

LOGIC & BINARIES

Thais Moreira Hamasaki aka barbieAuglend

2010-10-03 | Virus Bulletin 2010 | Montreal, CA



DISCLAIMER

*This research was accomplished by
me in my personal capacity during
my spare time.*



WHAT AM I GOING TO TALK ABOUT?

- **constraint logic programming (CLP)**
- **solvers**
- **malware RE challenges**
- **Logic vs. Malware**



S..A..M.. WHAT?




- Solver†
 - Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT)





CONSTRAINTS






"Constraint programming represents one of the closest approaches computer science has yet made to the Holy Grail of programming: the user states the problem, the computer solves it." Eugene C. Freuder, Constraints, April 1997



AUTOMATED THEOREM PROVING



- **Hardware and Software → Large-scale verification**
- **Languages specification and Computing proof obligations**



SYMBOLIC EXECUTION



IT LOOKS LIKE THAT ...




Figure 8: Example of symbolic execution for simple program



HOW IT WORKS

- **Create a process ($pc = 0$, $state = []$)**
- **Add the process (pc , $state$) to the domain system D**
- **while D not empty:**
 - **Remove process (pc , $state$) from system**
 - **Execute it until the next branching point**
 - **If both paths are feasible, add both to D**
 - **if just one is feasible, add the feasible path and the negation of the not feasible path to D**



KEEP IN MIND!

- **Symbols as arguments**
 - any feasible path
 - all Program states
- **Symbolic values also for memory allocations**
- **Path conditions**



APPLICATIONS



BUG HUNTING



- **Fuzzing**
- **Code verification**
- **Binary Analysis**



EXPLOITATION



- PoC
- AEG
- APG



MALWARE ANALYSIS



- **Obfuscation**
- **Compiler optimizations**
- **Crypto-analysis**



BINARY OBFUSCATION



TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN



- **Malware obfuscation**
- **Software property protection**



MALWARE DEOBFUSCATION



WHAT CAN POSSIBLY GO WRONG?




Compiler optimization

Packing

Various obfuscation techniques



OBFUSCATION TECHNIQUES




Garbage code

Unnecessary instructions

Opaque predicates



OBFUSCATION TECHNIQUES



FOR PACKERS' SAKE



UPX

NSIS

Self implemented



IMPLEMENTATION



CONTROL FLOW



All the J* instructions



DATA FLOW




MOV, ADD, SUB, MUL, DIV


OR, AND, XOR, CMP, TEST




API CALLS




RESULTS - DEMO




RESULTS - DEMO



RESULTS - DEMO



RESULTS - DEMO



LIMITATIONS



THEORETICAL

Rice's Theorem

Theorem

Let L be a subset of strings representing Turing machines, where


1. If M_1 and M_2 recognize the same language, then either $\langle M_1 \rangle, \langle M_2 \rangle \in L$ or $\langle M_1 \rangle, \langle M_2 \rangle \notin L$.

2. $\exists M_1, M_2$ s.t. $\langle M_1 \rangle \in L$ and $\langle M_2 \rangle \notin L$.

Then L is undecidable.



PRACTICAL




Remember...



CONCLUSION



LEARNINGS / TAKE AWAY



- Symbolic execution is a powerful tool while analysing malware
- SMT solvers can be used to simplify CFG and support analysts while reversing



WORK DONE:



- a binary garbage-code eliminator, a XOR search, some "cryptographic" algorithm breaker, a generic unpacker, a binary structure recognizer, a C++ class hierarchy reconstructor.



WORKING ON ...



- r2 integration,
- maybe IDA-Plugin.



QUESTIONS?



 [barbieAuglend](#)

 barbieAuglend@chaosdorf.de

More information and sources can be found in the
UB paper!

