VB2018 video: Triada: the past, the present and the (hopefully not existing) future

Posted by   Martijn Grooten on   Nov 13, 2018

From NotPetya to Shadowpad, supply chain attacks have become a serious and hard-to-fight security problem. One prominent type of supply chain attack involves the pre-installation of malware on (often) cheap Android devices.

At VB2018 in Montreal, Google researcher Łukasz Siewierski talked about one such case: that of the multi-purpose 'Triada' trojan. First discovered by Kaspersky Lab in 2016 and further analysed by Dr. Web a year later, Triada found itself pre-installed on many devices through various OEMs.

In his presentation, Łukasz looked at Triada's technical properties and at the evolution of the malware, before going on to describe a successful operation between Google and the OEMS that led to the removal of the malware from infected devices.

oem-outreach.jpg

We have uploaded the video of Łukasz's VB2018 presentation to our YouTube channel. Next month, he will be speaking on the same subject at Botconf in France.

 

 

 

twitter.png
fb.png
linkedin.png
hackernews.png
reddit.png

 

Latest posts:

VB2021 localhost videos available on YouTube

VB has made all VB2021 localhost presentations available on the VB YouTube channel, so you can now watch - and share - any part of the conference freely and without registration.

VB2021 localhost is over, but the content is still available to view!

VB2021 localhost - VB's second virtual conference - took place last week, but you can still watch all the presentations.

VB2021 localhost call for last-minute papers

The call for last-minute papers for VB2021 localhost is now open. Submit before 20 August to have your paper considered for one of the slots reserved for 'hot' research!

New article: Run your malicious VBA macros anywhere!

Kurt Natvig explains how he recompiled malicious VBA macro code to valid harmless Python 3.x code.

New article: Dissecting the design and vulnerabilities in AZORult C&C panels

In a new article, Aditya K Sood looks at the command-and-control (C&C) design of the AZORult malware, discussing his team's findings related to the C&C design and some security issues they identified.

We have placed cookies on your device in order to improve the functionality of this site, as outlined in our cookies policy. However, you may delete and block all cookies from this site and your use of the site will be unaffected. By continuing to browse this site, you are agreeing to Virus Bulletin's use of data as outlined in our privacy policy.