
    ...
  else if (msg.data.length > 0)        //ether is not sent, but some data is
    _walletLibrary.delegatecall(msg.data);                //let's check if we can execute this code via shared
library
}
```

- If the method name is not defined on this contract…
- And there's no ether being sent in the transaction…
- And there is some data in the message payload…

for whatever method that calls DELEGATECALL, it will call the same method on the contract you're delegating to, but using the context of the current contract

Teh library codez

```
function initWallet(address[] _owners, uint _required, uint _daylimit) {
        //the shared library has initWallet and it is public !


  initDaylimit(_daylimit);
  initMultiowned(_owners, _required);
}
```

initWallet is not in the non-library code, but is called in the shared library

So some random guys don’t know how to code Smart Contracts …





Fixing the Parity bug

Parity fixed previous bug

and introduced a new one

3esmit commented on Aug 3, 2017 — Contributor

BTW, when you deploy WalletLibrary, the init function will be open in that contract. I recommend you calling initWallet on WalletLibrary right after its deploy, just to ensure no one will use it.

👍 7 😄 5

Library contract was not initialized properly. That allowed anyone to turn the library contract into a multi-sig wallet

The next Parity hack

November 2017 - $300M lost – 1500 Lambos

@devops199 “accidentally” called initWallet() method to own the library

@devops199 “accidentally” called kill() method to self-destruct it

It was planned to be fixed – forking EIP-999. Community voted no

Conclusion

Blockchain, Ethereum, Smart Contracts are here to hack

Writing secure Smart Contracts is hard

Ethereum is still in beta

Hacking Smart Contracts is possible, fun, but probably illegal

- Hacking your own smart contract is probably not illegal
- Hacking in test blockchain is not illegal

Where to learn to code? cryptozombies.io

Where to learn to hack?



References

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https://medium.freecodecamp.org/a-hacker-stole-31m-of-ether-how-it-happened-and-what-it-means-for-ethereum-9e5dc29e33ce
https://www.stateofthedapps.com/
Cryptozombies.io - best tutorial
Latest hype and scams: https://boards.4chan.org/biz/


PRESTO

Whoami?

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Twitter – @zh4ck

www.slideshare.net/bz98

HACKERSULI !!!1!

https://JumpESPJump.blogspot.com

Zombie Browser Toolkit

https://github.com/Z6543/ZombieBrowserPack

HWFW Bypass tool

Similar stuff was used in PacketRedirect in Danderspritz FlewAvenue by EQGRP

https://github.com/MRGEffitas/hwfwbypass

Malware Analysis Sandbox Tester tool

https://github.com/MRGEffitas/Sandbox_tester

Played with crappy IoT devices – my RCE exploit code running on ~600 000 IP cameras via Persirai

https://jumpespjump.blogspot.hu/2015/09/how-i-hacked-my-ip-camera-and-found.html

https://jumpespjump.blogspot.hu/2015/08/how-to-secure-your-home-against.html

Invented the idea of encrypted exploit delivery via Diffie-Hellman key exchange, to bypass exploit detection appliances

Implemented by Angler and Nuclear exploit kit developers

https://www.mrg-effitas.com/generic-bypass-of-next-gen-intrusion-threat-breach-detection-systems/